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This thesis explores the relationship between the capability approach to justice and liberal 
philosophy. I argue that the most compelling articulation of the capability approach—one 
given by Martha Nussbaum—suffers from an unattractive kind of inconsistency. On the one 
hand, Nussbaum is committed to formulating a robust account of a dignified human life 
which can give rise to a range of individual entitlements which ought to be guaranteed to all 
individuals. On the other hand, Nussbaum is committed to political liberalism which requires 
state institutions to uphold strict neutrality between a variety of reasonable conceptions of 
the good. Nussbaum’s first commitment results in the formulation of a list of ten central 
human capabilities. However, I argue that the content and justification of this list cannot be 
successfully established in a way that is consistent with Nussbaum’s second commitment.  
Therefore, in this thesis, I propose a novel capability approach: a two-step approach 
which consists of two principles arranged in lexical priority. First, governments have a moral 
obligation to secure individuals with a meta-capability of autonomy. That is to say, 
governments must provide the conditions which are conducive to individuals exercising a 
range of agentic competencies which are constitutive of autonomous judgement. Second, 
governments have a moral obligation to provide opportunities for individuals to exercise this 
meta-capability in six domains of well-being: health, politics, knowledge, relationships, self-
expression, and work. I argue that exercising autonomous choice in the pursuit of welfare is 
necessary for a good life, regardless of the specific choices individuals eventually make, and 
even if they choose to forgo some supposedly valuable choices altogether. 
My proposal has two striking features which set it apart from other articulations of the 
capability approach (most notably Nussbaum’s). First, my proposal is comprehensive in that 
it relies on a particular view about what is a valuable way of life. In my view, a way of life 
is valuable if it is pursued autonomously, that is to say, if it involves an individual (a) 
exercising a set of agentic competencies and (b) standing in appropriate relations with other 
people. And second, by virtue of being based in this particular comprehensive claim, my 
account of justice is anti-perfectionist. That is to say, my proposal does not aim to compel 
people to make valuable choices. Rather, it aims to equip people with the means to live the 
kind of life they find valuable and worth living.  
I then apply this capability approach to the domain of education, and I argue it can be 
useful in formulating an ambitious and transformative approach to education. In particular, 
I develop a program of civic education aimed at responding to the problems associated with 
disinformation and ‘post-truth’ trends in politics.  
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Introduction: What is the Capability Approach? 
The capability approach is an ambitious framework for thinking about justice which starts 
with a simple question: what are people capable of doing and being? In other words, what 
opportunities do they have to live a life of dignity and fulfilment, a life lived well? According 
to the capability approach, all questions concerning what justice demands can only ever be 
imperfect proxies for getting to what we are really interested in when we think about justice: 
how well are people able to live? 
It is a framework used across multiple fields and disciplines—such as philosophy, 
economics, development studies—to frame inquiries into human well-being and the moral 
entitlements which they give rise to. At the core of this framework are two normative claims: 
(1) “the freedom to achieve well-being is of primary moral importance, and (2) that [this 
freedom] is to be understood in terms of people’s capabilities, that is, their opportunities to 
do and to be what they have reason to value” (Robeyns, 2016). According to the capability 
approach, when we deliberate about the principles of justice, our primary concern should not 
be with the equal distribution of some key good, or with the level of utility or welfare that 
individuals can derive from this good. Instead, our primary commitment should be endowing 
people with abilities and opportunities to pursue well-being freely and in accordance with 
their values. 
The capability approach was pioneered by the economist and philosopher Amartya 
Sen who saw it as “an intellectual discipline that gives a central role to the evaluation of a 
person’s achievements and freedoms in terms of his or her actual ability to do the different 
things a person has reason to value doing or being” (Sen, 2009a, 16 cited in Robeyns, 2017). 
Sen proposed that the notion of capability be used as a metric (or ‘space’ in Sen’s 
terminology) for expressing “well-being freedom” (Sen, 1992: 40), or the freedom to pursue 
well-being. The term ‘capability’ thus refers to an individual’s real or effective1 freedom to 
“to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being” (Sen, 1993: 30), while the term 
‘functioning’ picks out the state or action itself. Sen argued that the freedom to achieve 
functionings was constitutive of a person’s being – choosing to pursue what is valuable to 
us is what make our lives distinctly human (e.g., Sen, 1992: 39). 
 
1 Sen uses the term ‘effective freedom’ to refer to conditions under which an action is possible either through 
one’s own endeavours or through the help of others. He gives the example of living in an epidemic-free 
environment, which requires a number of health policies to achieve. Individually, no one person is able (or 
free) to live in such an environment, but health policies, such as vaccinations, can give people effective 
freedom to do so (Sen, 1992: 65-9). 
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Sen proposed that we break down theories of justice into: (a) a criterion for making 
ethical evaluations, and (b) a space to which this criterion is applied. In Sen’s terms, the 
space of justice refers to a variable good, be it material resources, income, or primary social 
goods. The criterion refers to the norms that allow us to go from a judgment about individual 
welfare to a judgment about social welfare or, in other words, the principle for distributing 
the good in question (ibid, 25). Sen proposed that the space of justice should be understood 
in terms of individual capabilities rather than resources or utility. And the criterion ought to 
be one that gives way to “basic capability equality” (Sen, 1979: 218): a situation where 
everyone enjoys equal capabilities to achieve basic necessities, like being nourished and 
educated and so on. Moreover, all people are to be given equal consideration, regardless of 
the identity of the person in question (Sen, 1995: 19). 
However, this does not mean that justice ought to be concerned with equalising 
everyone’s abilities and talents, or compensating individuals for their lack of abilities in the 
style of luck-egalitarian approaches to justice (e.g., see Cohen, 1989). Rather, we should aim 
to bring all people above a specified threshold such that they enjoy a sufficient level of 
capabilities to live a good life. Capability theorists thus typically align themselves with 
sufficientarianism: the view that justice requires distribution to clear either a minimal 
threshold above which basic human needs are met, or a more maximal threshold where 
individuals are subjectively content (e.g., Huseby, 2010). According to sufficientarian 
accounts of justice, any further distribution above this level is either not necessary, or no 
longer strictly a consideration of justice (ibid.).  
According to Sen, other spaces of justice are inadequate. A focus on resources, for 
example, is arguably indifferent to the diversity that exists in people’s needs and natural 
abilities, including their ability to convert resources into utility or welfare. In the 1979 
Equality of What Tanner Lectures, Sen asks us to imagine two people with the exact same 
bundle of resources. One of them has a disability, so if we assess both of their well-being by 
focusing only on the bundle of resources at each person’s disposal, we will remain ignorant 
of two significant facts: that not only does the disabled person require additional resources 
to compensate for her disability, but she also has fewer resources available for pursuing other 
valuable ends. So, according to Sen, instead of looking at resources as the object of 
distribution, we ought to ask what people are able to do and to be with the resources at their 
disposal. 
People have disparate physical characteristics connected with disability, 
illness, age, or gender and these make their needs diverse (Sen, 2000: 70).  
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Sen also takes issue with utilitarian approaches to distributive justice, according to 
which we ought to distribute goods in such a way as to produce equal utility levels among 
different people, thereby correcting for their difference in natural ability to convert resources 
into utility. A utilitarian solution to the above example would, therefore, involve distributing 
a larger bundle of resources to the person with a disability so that she is able to derive from 
it a comparable amount of utility as the person without a disability. Sen argues this response 
is unsatisfactory, too since it ignores the possibility that the person with a disability may be 
a so-called utility monster and as such would be able to derive much more utility from a 
single resource than the other person in our example, whose desires, let us suppose, are 
notoriously difficult to satisfy. The upshot of a utilitarian analysis, according to Sen, would 
be that we would have to give more resources to the able-bodied person than the person with 
a disability (Sen, 1979). Of, course, this seems like the wrong conclusion to reach. According 
to Sen, the capability approach avoids both of these problems; it recognises the diversity of 
individuals’ needs and their circumstances and it focuses on their effective freedoms to 
achieve the things they want to achieve. 
We can understand a capability to consist of two components: internal ability or 
capacity on the one hand, and external freedoms and opportunities on the other. Together, 
these constitute a “combined capability” (Nussbaum, 2000: 84-5). Take the capability to ride 
a bicycle, for example. For someone to possess this capability, they would have to own a 
bicycle, or have access to one. This would not be sufficient for full capability, however, for 
she must also know how to cycle, and she has to live in a place in the world where cycling 
is not outlawed, and so on. When capability theorists talk about endowing individuals with 
capabilities, what they have in mind is this combined notion which contains provisions both 
internal and external to the agent.  
Save for some examples for illustrative purposes, Sen does not enumerate specific 
capabilities, or specific constituents of human well-being. Sen picks out nourishment, health, 
shelter, as well as more sophisticated functionings, such as enjoying valuable relationship 
and pursuing valuable goals as relevant examples (Sen, 1979). However, to commit to a 
fixed list of capabilities applicable to all contexts would, according to Sen, be to “deny the 
possibility of fruitful public participation on what should be included and why (Sen, 2004: 
77). For Sen, open and public dialogue and the associated political freedoms are themselves 
intrinsically valuable and “a crucial part of good lives for individuals as social beings” (Sen, 
1999a: 9). We thus cannot ‘freeze’ a list of capabilities for all societies for all time to come, 
irrespective of what the citizens come to understand and value (Sen, 2005: 336). For Sen, 
capabilities are thus not content-specific at the level of theory; their content will depend on 
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the particulars of the context and situation to which the approach is applied in practice, 
pending clearing a threshold of public deliberation. 
One of the most influential articulations of the capability approach has been given by 
Martha Nussbaum who set out to transform Sen’s framework into what she takes to be a 
“partial theory of justice” (Nussbaum, 2000: 12). Unlike Sen, Nussbaum opts to engage in a 
series of normative discussions about particular constituents of well-being by discerning “the 
central elements of truly human functionings” (ibid, 74). One of her most notable 
contributions is the formulation of an open-ended list of ten central human capabilities. 
These include life, bodily health, bodily integrity, and practical reason (see page 25 for the 
complete list). According to Nussbaum, all people around the world have a moral claim that 
these capabilities be secured and protected. This means that there is a corresponding duty on 
governments to guarantee them as a matter of constitutional importance (Nussbaum, 2011a: 
33-4). Nussbaum’s view does not allow trade-offs between capabilities. On her view, 
capabilities refer to heterogenous dimensions of well-being that cannot be collapsed into a 
unified scale of well-being, like a utilitarian analysis would allow. For this reason, 
deficiencies in one dimension of capability can never be compensated for by additional gains 
in another. 
[The capabilities] are all of central relevance to social justice . . . a society 
that neglects one of them to promote the others has shortchanged its citizens, 
and there is a failure of justice in the shortchanging (Nussbaum, 2003 cited 
in Nelson, 2008: 98) 
In this thesis, I will primarily focus on Nussbaum’s articulation of the capability 
approach since the problems I will go on to address find their origin Nussbaum’s work by 
virtue of her aspiration to transform the approach into a partial theory of justice. I also take 
Nussbaum’s approach to be more ambitious and, therefore, more worthy of critical scrutiny 
from a political morality point of view. Nussbaum argues compellingly for a range of basic 
entitlements that a reflections on a dignified human life can give rise to, and she addresses a 
number of urgent injustices that must be tackled around the world. 
In both Sen and Nussbaum’s articulations, the capability approach can be described as 
a liberal approach to distributive justice.2 One of the defining features of the capability 
approach is the claim that it is the freedom to achieve well-being, not the well-being in itself, 
 
2 Nussbaum makes such a claim explicitly in Women and Human Development (e.g., p.5), whereas Sen does 
not. However, it is clear from Sen’s claims that he intends the approach to be built around a liberal conception 
of society where free and equal people make binding decisions about their own lives. 
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that is fundamentally the concern of justice. This is motivated, for example, by Nussbaum’s 
claim that it is the free choice of pursuing an activity which makes that activity distinctly 
human (Nussbaum, 2000: 72). Indeed, this is why we speak of a capability approach, and 
not of a functioning approach, or an achievement approach. Moreover, the capability 
approach is committed to treating each individual as an equal. No-one’s capability matters 
more than someone else’s; the state could never advance the cause of justice by giving more 
opportunities to one group of individuals, while neglecting another. In this sense, the 
capability approach is firmly perched on the ‘egalitarian plateau’ that Will Kymlicka takes 
much of contemporary political theory to be characterised by (Kymlicka, 1990: 5). 
At a minimum, liberalism entails “the moral ideal of persons as free and equal, and of 
society as a fair system of cooperation” (Quong, 2011: 140). When we zoom in, however, 
we realise that the terrain of liberal philosophy is not so even; while liberal philosophers 
share a common normative core, they disagree with each other on a range of fundamental 
questions. 
One of these disagreements involves a distinction between conceptions of political 
morality and individual flourishing (or individual morality), the latter sometimes referred to 
as a comprehensive doctrine. Whereas conceptions of political morality regulate political 
action and “supply criteria for distinguishing the morally justified from the morally 
unjustified exercise of political power” (Wall, 1998: 12), individual conceptions of the good 
comprise the goals and activities that give meaning to people’s lives. While liberal 
philosophers would generally agree that people should be free to pursue whatever 
comprehensive doctrine they wish, so long as it is reasonable (i.e., not harmful or 
disrespectful toward others), they disagree about whether the state itself can be tied to some 
comprehensive doctrine. Political liberals argue that the liberal state should be based on a 
strictly political set of procedures and institutions characterised by liberal values such as 
freedom and equality (e.g., Rawls, 1993: 77-8). Liberal perfectionists, on the other hand, 
argue that liberal philosophy is best understood as being committed to promoting a range of 
objective values in people’s lives (e.g., Wall, 1998: 8)  
Political liberals defend their position by pointing out that, according to liberalism, for 
state power to be legitimate, it must be publicly justifiable to all its subjects, which, in a 
society with multiple and irreconcilably different moral and religious viewpoints, requires 
the state to remain neutral on matters of comprehensive value (Rawls, 1993). Under this 
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view, the liberal state upholds an agreement to disagree about matters of comprehensive 
value, sometimes referred to as a modus vivendi.3 
I will show in the coming chapters that when the capability approach is transformed 
from a tool for framing philosophical inquiry about justice into a theory of justice—like 
Nussbaum intends to—it becomes a fierce battleground for this debate about the legitimate 
role of value judgements. As the framework incorporates normative claims, advocates of the 
capability approach have to decide if these claims refer to political morality, or to a 
comprehensive doctrine, or if they refer to both. These decisions will, in turn, fundamentally 
change the capability approach and have far-reaching practical implications on policy which 
aims to champion people’s capabilities.  
Nussbaum has insisted that in her view, the capability approach is explicitly committed 
to political liberalism – the view of liberalism which maintains that the liberal state can only 
trade in claims of political morality, and as such, ought to remain neutral on contentious 
value judgements that reasonable citizens disagree about. However, in recent years, several 
philosophers have noted that there is an unmistakeable tension between this claim and the 
capability approach as Nussbaum defends it (e.g., Deneulin, 2002; Nelson, 2008; Terlazzo, 
2019). Sen held that capability “reflect a person’s freedom to choose between alternative 
lives ( . . . ) and its value need not derive from one particular comprehensive doctrine 
demanding one specific way of living” (Sen 1999b: 118). In Nussbaum’s interpretation of 
the approach, however, there seem to be several assumptions about the objective value of 
some ways of life which appear to be comprehensive inasmuch as they contain specific 
judgements about the value of certain functionings. 
I begin the thesis by exploring this normative tension. I argue that it leads to an 
unattractive kind of inconsistency. Namely, I argue that the content and justification of 
Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities cannot be successfully defended in a way that is 
consistent with Nussbaum’s commitment toward political liberalism. I argue that this 
inconsistency warrants a fundamental rethink of the capability approach which is informed 
by recent developments in liberal theory. 
This thesis has three parts, and each part is made up of two chapters. 
In Part 1, I critically examine the justification and content of Nussbaum’s capability 
approach, and I argue that an advocate of this approach faces an apparent dilemma. Namely, 
if the capability approach is to be more than just a metric for interpersonal comparisons of 
welfare, it looks like it has to take a stand on controversial, substantive ethical disputes. 
 
3 Literally translated from Latin as ‘mode of life’, but it is used to refer to a particular type of arrangement 




However, if it does that, it cannot remain politically liberal in the way Nussbaum intends her 
approach to be. But if it does not take a stand, it is much less likely to reach its goal of 
enabling individuals to overcome various forms of incapability. In Chapter 1, I lay the 
groundwork for understanding this normative tension and what causes it. In Chapter 2, I 
argue for two solutions to rescuing the approach from this problem. I find both of these 
solutions to be ultimately unsuccessful. Either the capability embraces a principle of 
neutrality in earnest by restricting the concept of capability, thereby risking that some 
obstacles to capabilities go on unchallenged, or it can embrace perfectionism, thereby 
greenlighting an intrusive and paternalistic approach to justice.  
In Part 2, I argue that this dilemma can be resisted by recognising a novel interpretation 
of liberal theory. In Chapter 3, I argue that the capability approach ought to realign itself 
with comprehensive anti-perfectionism – a hybrid position which takes liberalism to be 
based on a comprehensive doctrine which simultaneously rules out promoting objective 
moral value in people’s lives. I argue that this realignment provides an elegant way of 
resolving competing strands in Nussbaum’s capability approach and, I will argue that it also 
has attractive practical implications for responding to real world injustices. 
The value that I argue fundamentally underlies this approach to justice is personal 
autonomy: the ideal of individuals leading their lives according to their own values. I argue 
that insofar as the reader has reason to accept that justice should concern itself with the 
capabilities of persons, the reader must also recognise that this ties her to the idea that 
personal autonomy is foundationally valuable. In particular, I endorse a socially relational 
conception of autonomy, according to which, autonomy is causally dependent on individuals 
standing in particular types of relations with other people. I show that understanding 
autonomy this way can help the capability approach to identify and respond to real-world 
injustices which come about because of the internalisation of unjust social norms.  
If Nussbaum’s contribution to the capability approach consisted in turning it from a 
conceptual framework into a partial theory of justice, then my contribution in this thesis will 
be to propose a full or comprehensive theory of justice with the foundational value of 
autonomy at its core. In Chapter 4, I provide a statement of this comprehensive capability 
approach and I defend it from three significant objections: that it involves subordinating or 
disrespecting some people, that it is incoherent, and that it is unstable. I argue that all three 
objections are mistaken.  
In Part 3, I show that my capability account of justice has significant implications on 
practical policy. I apply my approach to education policy, and I argue that capabilities can 
be used as a guide for formulating an ambitious and transformative education policy which 
furthers the aims of justice. In Chapter 5, I develop a sketch of how an autonomy-minded 
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capability approach can be used to empower individuals and to challenge unjust social norms. 
In Chapter 6, I apply these claims to the realm of political participation and formulate a 
capability approach to civic education. I argue that understanding political participation 
through capabilities allows us to see exciting ways for containing the negative effects of 





















Chapter 1: Neutrality, Perfectionism, and the Normative 
Justification of the Capability Approach 
Before I can articulate my critique of the capability approach, I must first explain the 
tripartite relationship between neutrality, perfectionism, and the normative justification of 
the capability approach – a relationship which will serve as the guiding framework for the 
remainder of this thesis. The aim of this chapter is to identify a particular kind of tension 
between the way the capability approach is justified and the kinds of substantive claims 
about individual well-being it wishes to defend. In particular, I argue that the Nussbaum’s 
articulation of the capability approach is not as liberally neutral as she intends it to be. 
Namely, contestable value claims play a role in both the justification and the content of 
Nussbaum’s articulation of the capability approach to justice. 
In Section 1, I explain the principle of neutrality and establish it as a relevant standard 
by which to assess Nussbaum’s capability approach. In Section 2, I introduce and explain 
the position of liberal perfectionism. In Section 3, I reconstruct Nussbaum’s justification for 
her capability theory and break it down to its constituent parts. In Section 4, I demonstrate 
the ways in which Nussbaum’ normative justification of the capability approach is not 
neutral with regard to competing conceptions of the good. Finally, in Section 5, I 
demonstrate the significant implications of my claims for the capability approach in general, 
and for the rest of this thesis in particular. 
 
1. Political Liberalism and Neutrality 
As we saw in the introduction, liberal philosophers disagree with one another about the 
specific role that value claims ought to play in organising and justifying liberal institutions. 
Political liberals conceive of the state as playing the role of an impartial arbiter. While 
different people may disagree about matters of value, the state’s main function is to provide 
a fair arena in which everyone can co-operate despite their disagreements. To co-operate 
successfully, citizens of the state must agree to be governed by a set of rules. One of these 
rules, according to political liberals, is neutrality. 
The principle of neutrality aims to limit state power in order to prevent the state from 
favouring, or actively promoting, the reasonable conceptions of the good of some citizens. 
Citizens of free states, such as contemporary democracies, subscribe to a diverse array of 
metaphysical, moral, and religious beliefs which comprise their various plans of life. 
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According to proponents of the principle of neutrality, the state would be doing something 
wrong if it were to elevate some conceptions as objectively better, or more worthwhile, or if 
it were to denigrate some conceptions and close off people’s access to realising them. For 
example, the liberal state would be acting unjustly if it were to endorse Swedish Lutheranism 
as the only true religion or hillwalking as the most virtuous pastime. People who do not share 
these values would, in effect, be treated worse by the state; they would be disrespected.  
This is because making such proclamations would run counter to the quintessential 
liberal values of equality and freedom. For example, Ronald Dworkin argues that promoting 
some conception of the good over others would signal that the “government does not treat 
[people] as equals” (Dworkin, 1978: 191) since it would be enhancing the opportunities 
available to citizens in a selective and discriminatory way. Drawing on Locke’s Second 
Treatise of Government, Gerald Gaus argues that neutrality is a matter of respecting 
individual freedom. Freedom requires living in ways that accord with one’s standards of 
value; “At a minimum, to conceive of oneself as a morally free person is to see oneself as 
bound only by moral requirements that can be validated from one’s own point of view” 
(Gaus, 2009: 84). Neutrality is a matter of respect for persons, their distinguishing feature 
being “that they are beings capable of thinking and acting on the basis of reasons” (Larmore, 
1996: 137). Respecting an individual means respecting her capacity to respond to reasons 
and to make free choices about what kinds of reasons to act on. 
The principle of neutrality has been central to the writings of countless liberal 
philosophers. It has been referred to as the “the central ideal of the modern liberal state 
(Larmore, 1987: 42), while for Dworkin a principle of equality that relied extensively on 
neutrality was the “nerve of liberalism” (Dworkin, 1977: 273). 
Perhaps the most influential account of liberal neutrality has been given by John Rawls. 
In Political Liberalism (1993), Rawls set out to deal with two fundamental challenges posed 
by pluralist societies: legitimacy and stability. Namely, how can people who hold conflicting 
world views be legitimately bound by the same laws, and why are citizens expected to obey 
laws that may not align with their values? Rawls’ response to the first challenge was to argue 
that power ought to be exercised in accordance with a political conception of justice – a 
“freestanding view” (Rawls, 1993: 12), the content of which is “expressed in terms of certain 
fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society” 
(ibid, 13). Such a conception of justice would be coupled with a “criterion of reciprocity” 
which states that “our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe 
that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens 
as a justification of those actions” (ibid, xlvi). This criterion effectively requires neutrality, 
for the only way we may expect citizens to share reasons for political action would be if 
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those reasons were free of contentious philosophical, religious, or ethical claims. According 
to Rawls’ view, neutrality thus ensures that the state is acting legitimately by not favouring 
the comprehensive views of some of its citizens. 
The principle of neutrality appears, on the face of it, clear and attractive. Two 
immediate questions should be addressed, however, that may complicate things. How should 
neutrality deal with illiberal or outright harmful conceptions of the good, and how should 
neutrality be realised in practice? 
If judgments on Swedish Lutheranism and hillwalking are off limits to the state, how 
should a liberal government treat conceptions of the good that are significantly more 
controversial? Suppose Colette grew up in a neo-Nazi household and was taught that there 
is an objective race hierarchy. Later in life, Colette makes it her goal to campaign for political 
and economic power to be stripped from ethnic minorities. Suppose further that Colette 
freely endorses these ideas – she is neither coerced nor manipulated into believing them; 
racist ideas ring true to her because of her upbringing. Does Colette have a legitimate claim 
against her government when they ban his political party from appearing on local election 
ballots, or when members of her government appear on television denouncing and ridiculing 
the ideas that Colette sincerely believes in?4 
Emphatically, no. Political liberals do not stand by neutrality with regard to every 
conceivable conception of the good. Neutrality should only extend to those ideas that are 
considered reasonable. How reasonability ought to be defined and, in turn, the role it plays 
in liberal thinking is a matter of much philosophical debate.5 For example, Rawls proposed 
that reasonable people are those who seek “a social world in which they, as free and equal, 
can cooperate with others on terms all can accept” (Rawls, 1996: 60). Since Nazi ideas are 
antithetical to freedom and equality and they imply terms that are unlikely to command 
universal assent (not least since bringing them to fruition would involve enforcing selective 
violence), political liberals need not tolerate them. 
This suggests that we should not think of neutrality as neutral itself, for if it were, it 
would run the risk of becoming a self-defeating principle. For example, Thomas Nagel’s 
early critique of Rawls’ original position was that it seemed to presuppose a liberal and 
individualistic conception of the good despite being restricted by a supposedly neutral 
conception of neutrality (Nagel, 1973: 228-9). However, Rawls’ original position need not 
be bound by the principle of neutrality that it suggests in practice. 
 
4 This point is adjacent to, but not dependent upon discussions about freedom of speech, and whether or not 
freedom of speech ought to include the freedom to utter hate speech, harmful speech, or illiberal speech. I 
do not take up this discussion here. 




One way to understand why, and to make sense of the substantive content behind the 
idea of neutrality is to follow Jonathan Quong in distinguishing between two ways in which 
value pluralism could be accommodated by liberal theory. We can see pluralism as either an 
internal condition of liberalism, or an external one. Pluralism being a condition external to 
liberalism means that the procedures of a just liberal state can be justifiable to a diverse 
population, some of whom may endorse illiberal views. Alternatively, treating pluralism as 
internal to the liberal state means that these procedures ought to be justifiable only to 
reasonable individuals who already happen to agree on some minimally liberal platitudes 
about the value of equality and individual freedom (Quong, 2011: 139-44). Quong endorses 
the latter view, the upshot of which is that the presence of views antithetical to liberalism 
does not pose a justificatory problem for liberal philosophers. This is because the liberal 
framework comes with a set of normative claims. Accommodating the views of those 
individuals who disagree with these claims ought not to be the goal of liberalism. This means 
that neutrality can be defended as a value that is downstream from other, more fundamental 
liberal values, like equality and freedom. The liberal state, therefore, does not need to be 
neutral all the way down. 
The second question can be put like this: what is the rightful object of liberal neutrality? 
That is to say, what is it specifically that we must be neutral about? There are several answers 
available in the literature. 
Neutrality of effect is perhaps the most obvious answer. According to this conception, 
neutrality becomes a consequentialist notion; it obtains if a law has no causal effect of 
promoting or subsidising the cost of some conceptions of the good. This view runs into 
immediate difficulty, however, since almost every policy with far-ranging causal effects will 
invariably affect the availability and realizability of some conception of the good in the 
future. For example, labour laws and social welfare provisions will make it easier to live 
lives that require an element of leisure, licensing laws and excise tax will make it harder to 
live lives that involve consciousness-altering substances, and so on. This will, no doubt, have 
different implications on the cost of various conceptions of the good down the line (e.g., 
Patten, 2012: 256-7). This implication hardly seems problematic from the liberal’s point of 
view.  
Perhaps instead we ought to think of neutrality of effect in a comparative way. In this 
case, a policy that subsidises a lifestyle may nonetheless be neutral so long as it does so 
even-handedly with regard to all lifestyles. For example, if a proposed policy would lower 
the price of all plans of life by an equal amount, then according to a comparative neutrality 
principle, such a policy may still be neutral in effect, even if it is effectively altering the 
realizability of some conceptions of the good. However, in this case there would be difficulty 
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in establishing a baseline relative to which we could assess whether a given policy has been 
even-handed with regard to competing notions of the good (Waldron, 1993: 149-50). Both 
of these problems make neutrality of effect much too difficult to achieve in practice, even if 
it could be possible in some specific circumstances. For similar reasons, Matthew Kramer 
calls this interpretation of the neutrality principle a “disastrous non-starter” (Kramer, 2017: 
13). 
Neutrality of justification may fare better. According to this conception, the state acts 
in a neutral way if it does not intend to promote a particular conception of the good in some 
way, or if it does not seek to justify a particular law by appealing to the truth of a particular 
conception of the good (Wall and Klosko, 2003: 8). There is a broad consensus among 
philosophers that this is generally the right way to understand neutrality (e.g., Rawls, 1999: 
457-65; Sher, 1999: 3-5; Quong, 2011: 18). According to this way of understanding 
neutrality, laws must be justifiable to all reasonable individuals who already share a minimal 
acceptance of liberal values, such as freedom and equality. Justificatory neutrality of this 
sort places a realistic constraint on the state (unlike neutrality of effect), and it is consistent 
with the reasoning behind the principle of neutrality itself, namely that laws ought to be 
justifiable to everyone in a pluralist democracy. So, if a particular policy has a partisan 
justification which would not be acceptable to all reasonable people, then this policy cannot 
be legitimately passed. The political liberal would object to it on the basis that it favours 
some citizens’ conception of the good over others. .  
As we saw in the introduction, the capability approach is considered a liberal approach 
to justice; it affords equality of consideration to all people, and it aspires to empower 
individuals by securing them with a range of effective freedoms so that they could pursue 
their own well-being in ways of their choosing. In particular, Nussbaum is committed to the 
principle of neutrality not just through her self-described alliance with Rawls’ political 
liberalism, but supposedly through the internal logic of her capability framework, too.  
For Nussbaum, neutrality is intended to safeguard individual choice given the 
condition of value pluralism in a society. Nussbaum follows Rawls in arguing that neutrality 
is necessary for political systems to be stable, and for them to afford sufficient respect to its 
subjects. Like Rawls, Nussbaum holds that a theory of justice which conflicts with people’s 
deepest convictions will not result in a stable allegiance to the state (Nussbaum, 2006: 299). 
Nussbaum contends that even if we could achieve stability with such a theory of justice, the 
state would be nonetheless relegating some individuals to second-class citizenship by 
forcing them to accept claims that they may want to reject (ibid, 296-298). For these reasons, 
Nussbaum argues that the capability approach ought not to be tied to any comprehensive 
claims about the good. 
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More specifically, Nussbaum takes her capability approach to provide “a partial, not a 
comprehensive, conception of the good life, a moral conception selected for political 
purposes only” (Nussbaum, 2000: 74). This conception of the good life is partial insofar as 
it provides a basis for political cooperation—a basis characterised by equality, freedom, and 
dignity—but it remains agnostic and neutral about what is good for individuals in their own 
lives. For Nussbaum, capabilities thus refer to opportunities to be and to do what people have 
reason to be and to do. Nussbaum stresses that it is rational for people to want access to 
capabilities regardless to what end they choose to exercise them for (ibid, 88-9). 
 
2. Liberal Perfectionism 
The principle of neutrality is not endorsed by all liberals. Some philosophers have explicitly 
rejected it and have argued that it is either incoherent or unattractive for shaping liberal 
institutions. Those who take this view tend to endorse a comprehensive or perfectionist view 
of liberalism. A comprehensive view of liberalism holds that liberal philosophy must reflect 
our best understanding of what gives value to people’s lives. A perfectionist view of 
liberalism holds that liberal institutions ought to be arranged in such a way to actively 
promote value and human flourishing (e.g., Quong, 2010: 12). 6 
Liberal perfectionism is a combination of two views: liberalism, the view that political 
institutions ought to be primarily concerned with upholding individual freedom and equality, 
and perfectionism – the view that there is a particular objective theory of the good. 
Throughout the history of moral philosophy, there have been numerous perfectionist theories. 
For example, one of the most well-known examples was articulated by Aristotle who argued 
that it is our natural function to exercise practical reason, and the best human life was one 
that exercised this capacity in line with a set of practical virtues (Hurka, 1993: 37). In this 
combination of views, liberalism sets the boundaries of what kind of perfectionism can be 
acceptable, as well as what kind of means perfectionist ends could be pursued by. As a result, 
liberal perfectionists tend to advocate for values like freedom and autonomy, which they 
argue offer the most cogent expression of liberal philosophy, and they do so by non-coercive 
means (e.g., Raz, 1986; Wall, 1998). 
Unlike political liberals, liberal perfectionists endorse “ideals claiming to shape our 
overall conception of the good life, and not just our role as citizens” (Larmore, 1996: 122). 
 
6Not all comprehensive conceptions of liberalism are perfectionist, and not all perfectionist conceptions are 
comprehensive. In Chapter 3, I talk about the interesting ways in which these dimensions of liberalism can 
come apart.  
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Political morality refers to rules and principles that inform political action and terms of 
cooperation, whereas our individual morality is expressed in a conception of the good – a 
set of claims about what we have reason to value and how we wish to guide our lives in order 
to reflect these values. According to perfectionism, “certain properties constitute human 
nature – they make humans humans, and the good life develops these properties to a high 
degree or realizes what is central to human nature” (Hurka, 1993: 3). Perfectionists trade in 
normative claims that are “independent of any subjectivity” (Deneulin, 2002: 498), for the 
claims need not be endorsed by individuals for them to reflect our best understanding of 
human flourishing. 
So, unlike political liberals, perfectionists do not hold the foundational normative view 
that the realm of individual morality is off limits to political actors. As such, they argue, for 
example, like Steven Wall does, that “political authorities should take an active role in 
creating and maintaining social conditions that best enable their subjects to lead valuable 
and worthwhile lives” (Wall, 1998: 8). According to Wall, the goals of liberalism are, in fact, 
better served by perfectionist means than they are under the restraints of a principle of 
neutrality. I living under conditions of freedom is indeed valuable, then why shouldn’t the 
state take an active interest in ensuring that its citizens have a robust standard of freedom?  
In the previous section, we saw that the principle of neutrality was developed as a 
response to the condition of value pluralism. If people disagree with each other on a number 
of normative issues, then the state must emphatically separate political morality from 
contested claims about the good as a matter of principle. Wall argues that perfectionists can 
reject this reasoning in one of two ways. They can either argue that all plausible conceptions 
of political morality are in some important sense informed by claims about the good, even if 
its proponents do not wish to admit it. Alternatively, they can concede this to be false, but 
argue that extricating the two “results in impoverished conceptions of political morality” 
(ibid, 13). That is to say, for liberalism to have adequate normative content in the first place, 
it cannot be neutral with regard to individual flourishing, or perhaps it never has been in the 
first place.  
Neither of these moves, however, does much to disarm Rawls’ worry that without a 
system of restraint between competing conceptions of the good our political systems risks 
being unstable and illegitimate. So how can liberal perfectionists ensure that if the state 
endorses some claims about the good, it will not lead to exercises of power which would be 
unacceptable to swathes of the population? 
Joseph Raz (1986) argues that descriptive pluralism is consistent with perfectionism 
because perfectionism is based on value pluralism: the view that there are numerous and 
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incommensurable ways of living a good life that cannot be simultaneously realised.7 Raz 
argues that the liberal perfectionist state need not be based on a singular idea of the good 
and, as such, it need not be dictatorial about the good. For example, if I set up a perfectionist 
state with the intention of promoting, say, religious devotion as its singular goal, it would be 
easy to see how such a state would fail to be liberal. My state would invariably have to resort 
to coercion in order to marshal my entire population into a suitable religious way of life.  
Raz’s liberal perfectionism, on the other hand, explicitly rules out not only value 
singularism, but also pursuing perfectionist ends through coercive or manipulative means. 
Coercion is self-evidently incompatible with taking freedom seriously, while manipulation 
consists in “perverting the way a person reaches decisions” (Raz, 1986: 378) which amounts 
to an invasion of her autonomy. Raz thus endorses ‘soft’ perfectionism which consists of 
advertising, subsidising, and encouraging valuable options for citizens on the one hand, and 
taxing and discouraging bad or worthless options. 
For Raz, not only is perfectionism not inconsistent with the parameters of liberalism, 
the two are mutually complementary. Raz’s perfectionism is founded on the value of 
personal autonomy: an individual’s capacity for self government, or self-authorship through 
a series of decisions about one’s life (ibid, 369). Raz argues that autonomy requires a robust 
range of options from which we can choose our ends. If the state is concerned with upholding 
autonomy, then it must do more than to stand back and refrain from interfering with 
individual choices. According to Raz, a concern for autonomy “permits and even requires 
governments to create morally valuable opportunities, and to eliminate repugnant ones” (ibid, 
417). 
If political liberalism turns out to be ultimately unsuitable for, or inconsistent with, the 
capability approach, then perhaps liberal perfectionism may provide a plausible alternative. 
On the face of it, perfectionism appears to bear a noteworthy resemblance to the way 
Nussbaum reasons about the good. For example, Nussbaum proposes a list of objectively 
valuable capabilities which cover a broad range of domains of individual life. On the face of 
it, this resembles a partial conception of individual flourishing (or perhaps more so than it 
resembles a list of precepts of political morality). Moreover, Nussbaum’s claim that 
capabilities are heterogeneous and multiply realisable seems to echo Raz’s value pluralism. 
This reading might be surprising given that Nussbaum has explicitly rejected liberal 
perfectionism by arguing that it entails a kind of subordination of some individuals who are 
seen not to embrace the notion of good peddled by the state (Nussbaum, 2011b: 35). But, as 
 
7 Value pluralism is a normative claim—a claim about what is valuable—whereas descriptive pluralism (or 
sometimes simply pluralism) is a descriptive claim, a claim about what actual people value as a matter of fact.  
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I will argue in the coming sections, Nussbaum’s claims against perfectionism may be 
inconsistent with both the justification and the practical implications of her own capability 
framework. The primary goal of this short section, however, was to outline the basic tenets 
of liberal perfectionism and to introduce this as a possible interpretation of liberalism that 
the capability approach may align itself with. 
 
3. Capabilities and Justification 
The claims that make up Nussbaum’s capability approach, along with their justification, 
have evolved substantially over the decades. In early writing on this topic, Nussbaum argues 
that an Aristotle-inspired human essentialism can help us develop a universal account of 
human dignity which can be expressed as a set of capabilities which can be promoted by 
states (Nussbaum, 1988; 1992). Later, she argues that this minimal account of human dignity 
can be pitched as a politically neutral proposal, one that would be accepted from a range of 
reasonable standpoints about ethical matters, despite specific disagreements individuals may 
have about what they themselves value (Nussbaum, 2000). Even more recently, Nussbaum 
refines this method of justification by arguing that her account of human dignity can be 
established with a contractualist argument (Nussbaum, 2006). The most recent formulation 
of the approach (as found in Nussbaum, 2000 and 2006) has four distinct lines of justification.  
First, Nussbaum employs a reflective equilibrium as a way of achieving a fit between 
a set of guiding intuitions and the propositions intended to constitute the list of capabilities. 
Nussbaum likens this approach to a Socratic dialogue – whereby a capability is proposed, 
and subsequently challenged and “tested against the most secure of our intuitions” (ibid, 
2000: 77) and is either refined or scrapped. Intuitive judgments play a significant role in 
Nussbaum’s work, with the overall concept of capabilities themselves resting on the intuitive 
claim that agency and dignity have foundational moral value (ibid, 5). 
Second, Nussbaum argues that the account of capabilities proposed this way could 
then be defended as an object of an overlapping consensus. Rawls defined an overlapping 
consensus as a core set of precepts of political morality that all individuals may endorse from 
their own standpoint, despite each subscribing to their own comprehensive doctrine (Rawls, 
1993: 385-95). A list of central capabilities defended this way is meant to pick out 
capabilities that all reasonable people would be expected to endorse and want access to 
despite the specifics of their own life plans. It is important to note that there need not be 
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imminent agreement on a particular version of the list of capabilities, it is enough to claim 
that a proposed list can be converged on either hypothetically or given enough time.8 
Nussbaum reflects on her work as having “some convergences with contractarianism 
of Scanlon’s ethical type, but also some very striking departures, and even more striking 
departures from the Rawlsian form of political contractarianism” (Nussbaum, 2006: 156). 
The convergence is most clearly seen in her endorsement of the overlapping consensus. The 
departures she goes on to mention include the view that human beings have benevolent 
motivations toward one another, and are “held together by many altruistic ties as well as by 
ties of mutual advantage” (ibid, 158). Nussbaum thus believes that the political community 
is brought into being not just for the pessimistic reason that the hypothetical life outside the 
community is nasty and short, but also for the more optimistic reason that people care about 
one another and have shared ends, and therefore are able to flourish under social and political 
ties.  
Third, Nussbaum appeals to what she calls a ‘Non-Platonist substantive-good 
approach’. This produces an instance of an objective-list theory of the good. Theories of this 
kind treat moral goods to be attitude-independent. Namely, what counts as valuable is not a 
matter of an individual’s endorsement or valuation, but rather a matter of it satisfying certain 
objective criteria (Fletcher, 2016: 148-9). Nussbaum emphasises hers to be a non-Platonist 
approach since its goal is coherence between people’s beliefs and values, rather than a fit 
with an independent platonic moral reality. Nonetheless, the content is intended to be 
“universalist” (e.g., Nussbaum, 2000: 6). Nussbaum argues that a subjective notion of the 
good is unsuitable for theorising about injustice because of “the many ways in which habit, 
fear, low expectations, and unjust background conditions deform people’s choices and even 
their wishes for their own lives” (ibid, 114). For example, a victim of oppression or 
disadvantage may end up altering her preferences in order to make peace with her situation. 
In such cases, persons may not report having any unmet desires. For this reason, Nussbaum 
argues that desires and preferences are “basically not relevant, given our knowledge of how 
unreliable [they] are as a guide to what is really just and good” (ibid, 117). Instead, 
Nussbaum builds into her theory a substantive commitment to the values of dignity, agency, 
and equality, with which we can challenge oppression and disadvantage. 
Fourth and finally, Nussbaum mentions informed desires. As a liberal, Nussbaum is 
keenly aware of the unpalatable implications that a disregard for individual preferences may 
invite, so she retains the role of desire, but only in an “ancillary” or “heuristic” role (ibid, 
 
8 This is consistent with how Rawls conceives of an overlapping consensus in his work, i.e., the possibility of 
an overlapping consensus is an indicator of stability for the right reasons, not the sociological fact of the 
consensus obtaining as a matter of fact (Rawls, 1993: 390). 
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119). In this role, individual desires are qualified by an ideal information clause. Since 
Nussbaum finds a simple desire approach to be unreliable for grounding principles of justice, 
she attempts to delineate a space where desires play a (limited) role, namely, under idealised 
conditions. How this ancillary strategy relates to the three above is somewhat unclear, but 
Nussbaum claims that in justifying a political conception of justice, we ought to “consult not 
all actual desires, but only some of them, desires formed under appropriate conditions; and 
even then we do not let desires have the last word” (ibid, 160). As Alison Jaggar notes,  
[Nussbaum] finesses this problem [of disregarding individual desires] by 
asserting her willingness to take account of everyone’s desires in the long 
run. Once the capabilities have been protected for several generations, 
Nussbaum thinks that the likelihood of people’s desires being corrupt or 
mistaken will be much reduced (Jaggar, 2006: 309-10).  
The indifference toward individuals’ self-reported preferences is thus a necessary, if a 
prima facie problematic, step for meaningful progress in the long run. 
With the different lines of justification converging, the resulting index of central 
human capabilities that Nussbaum proposes is reproduced here from Women and Human 
Development: 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one’s life is so reduced as to be not worth living. 
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to 
be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter. 
3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one’s 
bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e., being able to be secure against assault, 
including sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having 
opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction. 
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, 
and reason – and to do these things in a “truly human” way, a way informed and 
cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy 
and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and 
thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-expressive works and 
events of one’s own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to 
use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with 
respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. 
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Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way. Being able 
to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain. 
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; 
to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence, in general, to love, 
to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one’s 
emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic 
events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of 
human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.) 
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life. (This entails protection for the 
liberty of conscience.) 
7. Affiliation. A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show 
concern for other human beings, to engage in various form of social interaction; to 
be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; 
to have the capability for both justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability 
means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, 
and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech. B. Having the 
social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, 
protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, 
religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin. In work, being able to work as a human 
being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of 
mutual recognition with other workers. 
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature. 
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Control over One’s Environment. A. Political. Being able to participate 
effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political 
participation, protections of free speech and association. B. Material. Being able to 
hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally, but in terms of real 
opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the 
right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from 




4. Capabilities and Justification II 
Nussbaum conceives of her capability framework as normatively thin in the sense that it is 
intended to refer to a set of claims about political morality only, rather than to comprehensive 
claims about what makes individuals’ lives more or less valuable. This entitles Nussbaum to 
claim that her index of capabilities is neutral with regard to competing conceptions of the 
good. In this section, I will argue that this claim does not follow. I will argue that the 
normative specificity of Nussbaum’s capabilities, alongside the way they are justified, makes 
it incompatible with a principle of liberal neutrality.  
I take it that there are two independent levels at which contentious value judgements 
could play a role in Nussbaum’s capability framework. These levels correspond to the 
following two questions Quong (2010) asks about liberal theory in order to introduce a useful 
taxonomy of liberal positions: 
1. Must liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ideal of what 
constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical 
beliefs? 
2. Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, 
ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, 
or on the basis of other metaphysical claims? (italics mine) (Quong, 2010: 
12) 9 
The first question concerns whether a proposal is comprehensive, and the second 
concerns whether it is perfectionist. In this section, I show that contestable value judgements 
play a role at both levels of Nussbaum’s capability approach. This may not provide us with 
sufficient reason to christen Nussbaum a closet comprehensive liberal, or a closet 
perfectionist, but it should provide the reader with reason to reconsider Nussbaum’s claim 
that her capability framework is a straightforward expression of political morality only. At 
best, there is an unmistakable normative tension between the way that Nussbaum wishes to 
defend her partial theory of justice, and the particular claims that make it up. At worst, the 
way she justifies her approach is inconsistent with its content. 
  
 
9 We will come back to this taxonomy and consider it in greater detail in Chapter 3. 
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4.1. Are the Capabilities Comprehensive? 
 
I argue that the way Nussbaum establishes the central capabilities is primarily by appealing 
to the supposed truth of objective value judgements. Nussbaum’s contractualist argument in 
favour of the capabilities claims that universal agreement on her claims is imminent (or, on 
a weaker reading, possible). In this section, I demonstrate that her contractualist argument is 
a spare wheel. The bulk of the normative work of justifying the basic capabilities is done by 
free-standing judgements about the good. Moreover, I will show that these judgements can 
plausibly be rejected by some reasonable individuals, thereby denying Nussbaum the claim 
that her capability approach is justified in a neutral way. 
The way Nussbaum reasons about capabilities “begins with a conception of the dignity 
of the human being, and of a life that is worthy of that dignity” (Nussbaum, 2006: 74). I 
argue that this conception—which we saw proceeds with the use of purportedly objective 
value judgements—is primarily what justifies Nussbaum’s index of capabilities. A further 
speculative point is then made that the components of this framework would be acceptable 
to all reasonable individuals. But Nussbaum’s only reason for supposing that these intuitive 
goals would be endorsed in such a way appears itself to be intuitive – motivated by her belief 
that people, on the most part, have convergent intuitions about the good (e.g., Nussbaum, 
2000: 74). This kind of reasoning is not strong enough to establish constituents of political 
morality that we would expect universal convergence on. While the method of seeking a 
reflective equilibrium on intuitive judgements is extensively used across much of moral and 
political philosophy, this method of reasoning cannot be said to aspire to establishing 
universally binding claims. For the example, there is nothing to prevent multiple, mutually 
incompatible equilibria from coming about. In other words, different people may reach 
different conclusions, and aiming for a reflective equilibrium between intuitive judgements 
itself provides no way of adjudicating conflicts of judgement that may occur (see De Maagt, 
2017 for a discussion on the supposed universality of this reasoning method).  
Now, this need not pose an immediate problem for Nussbaum. It could be argued that 
some intuitions are so basic and straightforward that they do not need to be justified by 
further reference to anything else. For example, suppose I claim that murder is wrong. I 
would not need to say anything else in defence of a claim which relied on this intuition.  
The question to address then is whether the particular intuitions Nussbaum appeals to 
are so self-evident and uncontroversial to render them straightforwardly self-justifying. And 
it is not clear that this is the case for all of them. The intuitive value of agency and dignity—
the core intuitions that justify the notion of capabilities altogether —are perhaps best placed 
of all. Let us grant that Nussbaum is right about the universal convergence of these particular 
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values in human cultures across the world in a de dicto sense. However, different cultures 
will invariably understand these values differently de re, and so the particular claims derived 
from these intuitions may come into sharp conflict. Moreover, the intuitive value of creative 
expression, for example, may feature heavily in some lives, but we would hardly think of a 
person’s life as deficient in value if she were to spurn any kind of creative expression. 
Similarly, the free expression of various emotions may be intuitively self-evident to some 
individuals, but antithetical to the views of others, such as self-proclaimed stoics. For these 
reasons, I believe Nussbaum’s justification of her capabilities, as it stands, is insufficient to 
establish their universal, foundational value. 
The risk of this justification breaching the principle of neutrality should also then be 
readily apparent. If reasonable people naturally disagree with one another about the truth of 
various intuitions, then a justification of political morality which trades in such intuitions 
will likely fail to be neutral with regard to all conceptions of the good.  
In Frontiers of Justice, Nussbaum addresses a similar objection, which she imagines 
Rawls would make about her theory, namely that her view may have an “objectionably 
intuitionistic foundation” (Nussbaum, 2006: 173). She breaks it down to two claims (1) “that 
there is an unacceptable reliance on intuition in the generation of basic political principles, 
and (2) that the multivalued nature of the capabilities list makes inevitable a reliance on 
intuitionistic balancing that would make political principles indeterminate and never final” 
(ibid, 173-4).  
To (1), Nussbaum retorts that her reliance on intuitive judgements is nearly identical 
to that of Rawls’ theory, but that it is present in a different place in the argument. Whereas 
Rawls appeals to intuition (or “considered judgments” in his terminology) in the design of 
the Original Position, Nussbaum consults intuition in formulating the list of capabilities. 
Moreover, she argues that her theory avoids this supposed problem “insofar as it considers 
the account of entitlements not as derived from the ideas of dignity and respect but rather as 
ways of fleshing out those ideas” (italics mine, ibid, 174).  
Three things can be said about this retort. First, it is unclear how the distinction 
between deriving from and fleshing out an intuition avoids the charge that her theory relies 
too much on intuition. Deriving a moral claim from an intuition on the one hand and 
formulating a moral claim by fleshing out an intuition on the other, are descriptively distinct, 
but both types of argument share the assumption that the intuition is morally sound – which 
is what the objection is aimed at. It is because dignity or respect, or the value of tending to 
one’s environment, are intuitively valuable that Nussbaum goes on to flesh these ideas out, 
and it is precisely this reliance on intuitions that the objection is picking out.  
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Second, like I pointed out above, there may be multiple and incompatible ways that 
basic ideas like dignity, agency, or freedom could be fleshed out by different people in 
practice. This should give the reader enough reason to be doubtful of Nussbaum’s strategy, 
for if it possible that two mutually incompatible claims can be derived from a platitude like 
“Dignity is valuable”, then that should make it obvious that such claims cannot claim to hold 
universal assent just because the platitude could.  
Third, Nussbaum is being modest in her reply by only mentioning dignity and respect 
as the intuitive notions that inform her capability theory. They may be the most central ones 
insofar as they form the backbone of the very concept of capability, but as I have repeatedly 
shown in this section, the content of Nussbaum’s capability list refers to a larger number of 
intuitive judgements. The worry of Nussbaum’s overreliance on intuition is thus not 
dispelled by her remarks. 
Can Nussbaum’s justification of the capability approach, therefore, sustain its 
commitment to liberal neutrality? I argue that it cannot. The currency of intuitive value 
judgements is unreliable, even if the particular intuitions that these get fleshed out from could 
be argued to be universally sound in some sense (and even this is a big if). The imminent 
agreement on the precepts of political morality that Nussbaum envisions her justificatory 
argument to achieve is, therefore, unclear. 
Ian Carter has argued that “the capability approach supplies only a theory of the good, 
whereas liberalism imposes a priority of the right over the good” (Carter, 2014:76). This 
seems like an apt comment with which to end this discussion. Nussbaum’s reasoning about 
capabilities as constituents of well-being is compelling, and it succeeds at establishing a 
formidable free-standing framework which formulates a series of ethical entitlements out of 
a conception of human dignity. But while doing so, it seems to equate justice with goodness 
in a way that is not compatible with a politically liberal approach to justice. Political 
liberalism after all is a “second-order theory – an account of how first-order liberal 
protections should be justified” (Levine, 2012: 182), and it appears that Nussbaum’s 
theorising takes place in the first order, without a sufficiently plausible argument for how 
her conclusions could be justified as precepts of political morality. Of course, this may be a 
reason to think that Nussbaum’s alignment with political liberalism is unnecessary. Perhaps 
the approach need not consign itself to the realm of political morality only, in which case 
the principle of neutrality would be nothing but a handicap on justice, something that ought 
to be jettisoned off the capability approach as deadweight. I take up this idea briefly in 





4.2. Are the Capabilities Perfectionist? 
 
The second level at which value judgements could play a role in Nussbaum’s capability 
approach is at the level of policy output. If Nussbaum’s capability approach can be shown 
to deliberately promote some valuable ways of life, or to discourage worthless ones, then 
her capability approach would be an instance of perfectionism. Recall from Section 1 that 
political liberals like Nussbaum are committed to anti-perfectionism; they believe that the 
state ought not to be in the business of furthering claims about comprehensive morality.  
There are two ways in which Nussbaum’s proposal differs from bona fide 
perfectionism. First, Nussbaum’s proposal intends to establish a threshold level of 
capabilities, whereas perfectionists are typically committed to a maximisation strategy; they 
are interested in “[maximising] human excellence” (Rawls, 1971: 25), or maximising 
achievements in society (Kramer, 2017). Nussbaum argues that all items on her list of central 
capabilities are intended to be fundamentally important for a human life such that if 
thresholds of them were not satisfied, the life in question would be lacking in dignity. 
Perfectionists, on the other hand, are not primarily concerned with thresholds of this kind. 
For example, Hurka (1993) argues for an Aristotelian-inspired perfectionism which consists 
of maximising value across three dimensions: physical perfection, theoretical perfection, and 
practical perfection (Hurka, 1993: 37).  
Second, capabilities refer to opportunities (or effective freedoms) to live life in 
particular ways. Nussbaum holds that these opportunities are multiply realisable and that 
their content is not specific. The capability approach is, according to this claim, not a 
perfectionist approach to justice since it only intends to endow people with the means to 
achieve various functionings. Nussbaum adds that all reasonable will want these 
opportunities no matter their plans of life or conceptions of the good. This means that “one 
has hardly been harmed by having the chance to choose a life that [makes use of the 
capabilities]” (Nussbaum, 2000: 88-9) even if one ultimately chooses to forego some or all 
of them. Rutger Claassen (2014) calls this the ‘standard move’ in the capability literature. If 
the capability approach emphasises entitlements as capabilities, it can supposedly 
accommodate value pluralism and sidestep accusations of perfectionism and paternalism 
(Classen, 2014: 59). 
I argue that despite these immediate differences, Nussbaum’s capability approach 
nevertheless involves a measure of perfectionism, which makes it inconsistent with the 
principle of neutrality. Nussbaum’s capabilities are perfectionist because their value is 
established by reference to the value of the particular functionings that they are intended to 
secure. That is to say, it is an insufficient defence against perfectionism to pitch the 
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capabilities as freedoms if the freedoms in question are themselves ethically partisan and 
refer to content-specific functionings which have been deemed objectively valuable behind 
the scenes. The ‘standard move’ thus fails to be successful as a way of dispelling 
perfectionism. Carter (2014) argues for a similar claim when he writes that the notion of 
freedom in the capability approach is a content-dependent kind of freedom. Nussbaum’s 
capabilities are capabilities to do valuable things, such as to be healthy and to exercise one’s 
political power. In other words, these opportunities are valuable because the functionings 
they pick out have been assumed to be objectively valuable.  
The value of freedom therefore remains dependent upon its content – on what 
it is the freedom to do or become – and that content depends, in turn, on the 
specification of a set of ends worth realizing (Carter, 2014: 91).  
On the other hand, a content-non-dependent freedom would have value “independently 
of the nature of the specific things that it is the freedom to achieve (ibid, 92). Perhaps, this 
freedom could be formulated as series of rights of non-interference which would effectively 
guarantee individuals with a range of functionings over which they could make authoritative 
decisions about how to take up opportunities. However, it is clear that because of the value-
laden nature of the functionings in question, Nussbaum’s current list “hands down rulings 
on a vast array of questions in moral philosophy” (Nelson, 2008: 99) and, in turn, fails to be 
adequately neutral.   
Nussbaum holds that her list of central capabilities merely picks out opportunities for 
realising various conception of the good, but it must be pointed out that it does not do so 
even-handedly. Items on Nussbaum’s list are far too normatively specific to be pitched as 
all-purpose resources compatible with every reasonable conception of the good. For the 
capabilities to be pitched this way, they would have to be defined to pick out content non-
specific freedoms, or something entirely adjacent to conceptions of the good, like an index 
of primary social goods. I think it is clear that Nussbaum does not intend her approach to do 
either of those things. Rather, she intends to motivate a list of ways of being which she argues 
are objectively and universally valuable. And the reason why the freedom to achieve these 
things is valuable is because the things themselves are arguably valuable.  
The various ends worth realizing which Nussbaum speaks about are based on 
controversial claims about the good, and they consist in controversial claims about the good. 
In its current state, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is plainly a list of valuable things to do, 
rather than a list of valuable content-non-specific freedoms to have.  
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This way of defining the capabilities and establishing their value may not necessarily 
be a problem for Nussbaum. If the capabilities were to pick out only those freedoms which 
are, as a matter of fact, universally and uncontroversial valued, despite different conceptions 
of the good, then the capability approach need not be perfectionist in the way that I suggest. 
But, as I showed in the previous section, the claims that make up Nussbaum’s list of central 
capabilities are ethically partisan; they rely on particular judgements about what is valuable, 
and their value does not hinge on people’s actual endorsement of them. 
Moreover, the functionings picked out by Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities are 
not merely instrumentally valuable. They are valuable for their own sake as constituents of 
a good life. If a person is deprived by having her capability for bodily integrity or creative 
expression denied, she is not merely harmed by having her pursuit of her conception of the 
good frustrated. She has been “deprived of something good that is her due” (Kraut, 1999 
cited in Deneulin, 2002: 508). As such, it becomes clear that the entitlements that 
Nussbaum’s partial theory of justice picks out are part and parcel of a particular conception 
of a good life. Of course, this conception is not maximally specific in the style of bona fide 
perfectionist philosophers. The variety of lifestyles that Nussbaum’s style of perfectionism 
accommodates do not reflect a variety of conceptions of the good, rather they “reflect a 
prioritisation of some elements and some actualisation of those elements of a single and 
same human life” (Deneulin, 2002: 508). That is to say, Nussbaum’s capabilities presuppose 
a sketch of a valuable human life. It is up to free persons to finish this sketch how they see 
fit. But it seems to explicitly denigrate the possibility of going outside the lines, or sketching 
something radically different in its place.  
Moreover, given that not all reasonable people would endorse all items on the 
capability list, it appears that the inclusion of some items on this list may render it effectively 
perfectionist. Eric Nelson (2008) argues that this ought to be the relevant measure by which 
to assess if the capability approach is neutral. “A capability or good will be deemed non-
neutral if the act of providing it runs counter to at least one citizen’s idea of the good” 
(Nelson, 2008: 101). If our capability approach risks alienating some reasonable persons, 
then it may not be neutral in the way it was intended. This becomes especially apparent when 
we consider the public cost of capability promotion. Nelson points out that formulating key 
capabilities as public provisions means asking people not only whether they would want the 
capability in question, but also whether they would want the capability to be promoted by 
the state (ibid, 103). What if I do not see myself able to enjoy a particular capability? Do I 
still have to foot the bill? Rawls argued that “there is no more justification for using the state 
apparatus to compel some citizens to pay for unwanted benefits that others desire than there 
is to force them to reimburse others for their private expenses.” (Rawls, 1997: 250). 
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While Nussbaum’s account of capability justice falls short of bona fide comprehensive 
perfectionism, it is demonstrably not neutral with regard to competing conceptions of the 
good. This leaves Nussbaum’s capability approach at an impasse – by dint of its particular 
content-specific claims, it is neither a fully perfectionist or comprehensive approach to 
justice, nor a fully politically liberal one. It holds on to commitments which are mutually 
inconsistent. 
 
5. The Road Ahead  
In the previous section, I argued that Nussbaum is not entitled to claim that her capability 
approach is consistent with political liberalism. If a way of organising our principles of 
justice claims to be free of controversial value judgements by following a strictly political 
procedure for selecting entitlements, but ends up promoting specific ways of life, then such 
an account of justice is flawed. For example, it may give way to mutually inconsistent 
applications of justice. But more importantly, it may simply fail to be a feasible and action-
guiding way of achieving justice in the real world. At any rate, the approach would do better 
to stand by the controversial claims it tries to import, and to do away with its claim to 
neutrality altogether.  
I hope to have convinced the reader by this point that the capability theorist must 
modify her view. There are two ways this could be done (though I have already hinted that 
I think neither ultimately works, and that my proposal in this thesis is a novel third way). 
The capability theorist can stand by the principle of neutrality and shape the justification and 
content of the approach so that it reflects a genuinely neutral and procedural agreement 
between dissenting parties in order to formulate capabilities for political purposes only. 
Alternatively, the capability theorist can renounce the principle of neutrality and refine and 
further elevate the objective value claims that currently inform the content of the capability 
approach. In the next chapter, I develop both of these options with a view to rescuing the 




This chapter has critically examined the relationship between Nussbaum’s capability 
approach, liberal neutrality, and perfectionism. In particular, I showed that the capability 
approach straddles the political-comprehensive divide in a way that calls it internal 
coherence into question. Nussbaum’s account of justice, therefore, finds itself in an awkward 
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position. It avails itself to claims characteristic to both sides of the divide, yet these claims 
are not compatible with each other. I argued that the way Nussbaum justifies her capability 
framework relies on the truth of purportedly objective claims about value – claims that, I 
take it, could be rejected by some reasonable individuals. Moreover, I argued that the specific 
claims that make up Nussbaum’s index of central capabilities, while explicitly not trading in 
excellence, nonetheless appear to promote at least some ways of living that need not be 
endorsed by all reasonable individuals. Finally, I pointed out that if a capability theorist was 
to escape the impasse she finds herself in and to clarify the internal logic of the approach, 
she faces a choice: to either embrace neutrality at the expense of objective value judgements, 
or to embrace perfectionism at the expense of neutrality.  
 
Chapter 2: The Capability Dilemma 
In a 1982 essay, Rawls argued that there are two ways that disagreement about ethical 
matters is traditionally overcome in Western political philosophy. On the one hand, we may 
recognise a plurality of valid conceptions of the good and institute a modus vivendi 
arrangement. On the other hand, we may affirm a core conception of the good that is 
recognised by all rational persons, no matter the particular claims they may disagree with 
(Rawls, 1982). These two ways of overcoming disagreement roughly correspond to the two 
interpretations of liberal theory which we have been concerned with so far in this thesis: 
political liberalism and liberal perfectionism, respectively. I argued in the previous chapter 
that Nussbaum’s capability approach straddles this divide; while it claims to be an instance 
of the former, it endorses a set of ethical prescriptions that seem indistinguishable from an 
instance of the latter.  
If we take Rawls’ claim to be strictly true, that is to say, if we take him to contend that 
these options represent the only ways to overcome disagreement in practice, then we are 
presented with two potential directions to move the capability approach in if we wish to 
rescue it from the impasse I diagnosed in the previous chapter; we can either align our 
account of justice either with political liberalism, or with liberal perfectionism in earnest. 
In this chapter, I develop these solutions and demonstrate that while they are capable 
of resolving the inconsistency in question, each comes with a formidable set of problems 
which risk damaging the attractiveness and feasibility of capability approaches to justice. 
The capabilitarian thus seems to be faced with a dilemma – either she doubles down on 
neutrality by restricting the concept of capability, thereby risking that some obstacles to 
capabilities go on unchallenged, or she embraces a perfectionist conception of human 
flourishing, thereby risking an unattractive kind of paternalism. 
In Section 1, I develop two proposals for aligning the capability approach with liberal 
neutrality. In Section 2, I argue that this is a bad move, which is reflective of a more serious 
failing of political liberalism in tackling injustices. In Section 3, I develop a proposal for 
aligning the capability approach with liberal perfectionism. I argue that is a mistake, too, but 
for a different set of reasons. Finally, I end this chapter by formulating the choice between 




1. Politically Liberal Capabilities 
The way Nussbaum attempts to accommodate pluralism in her capability framework and 
establish that her approach is “closely allied to a form of political liberalism” (Nussbaum, 
2000: 5) can be split into two distinct claims about the justification of the capabilities she 
selects and their content, respectively. 
(1) The capabilities are justified by way of reflective equilibrium of a set of widely held 
intuitions about objective value which may (hypothetically) be put forth to a 
Rawlsian overlapping consensus between reasonable people who may differ in their 
individual conceptions of the good. 
(2) The content of the justification is such that it provides a “partial, not a comprehensive 
conception of the good life, a moral conception selected for political purposes only” 
(ibid, 74). 
In Chapter 1, we saw that despite Nussbaum’s claims to the contrary, value judgements 
play a role in both of these claims. This allowed us to challenge Nussbaum’s claim that her 
capability approach can be defended as a politically liberal enterprise. Now, if we wished to 
reimagine the capability approach as politically liberal in earnest, we would have to ensure 
that both the justification and the content of central capabilities can be defended as neutral 
with regard to a range of competing conceptions of the good. In the following two sub-
sections, I sketch how both of these conditions could be met. 
 
1.1. Neutrality of Content 
 
Perhaps the most obvious way of formulating a capability approach with neutral content 
would be to follow Sen in treating capability as a content-neutral kind of freedom. Sen 
arguably sidesteps a range of justificatory problems associated with selecting capabilities by 
remaining agnostic about their content and delegating the task of settling these substantive 
questions to democratic bodies. This may satisfy the principle of neutrality. But, of course, 
it may equally well fail to do so. In Sen’s capability approach this question is simply not 
settled. And since I take there to be at least one good reason to opt for a capability approach 
that agrees on substantive questions prior to application (i.e., to avoid idiosyncratic results), 
I will not focus on the possibility of achieving neutrality by omission here and focus instead 
on the prospect of arriving at a neutral list of central capabilities.  
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Doubling down on the principle of neutrality would involve selecting only those 
capabilities whose corresponding value could be defended as an object of an overlapping 
consensus between reasonable individuals. According to Rawls, the only type of claim that 
could be agreed upon in this way would consist of fair procedures of justice, rather than any 
claims about what makes people’s lives go better or worse outside of the political domain. 
Since several items on Nussbaum’s list currently do refer to doings and beings that are not, 
strictly speaking, situated only in the political realm (such as play, creative expression, or 
care for other species), the move toward neutrality of content should arguably involve 
eliminating references to these comprehensive domains of human activity. Of course, 
making a rigorous distinction between political functionings and apolitical functionings 
which would hold up in practice will be next to impossible. For example, my choice to 
engage in creative expression may only be possible because of a range of political facts 
obtaining, such as legally protected freedoms for expression and a decent threshold of 
socioeconomic entitlements which make creative endeavours possible. So, I contend that 
this distinction may be somewhat fuzzy in practice. Nevertheless, I take it that there is a way 
of distinguishing between capabilities which primarily pick out activities whose exercise 
falls outside of the remit of a Rawlsian basic structure of society, and those activities which 
do not. 
Redrafting a list of basic capabilities with a view to removing references to apolitical 
functionings seems like a reasonable move to make since the principle of neutrality can be 
understood as being aimed at trying to prevent a kind of overreach on part of state institutions. 
This is consistent with Nussbaum’s claim that her theory of justice is, to borrow Rawls’ 
phrase, formulated “for political purposes only” (Nussbaum, 2000: 77). As such, when it 
comes to matters that fall outside of the basic structure of society, it ought “to be silent about 
how people should live” (Deneulin, 2002: 514). Let us call this the political formulation of 
neutrality. Under the political formulation, the liberal state is only concerned with 
formulating capabilities which express fair procedures of public co-operation and, in turn, 
upholding a sort of agnosticism about the value of non-political activities. A list of central 
capabilities drafted in this way would then include capabilities to certain basic welfare 
entitlements, legal and political protections and so on. However, it would not include 
capabilities to do things that fall outside of this strictly political domain of activity. 
However, according to Wall (2019), the principle of neutrality need not rule out 
promoting a shared, and thus uncontroversial, conception of the good, namely, one that all 
people share as a matter of fact. According to Wall, such a conception of the good would not 
express disrespect to any citizen. If we take this claim to be correct, then there is nothing 
necessarily wrong with a capability list making reference to non-political functionings, so 
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long as the value of these functionings is, in fact, universally held. This would also seem like 
a reasonable move since neutrality would be preserved; after all, no one citizen’s conception 
of the good would be elevated above someone else’s if all the non-political capabilities in 
question were, in fact, indisputably valuable. Call this the non-political formulation of 
neutrality. Under the non-political formulation, the liberal state is primarily concerned with 
equality, which means that non-political value claims, so long as they do not run counter to 
the equal standing of citizens in front of the law, are acceptable in theorising about justice 
and, therefore, acceptable in a list of central capabilities. 
Under the political formulation, Nussbaum would have to eliminate a number of 
capabilities and, therefore, substantially restrict the scope of the list. This would have the 
following consequence: the capability approach would no longer be concerned with the 
valuable things people can achieve in their lives qua non-citizens. Instead, capability justice 
would be concerned with the goal of guaranteeing for all persons a sufficiently robust 
political standing in their relation to the state. This is, of course, perfectly consistent with 
political liberalism and, indeed, a worthwhile goal given the magnitude of the world’s 
disenfranchised communities and individuals. However, the capability approach is explicitly 
committed to a much stronger goal: it holds that “certain human abilities exert a moral claim 
that they should be developed” (Nussbaum, 2000: 83). Therefore, following the political 
formulation of capabilities may involve overly restricting the scope of justice. Such a thin 
notion of a capability is arguably not what defenders of the capability approach ultimately 
have in mind.  
So, perhaps we can do better with the non-political formulation of neutrality. Under 
this formulation, assuming that, for the sake of simplicity, we would like to retain as much 
content from Nussbaum’s original list as possible, we would have to ensure that the 
justification for these capabilities is consistent with political liberalism, namely, that these 
capabilities pick out (or at least tend toward) a set of values that would be acceptable to all 
people despite their different conceptions of the good. Whether this is possible depends on 
how these capabilities are to be normatively justified.  
 
1.2. Neutrality of Justification 
 
As we have seen, political liberals are concerned with establishing that political systems 
characterised by pluralism are stable and able to govern in ways that are legitimate and 
acceptable to all reasonable persons. For state power to be legitimate, it has to be supported 
by reasons that all reasonable citizens may share (Quong, 2011: 195).  
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Could Nussbaum’s current list of central capabilities garner a universal political 
justification in spite of the fact that it refers to a number of functionings that fall outside of 
the scope of the basic structure of society, strictly speaking? This depends on whether we 
believe the ‘standard move’ to be successful in dispelling the worry of backdoor 
perfectionism. Recall that the ‘standard move’ is the argumentative move of emphasising 
capabilities as freedoms, while pointing out that individuals may simply choose not to 
exercise freedoms to do those things which they happen not to value, thereby defusing the 
worry that a list of capabilities could be perfectionist (Claassen, 2014). According to the 
standard move, the state is not promoting controversial claims when it endows people with 
various freedoms to pursue functionings. Persons can make decisions about what to do with 
the opportunities available to them. According to the standard move, we would expect 
rational people to prefer the situation in which they have the freedom and not make use of it 
than vice versa. 
I believe that this move fails to placate the critic who worries about an illegitimate 
value import into an account of liberal justice. While it is plausible to hold that content-non-
specific freedom may indeed be valued by rational persons, all other things being equal, the 
freedoms in question here are content-specific, that is to say, they are freedoms to do specific 
valuable things. 10 The kinds of functionings we are concerned with here are comprehensive 
in that they comprise claims about what makes a person’s life have mor or less value, rather 
than claims about political morality only. So, if someone were to not endorse the value of 
the specific functionings to which they are entitled, then it would be false to claim that she 
would nonetheless prefer the state of affairs where this freedom is given to her. Such an 
option may have zero value to her whatsoever.  
This kind of reasoning about the good should start to trouble the reader at this point as 
it seems to imply an implausible procedure, namely, that the state should enshrine in law 
only those freedoms that are part of a conjunction between the sets of all freedoms valued 
by individuals. Aside from implying a rigid form of libertarianism (since the conjunction of 
these sets of freedoms is most likely going to be extremely minimal), such a claim could also 
be weaponised on divisive issues, for example, in instances where conservative or 
reactionary politics are invoked to deny certain expansions of freedom with the claim that 
they may be trivial at best, or harmful for society at worst, such as same sex marriage or 
legal protections for transgender people. Why, a disgruntled citizen may ask, should I value 
 
10I say ‘may’ here since I take it it’s not impossible to think of examples where, all other things being equal, 
the addition of an extra choice to an individual’s available choice set would result either in no extra value, or 
even negatively affect her well-being (say, due to mental overload or the burden of having to justify a higher 
opportunity cost and so on). 
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the freedom of individuals to do things I believe are immoral, or incomprehensible? Does 
such a citizen have a case against the state? 
Of course not. Not everyone in a society needs to share your reasons to allow you to 
do things that you want to do. Individuals should, therefore, not wish to restrict the freedoms 
of others based on their own preferences, at the very least because these preferences may 
change in the future, but more importantly, out of respect and normative recognition of other 
people. 
The only way to arrive at a list of central capabilities using the non-political 
formulation of neutrality would be to engage in a procedure of this kind. Namely, the extent 
to which we can find an overlap of substantive, non-political value claims that we can make 
use of will be small and contested. Moreover, there is a deeper procedural point to be made 
here that this is simply the wrong way of reasoning about entitlements of justice. I take these 
to be reasons not to favour this way of deliberating about the content of capabilities. Instead 
of attempting to accommodate a conjunction of everyone’s stated values, we should aim 
instead at justifying the values in a way which does not involve requiring everyone’s 
endorsement on value claims. I suggest how this could be done in an elegant way in Part 2 
of this thesis where I formulate a novel kind of capability approach.  
Perhaps there is another way to rescue Nussbaum’s justification of the capabilities and 
to bring it in line with liberal neutrality which does not consist in securing agreement over a 
range of content-specific moral judgements. Recall that one of Nussbaum’s justificatory 
methods—the informed desire approach—was relegated to an ancillary role in her 
framework due to the worry that individual desire may not lead us to reliable judgements 
about what is good for people’s well-being. Perhaps we can shift the justificatory burden of 
the capabilities to informed desires by arguing counterfactually that individuals would 
converge on a set of non-political capabilities if they satisfied certain descriptive conditions 
for their desires to count as genuine and authentic. We may formulate procedural criteria, 
such as independence from manipulation (e.g., Dworkin, 1988: 18), or a hypothetical 
endorsement test, whereby an individual’s desires would count as authentic if she were to 
not repudiate them given perfect information of how these desires came about (e.g., 
Christman, 1991:22). For example, if my desire not to desire, say, relationships with other 
people came about from a belief I had internalised that I do not deserve to be loved. I may 
reject this desire if I was given full information about how I had internalised this toxic belief. 
An argument of this kind could avoid many of the problems associated with ethical 
partisanship that we have looked at so far and provide the capabilitarian with a procedural, 
and therefore neutral, way of justifying the selection of central capabilities. 
42 
 
The problem with this move should, however, be readily apparent: the way these 
procedural criteria for adjudicating between good (authentic) desires and bad (corrupt) 
desires would themselves have to be neutral for this justificatory method to be consistent 
with liberal neutrality. Therefore, the criteria would have to be formulated in a descriptively 
neutral, rather than normatively demanding way, such that they could not be challenged by 
some reasonable people who may take issue with some normative claim in question. For 
example, a person may object to the claim that the uncritical internalisation of beliefs can 
lead to corrupted desires. A framework of justice based on this foundational claim would, 
therefore, fail to be neutral insofar as it would disrespect the dissenter’s conception of the 
good.  
Moreover, it is unclear how well a purely descriptive procedural notion of informed 
desires would perform in practice. For example, feminist philosophers like Natalie Stoljar 
(2000) working in the field of individual autonomy have argued that procedural criteria of 
individual autonomy are much too ineffective to respond to the many ways in which 
women’s socialisation hampers the choices available to them, and their desires to pursue 
these choices (Stoljar, 2000:100-7). And since one of the core aspirations of the capability 
approach is to attend to injustices of this very kind, a purely descriptive informed desire 
approach may not be effective at catching corrupted desires. Nonetheless, this is still a 
possible move toward liberal neutrality that Nussbaum’s capability approach can make – 
and one that appears, on the face of it, more promising than trying to justify the content of 
capabilities by identifying commonalities in everyone’s moral judgements. 
 
2. The Problem with Neutrality 
To recap, there are two ways we get to a politically neutral list of central capabilities. We 
might follow what I called the political formulation of neutrality and eliminate references to 
apolitical functionings from Nussbaum’s framework, making it a list of politically 
procedural capabilities. Alternatively, we try to retain as much normative content, including 
references to apolitical activities, from Nussbaum’s proposal and focus instead on providing 
a justification for all claims in this proposal which is consistent with political liberalism. We 
now have two extremely rough sketches of an earnestly politically liberal capability 
approach: a capability approach consisting of purely political capabilities on the one hand, 
and a capability approach with both political and apolitical capabilities, but one whose 




Does this newly minted neutral approach—under either of the two descriptions—fare 
any better in its purported goals than the original? I argue here that they would incur 
significant problems. As I pointed out in Section 1.1, the first would unduly restrict the scope 
of the capability approach, while the second would fail to meaningfully deal with internal 
obstacles to people’s capabilities by overestimating the extent to which individual choices 
are freely made. Both of these capability approaches would, therefore, fail to adequately 
respond to a range of significant injustices.  
The first approach would have the effect of severely restricting the scope of justice. 
Nussbaum and other capabilitarians argue that our thinking about justice ought to be guided 
by the question “What are people capable of doing and being?” The political formulation of 
neutral capabilities would effectively restrict this question to “What are people capable of 
doing and being purely in relation to institutional power?” This kind of approach to justice 
would be a capitulation on one of its most striking features – its aspiration to empower 
individuals in all aspects of their lives. I take this to be reason enough not to endorse a 
capability approach under this description.  
The second approach seems nominally more promising. However, I argue that it too 
would involve restricting the scope of justice to such a degree to render the capability 
approach unattractive. For the capability approach to be justifiable on the basis of informed 
desires, it would require a robust principle which could effectively adjudicate between 
instances where an individual has freely chosen not to pursue a capability, and instances 
where the capability was never effectively hers to choose to pursue. I will argue in the next 
chapter that this condition could be satisfied by a robust principle of personal autonomy. A 
politically liberal conception of autonomy is unfit for this task. Let me explain. 
David Crocker (1992) has argued that it is imperative for the capability approach that 
it does not fall into ‘relativism’ or ‘moral nihilism’ (Crocker, 1992: 605). The capability 
approach, therefore, must not be purely a descriptive enterprise, adaptable to any 
constellation of claims, no matter how reductive. It must take an active interest in the realm 
of value and set concrete directions in order to lift people out of poverty, oppression, and 
other forms of hardship. 
The capability approach to justice is thus intended to attend to people’s effective 
freedoms to live good and valuable lives. Philosophers traditionally distinguish between 
constraints to freedom that are internal and external to the agent.11 As we saw in the previous 
chapter, Nussbaum is attentive to the ways in which individual desires can be corrupted and 
 
11 For example. Isaiah Berlin (1969) who first distinguished between negative and positive liberty: the former 
requires an absence of relevant external constraints, whereas the latter requires the presence of a sufficient 
degree of control over one’s volitions and actions (p.121-22). 
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damaged due to oppression and disadvantage. In Nussbaum’s hands, the capability approach 
is explicitly geared at responding to constraints to freedom which are in some sense internal 
to the agent.  
It is in this goal, however, that the capability approach would fail if it were to complete 
its alignment with political liberalism in earnest. This is because the political liberal’s 
reluctance to take a stand on matters of value overestimates the extent to which individuals 
are free and unencumbered choosers. I take it that this is an instance of a more general 
problem with political liberalism, and the capability approach seems to be unable to offer 
any new resources to overcome it. For example, Michael Sandel (1984) has argued that 
liberals like Rawls are committed to an implausible metaphysical view of the self: as one 
that is necessarily “prior to and independent of purposes and ends” (Sandel, 1984: 86), a sort 
of “unencumbered self” (ibid.). This way of thinking about the individual, the critic 
continues, is wrong, and it can lead us to false conclusions concerning morality and justice. 
Let us refine this somewhat rough claim and apply it to the topic of justice. 
I argue that the capability approach lacks the necessary normative tools to identify and 
respond to a particular class of injustice which come about as a result of individuals 
internalising harmful or unjust norms. In the next chapter, I will argue that the internalisation 
of such norms is bad because it damage’s one’s autonomy; it makes an individual less 
capable of governing her own life based on her values. I have not yet established autonomy 
as the relevant normative benchmark here, and Nussbaum does not endorse the value of 
autonomy in the way that would be consistent with making this claim. For now, therefore, I 
argue that the internalisation of harmful and unjust norms is damaging to an individual’s 
capabilities insofar as it subverts the individual’s practical reason and, in turn, the other 
capabilities which rely on practical reason. 
One of the ways in which unjust norms can subvert a person’s practical reason is 
through adaptive preferences – preferences which have been formed as a “result of [one’s] 
downgrading of options that [one] believes are inaccessible to them” (Taylor, 2013: 138), 
such as the proverbial sour grapes. When a particular desire is systematically unmet due to 
hardship or disadvantage, a person may relinquish her desire, or form a desire to identify 
with her current situation in a process known as preference adaptation. According to Jon 
Elster (1983), a preference is adapted in earnest if it would revert to its original state just 
when the person’s option set were to expand. Preference adaptation poses a significant 
challenge for justice insofar as it can obscure the extent to which deficiencies in the 
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provisions of justice are brought about by individual own choices.12 And given that persons 
can come to internalise unjust and harmful norms, “our circumstances can effectively 
socialize us to prefer conditions or options that are bad for us” (Terlazzo, 2016: 206). 
An individual who has internalised her oppression will adapt her preferences so that 
she no longer prefers choices that are out of her reach and so that she prefers the choices that 
are in reach. For example, members of disenfranchised communities may be reluctant to 
seek political or legal representation if they believe they are not worthy of it. Domestic abuse 
victims may be reluctant to seek help if they believe their spouse’s anger toward them is 
justified. It would, however, be inappropriate to think of this reluctance as a genuine or free 
choice, or normatively authoritative.  
In capability terms, the phenomenon of preference adaptation obscures the extent to 
which a person’s lack of a particular functioning is due to her choice not to exercise her 
capabilities, or whether it is due to her adapting her preferences in light of disadvantage or 
oppression. I argue that the comprehensive value of autonomy must be made explicit in the 
formulation of capabilities in order to make sense of capability failures of this kind. Absent 
such a claim, the capability approach has limited tools for distinguishing between the 
following two cases: 
Forgone Capability: An agent possesses the internal requisites for φ-ing 
(i.e., she knows how to) and she is free of external constraints that would 
prevent her from φ-ing (e.g., it is not against the law, it does not incur 
prohibitive costs etc.). On reflection, she comes to the decision that φ-ing 
either has no value to her, or it goes against her conception of the good, so 
she chooses not to φ.  
Failed Capability: An agent possesses the internal requisites for φ-ing, and 
she is free of external constraints that would prevent her from φ-ing as above. 
Nonetheless, she does not see herself as able to φ because of the beliefs she 
has internalised, or because a lack of key options has led her to adapt her 
preferences. 
 
12 Of course, not all instances of preference adaptation will be like this. In many cases, people adapt their 
preferences in ways that are harmless, or even necessary for personal growth or character formation. For 
example, when I was 9, I wanted to be Britney Spears. This was, unfortunately, not possible for me, but we 
would not think of the resulting adaptation of my preferences as indicative of a wrong or a harm. See Colburn 
(2011) for a discussion of how an account of adaptive preferences can be modified to accommodate the 
relevant differences between preference adaptation and character planning. 
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In the former case, an agent has chosen to forgo a capability in a way that is consistent 
with the capability approach. According to the capability approach, individuals may choose 
not to pursue those capabilities which happen to not hold any value to them. Justice only 
requires that individuals have the opportunity to exercise capabilities, not that they do, in 
fact, exercise them. 
Surprisingly, the latter case is also consistent with the capability approach. However, 
this looks like the exact sort of injustice which the capability approach ought to correct. Here, 
an agent can be seen to lack the capability in question, despite the fact that she appears to 
have both the necessary internal and external requisites.  
I argue that the capability approach cannot make sense of the pertinent differences 
between these two cases, and therefore, cannot adequately respond to the latter without the 
normative vocabulary of a robust principle of autonomy. Rosa Terlazzo (2019) has recently 
argued in similar vein that the capability approach needs a principle of autonomy to make 
sense of unjust capability failures of a similar kind (Terlazzo, 2019: 10-11). She argues that 
the principled reluctance of the capability approach to accept comprehensiveness comes at 
the expense of letting certain internal obstacles go unchallenged. For example, a transgender 
person living in a society that invalidates her identity claims may not see herself as capable 
of deserving respect or other agentic tools needed to live a life of value. Here, Nussbaum 
would have to deny that this requires seeing oneself in this way “since in order for citizens 
to do so, they must be brought up in an environment in which autonomy is privileged at least 
to the same extent as other metaphysical commitments” (Ferracioli and Terlazzo, 2014: 449-
50). 
Clare Chambers (2007) has argued against Nussbaum’s commitment to political 
liberalism in a similar vein, and her argument picks out the role of social norms in regulating 
individual preferences more generally. Chambers argues that political liberalism is not 
responsive to two salient features of individual decision-making: (1) the extent to which 
individual preferences are shaped by social forces, and (2) the fact that individuals’ sets of 
options are constrained by social norms, some of which may be harmful or inegalitarian. To 
overcome these problems, Chambers advocates for a social constructionist approach to 
theorising about political morality which she takes to offer a more plausible account of how 
individual choices are made and how they may fall victim to various injustices. She writes:  
Individuals’ choices can never be assessed in isolation from the cultural 
context in which they take place, and a particular practice cannot be 
considered in isolation from the meaning it has for the community as a whole. 
More specifically, the justice of a practice or a choice is not usually 
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determined by the individual who initiates it but relies in large part on the 
role it plays in the overall system of (in)equality. A liberal focus on the 
individual fails to notice how individual actions fit into social structures of 
(in)justice (ibid, 44).  
Chambers takes this argument further and argues that recognising that individuals’ 
preferences are socially formed means that we cannot leave it up to individuals to make their 
own choices without placing some hard limits on acts which are harmful, or which come 
from unjust social norms, no matter if they are being done voluntarily. Even when certain 
choices are made seemingly autonomously, according to Chambers, they may nonetheless 
have come about from the internalisation of unjust and harmful norms. Chambers compares 
breast augmentation surgeries to FGM. The former seems unproblematic to political liberals 
because people who undergo such surgeries tend to do so voluntarily and freely, while FGM 
is usually carried out by force. However, Chambers argues that this distinction fails to 
account for the possibility that individuals may internalise and endorse unjust norms. 
Women’s lives are shaped by harmful and stifling norms concerning body image and beauty, 
which may propel them to undergo unnecessary surgeries. Political liberalism, therefore, 
fails to recognise that supposedly free actions may nonetheless be harmful and unjust.  
Liberals need to recognise that oppression can constitute rather than simply 
contravene individuals’ desires, and that social norms can make it rational 
for individuals to want things which profoundly threaten their wellbeing and 
equality (Chambers, 2004: 29-30). 
Chambers’ argument is useful in illustrating the practical shortfalls of a politically 
liberal approach to justice inasmuch as political liberals commit themselves to a view of 
autonomy which is insensitive to social construction. However, I will argue in the next 
chapter that this is not a failing of autonomy necessarily. I will defend a conception of 
autonomy which, I argue, can help us formulate a robust threshold with which to rule out the 
kinds of problems Chambers worries about. I will defend a socially relational conception of 
autonomy, which identifies autonomous capacity as causally dependent on a number of 
variables to do with the kinds of relations individuals stand in. 
For the time being however, in order to make sense of the difference between the above 
cases—the case of forgone capability and failed capability, respectively—the capability 
approach must recognise that there is a prior hurdle that must be cleared before an individual 
can be said to possess a capability. She must be shown to be autonomous, or self-governing. 
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She must be capable of resisting manipulation and oppression. A practical upshot of this 
requirement is that can it extend the range of problems that the capability approach can 
attempt to remedy. Numerous injustices around the world go on unchallenged because they 
are enabled by social forces that appear, on the face of it, voluntarily endorsed by the very 
people whom they wrong. For example, writing on women’s rights in the Middle East, 
Egyptian journalist Mona Eltahawy has observed that “[women] are so socialised in our 
oppression that even in the face of injustice, we know to stay within the lines. Instead of a 
bold demand for the removal of a system that keeps women forever at the whim of a male 
guardians, even their adolescent sons, women meekly suggest reform” (Eltahawy, 2015: 
158). These are precisely the kinds of injustices that Nussbaum worries about when she 
writes about the effects of adaptive preferences and oppression (e.g., Nussbaum, 2000: 117). 
Nussbaum does not, however, argue for a comprehensive principle of autonomy and as such, 
her framework, and those of others who follow her approach, fails to endow an account of 
justice with the tools for distinguishing between foregone capabilities and capability failures.  
The problem I have outlined in this section is an instance of a more general problem 
faced by political liberalism, and it looks like the capability approach cannot provide the 
political liberal with any novel resources to overcome it. Since the capability approach is 
explicitly committed to removing internal obstacles to individuals’ capabilities in the road 
to justice, a politically liberal capability approach is likely to fail in this goal. The discussion 
in this section has also allowed me to set the scene to argue for a foundational principle of 
relational autonomy in the next chapter; a principle which, I argue, is necessary for a 
capability account of justice. 
 
3. Perfectionist Capabilities 
Can the capability approach fare any better by giving up neutrality and reformulating its 
proper aim to be the promotion of individual flourishing and excellence across a broad set 
of domains of human activity? One way it could do this is by realigning itself with liberal 
perfectionism – the view that liberal goals are best promoted by the state taking an active 
interest in the goals that individuals pursue. 
What would a capability approach look like if it were to align itself with perfectionism? 
We would be entitled to retain Nussbaum’s substantive-good justification of the capabilities 
largely as it is since the value propositions are already pitched as having an independent 
standing. The move would involve giving up the contractarian elements of Nussbaum’s 
justification, including an appeal to an overlapping consensus between dissenting parties. I 
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already argued in the previous chapter that these elements are a spare wheel in Nussbaum’s 
account. The capability approach would then need to tease out its implicit claims to objective 
value and formulate these as a set of universal and binding ethical prescriptions for a good 
life. 
Such a move would be a return to Nussbaum’s original, pre-Rawlsian conception of 
the capabilities (e.g., Nussbaum, 1988; 1992), which were built around a notion of the human 
telos, given to us by our unique nature. Nussbaum follows Aristotle in emphasising the role 
of practical reason in guiding all our endeavours and making their pursuit characteristically 
human (Nussbaum, 2000: 82). The structure of a perfectionist capability approach could then 
be made to mirror, say Thomas Hurka’s (1993) form of neo-Aristotelian liberal 
perfectionism, which formulates a list of objective excellences across a theoretical, physical, 
and practical dimension (Hurka, 1993: 37). 
 As we have seen, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities currently does not trade in 
excellences, nor is it committed to a function of maximisation. Her list of central human 
capabilities does not intend to make judgments about what a good life is above a level of 
sufficiency. Nussbaum defends items on her list as “the features whose absence means the 
end of a human form of life” (Nussbaum, 1992: 215). The move toward liberal perfectionism 
would, therefore, be a move past this sufficiency threshold and into a more ambitious set of 
claims about what constitutes excellence in people’s lives. This would involve foregoing 
‘the standard move’ and asserting that the items picked out by a list of central capabilities 
are indeed valuable beings and doings, and individuals’ lives are all the better for making 
use of them, rather than by merely having the freedom to make use of them. 
There may be an additional reason than mere theoretical coherence that would 
motivate the capabilitarian to make this move. As we saw in the previous section, the 
principle of neutrality can be argued to muzzle the emancipatory ambitions of the capability 
approach. There are countless urgent problems in the world that ought to be addressed from 
the standpoint of justice. It may, therefore, be insufficient to merely aim at securing people 
with opportunities. Perhaps we ought to ensure that these opportunities are, in fact, made use 
of. Taking this line of argument, a capability theorist could explicitly disavow neutrality as 
it may be argued to be too costly a luxury, affordable only to developed and stable states 
whose citizens are well off enough to quibble over the minutiae of the limits of state power. 
Since the capability approach is intended to elevate people from poverty and disadvantage 
and empower individuals to live good lives, an explicit focus on the components of dignified 
and valuable lives may be a necessary feature for effectively delivering on this goal. 
However, I argue that realigning the capability approach with liberal perfectionism 
would undermine the capabilitarians’ fundamental commitment to upholding the value of 
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individual agency and freedom. My claim concerns both the internal coherence of the 
capability approach, as well as the internal coherence of liberal perfectionism. Namely, there 
is a particular tension that critics of liberal perfectionism identify: the tension “between the 
perfectionist idea of using political power to improve citizens’ lives according to some 
determinate judgements about human flourishing, and the liberal idea that citizens are free 
and equal and are entitled to certain forms of treatment as a result of that moral status” 
(Quong, 2011: 36). Quong argues that this worry is made all the more real by the 
perfectionist’s inability to provide a principled way of distinguishing between the sorts of 
non-coercive methods favoured by perfectionism and the coercive methods that they are 
supposedly against. In practice, therefore, the sort of reasons that justify liberalism also seem 
to place an embargo on the sort of actions that perfectionists take to be necessary for reaching 
their goals. I take it that Quong’s argument represents a powerful reason to resist a 
perfectionist capability account of justice. Let me unpack this argument. 
Perfectionism is sometimes accused of implying paternalism, which liberals are 
typically against. Paternalism refers to a kind of interference into people’s choices and 
actions whereby the state attempts to alter the behaviour of an individual. This interference 
is usually justified on the basis that it benefits the individual, or that it stops the individual 
from doing something harmful. For example, laws that require motorcyclists to wear helmets 
and laws that require mandatory use of car seatbelts would be paternalistic. Of course, 
neither of these laws is particularly controversial among liberal philosophers, so the liberal’s 
relationship with paternalism should be understood as more of a presumption against it, 
rather than outright opposition. According to this presumption, if the state wishes to interfere 
in individual choices, it better have “a powerful justification” (Mills, 2013: 446). Otherwise, 
the state ought to leave people to make choices as they see fit. 
This presumption carries over in the writings of liberal perfectionists, but it tends to 
be modified to only exclude actions which limit someone’s freedom or autonomy (e.g., 
Hurka, 1993: 147-60; Raz, 1986: 369-72). Raz insists that the liberal presumption against 
paternalism ought to only exclude ‘hard perfectionism’, which involves coercion or 
manipulation. Other forms of perfectionism—encouraging valuable options with subsidies, 
discouraging worthless options with taxation—are not coercive and, therefore, not 
problematic from the point of view of liberalism. According to Raz, “a government which 
subsidizes certain activities, rewards their pursuit, and advertises their availability 
encourages those activities without using coercion” (Raz, 1986: 417). So long as coercion is 
avoided, there is nothing illiberal about encouraging valuable choices, according to Raz.  
Despite these claims, Quong thinks that liberal perfectionists cannot ever escape the 
charges of paternalism. Quong argues that no matter what justification is given, perfectionist 
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action will inescapably be motivated by “a negative judgement about citizens’ abilities to 
effectively advance their own interests” (Quong, 2010: 86). According to Quong, this is a 
problem because it involves disrespecting the moral status of citizens as free and equal (ibid, 
102-3). When we compel someone to make supposedly valuable choices because the choices 
are good for them, we are making a kind of judgement: namely, that the person is somehow 
deficient in her abilities and would not have made the supposedly right choice on her own. 
This kind of judgement is presumptively wrong in the relationship between the citizen and 
the state. This presumption will be defeated in certain cases, such as in the relation between 
a parent and a child, or between a mentally disabled person and their guardian or carer. In 
such cases, the judgement in question is justified. However, in the relation between the state 
and individuals, it is typically not. Or rather, the state has to clear the burden of justifying 
that judgement.  
If the capability approach were to realign itself with a perfectionist account of 
liberalism, it would, therefore, be committing itself to a series of judgements about people’s 
inability to make valuable choices on their own accord. The capability approach would 
become an overly micro-managerial approach to justice: one whose primary concern would 
no longer be individuals’ freedoms to achieve value, but rather an approach that compels 
individuals to achieve valuable states in themselves, motivated by the judgement that they 
would be unable to do so otherwise.  
Moreover, according to Quong, even if the perfectionist were to argue that the 
presumptive wrong of paternalism was outweighed by the benefits of the perfectionist state, 
perfectionism would still be unviable because it lacks an account of political legitimacy. 
Quong holds that even if we have good reasons to accept perfectionism (insofar as it will 
help us live more valuable lives), this in itself does not establish that the state has the 
authority to issue binding commands that we do so (ibid, 120). Just because perfectionist 
policies will benefit us is not a reliable justification for these policies to be legally binding. 
One thing to note in Quong’s argument is that he rejects two rival accounts of the 
wrong of paternalism: Mill’s argument that individuals are always the best judges for what 
is good for them and that paternalism questions this claim (Mill, 1989: 85, 92), and that 
paternalism is wrong insofar as it damages someone’s autonomy (e.g., Dworkin, 1988: 121-
29). This way of conceiving of the wrong of paternalism is thus consistent with Nussbaum’s 
own reasoning against perfectionism – that it fundamentally disrespects the individual whose 
choices are interfered with (Nussbaum, 2011b: 35). Quong’s argument would, therefore, be 
acceptable to Nussbaum on her own terms. 
Therefore, insofar as the perfectionist kind of capability approach was trying to offer 
us a novel and more widely acceptable way of promoting value in people’s lives than liberal 
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perfectionism, it plainly fails if the only way to defend it is to turn it into a form of the latter. 
And in any case the tactic makes it vulnerable to the kinds of arguments we might make 
against liberal perfectionism in general, such as the objection that it involves an unattractive 
kind of paternalism, which itself implies a kind of disrespect toward individuals. Therefore, 
not only does the capability approach have excellent reasons not to commit itself to a 
perfectionist account of liberalism, there are also excellent reasons to unreservedly disavow 
the perfectionist leanings we looked at in Chapter 1. The capability approach must, therefore, 
endorse anti-perfectionism in earnest and strive to distribute goods in such a way to enable 
persons to make autonomous choices free of paternalistic intervention. I demonstrate how 
this can be done in Part 2 of this thesis.  
 
4. The Dilemma 
The significant problems associated with developing the capability approach in either of the 
two directions we have looked at in this chapter suggests that the approach faces a dilemma. 
Terlazzo (2019) has recently argued in a similar vein that the tension in Nussbaum’s version 
of the capability approach produces a dilemma. She formulates the dilemma in the following 
way: 
The Capability Dilemma: either [the approach] can ensure that persons are 
free of internal obstacles to the possession of capability by pushing them to 
be open to functionings across a relatively comprehensive set of domains of 
life . . . Or else it can side with political liberalism by making options 
externally available across many domains of life without encouraging 
internal endorsement – but in this case, it runs the risk that persons will 
foreseeably and avoidably face internal obstacles to genuine possession of 
some capabilities (Terlazzo, 2019: 2) 
The dilemma—in both Terlazzo’s formulation and in the way I have characterised it 
throughout this chapter—arises due to a tension between Nussbaum’s aspiration of 
championing individual agency and her reluctance to commit to comprehensive judgements 
about the conditions under which the exercise of these capabilities can be considered 
authentic or autonomous. What makes this tension more robust is the fact that both of these 
claims appear to be fundamental for Nussbaum’s capability approach; one is the overarching 
goal of a theory of justice expressed in terms of capabilities, while the other is an explicit 
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opposition to perfectionist liberals like Raz and John Stuart Mill and Susan Moller Okin, for 
whom “the fostering of personal autonomy is an appropriate goal of the state” (Nussbaum, 
1999: 108). Nussbaum thinks fostering autonomy is problematic as it may lead to 
“expressive subordination” (Nussbaum, 2011b: 35) insofar as their conception of the good 
life is “publicly ranked beneath others” (ibid.). As it happens, Nussbaum thinks that 
autonomy need not be valued by everyone (e.g., Nussbaum, 2000: 110). And since 
subordination is incompatible with equality, Nussbaum argues that promoting autonomy is 
fundamentally illegitimate. So, it appears that too much weight rests on both claims for a 
capabilitarian to be able to downplay their fundamentality and reject the dilemma as stated. 
Terlazzo distinguishes between tree dimensions of comprehensiveness. According to 
Terlazzo, doctrines can be turn out more or less comprehensive based on where their claims 
fall along these independent dimensions. A doctrine can be comprehensive in its depth 
insofar as it relies on a final explanation for why some things are good. It can be 
comprehensive in its height insofar as it provides an exhaustive list of objective excellences. 
And finally, a doctrine can be comprehensive in its breadth insofar as it makes claims about 
what is good across a number of domains of life (Terlazzo, 2019: 5-7). 
What animates Terlazzo’s dilemma is the claim that for the capability approach to be 
successful in securing individual capabilities, it must “encourage citizens to value or 
countenance certain functionings in a broad set of areas of life” (ibid, 7). That is to say, the 
capability approach must be substantially comprehensive in terms of its breadth. As I pointed 
out earlier in the chapter, Nussbaum’s proposal covers areas of life that go beyond regulating 
political morality only. Terlazzo argues, therefore, that if the approach wishes to retain this 
multi-dimensional commitment to various kinds of capabilities, political and non-political 
alike, it must not shy away from embracing breadth comprehensiveness in earnest. And 
doing so would involve providing a principle for identifying a particular kind of internal 
obstacle to individual capability – an individual failing to see an opportunity as one that is 
genuinely available to them. Terlazzo uses the example of a masculine man who deep down 
yearns to play jazz saxophone, but fails to see this as a genuine opportunity because of the 
cost to his apparent masculinity it would have. 
This point is only reinforced when we recall the capabilities approach’s first 
motivation for rejecting preference satisfaction as an appropriate currency of 
distributive justice: That persons’ preferences might become problematically 
adapted so that they fail to want what is good for them or what they are owed. 
In those cases, we rightly recognize that a person’s capability is 
compromised and that their preferences must be changed if they are to be 
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genuinely able to do and be the things associated with the relevant 
capabilities on the list. But given this, if persons’ preferences can more 
generally count the exercise of capabilities as unavailable, inappropriate, 
worthless, or morally unacceptable, then ensuring full capability will require 
the removal of these internal obstacles to functioning as well. (ibid, 11). 
It is this step, as I have already argued in Section 2, that would involve effectively 
walking back the approach’s commitment to Rawlsian political liberalism. Terlazzo does 
not argue that this is, therefore, what Nussbaum and other capabilitarians ought to do. The 
reasons for aligning the approach with political liberalism—such as stability and respect for 
individuals—still hold, but, as Terlazzo points out, perhaps they need to be seriously 
weighed alongside other values, like the removal of internal obstacles to capability. At any 
rate, she does not suggest a way forward out of the dilemma.  
I will argue that these values can in fact be reconciled in a way that does not involve 
accepting the problems associated with following either horn of the supposed dilemma. 
Similar to how Terlazzo disambiguated between different ways in which doctrines can be 
comprehensive, we can distinguish ways in which political institutions can be 
comprehensive without being perfectionist and without falling prey to the kinds of problems 
of subordination and second-class citizenship that Nussbaum associates with comprehensive 
liberalism. 
In the next chapter, I will effectively prove the capability dilemma false by showing 
that it does not exhaust the logical space of liberal theory. I will develop an argument for 
aligning the capability approach with a relatively novel interpretation of liberalism known 
as comprehensive anti-perfectionism. I will show that making this realignment can allow the 
capabilitarian to reconcile competing normative commitments, as well as providing her with 
a set of practical tools for identifying and responding to real-world injustices. I will also 
show that Nussbaum’s reasons against comprehensive theories of justice do not apply to this 




This chapter has critically examined two solutions for rescuing Nussbaum’s capability 
approach from the impasse it found itself at the end of Chapter 1. The first solution involved 
restricting the content, or the justification of the approach in such a way to pitch the central 
capabilities as purely neutral precepts of political morality. I suggested this could be done 
either by removing references to apolitical capabilities, or by justifying the list based on 
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counterfactual claims about what individuals were to desire if they would be free of certain 
informational deficits or corrupted desires. I then argued that such a capability approach 
would be unsuccessful in its purported goals and appear less attractive. It would either have 
to restrict its goal to no longer be concerned with individuals achieving well-being across 
many domains of life, or it would have to give up the tools needed to identify instances of 
capability failure that are due to internal constraints. The second solution involved doubling 
down on comprehensive claims about individual flourishing and modifying the justification 
of the approach to be teleological, rather than contractualist. I then argued that this move 
would run counter to Sen and Nussbaum’s inaugural commitment to allowing individuals to 
define their own path to well-being and value by entailing a kind of unattractive paternalism. 
Finally, I looked at a particular dilemma that the problems associated with both of these 
solutions entails. I concluded that this dilemma may turn out to be false, as it rests on a 
simplified distinction in liberal theory which can be challenged. If the dichotomy implied by 
this distinction is false, then so must be the dilemma, and there are other solutions available 


















Chapter 3: Autonomy and Anti-Perfectionism 
So far, we have seen that the capability approach faces a dilemma when trying to resolve the 
internal conflict between its perfectionist and politically liberal leanings. In this chapter and 
the next, I show that there is a third direction for the capability approach to take, which is 
informed by recent developments in liberal theory. The capability approach can align itself 
with a hybrid interpretation of liberal theory known as comprehensive anti-perfectionism. If 
tenable, this position may allow the capabilitarian to reconcile the two competing 
commitments of Nussbaum’s view that we identified in the previous chapter: championing 
individual empowerment on the one hand, and respecting value pluralism on the other. I 
show that this can be done by justifying the content of the approach on the value of personal 
autonomy: a value that, as I will argue, plays an organising role in justifying liberal political 
philosophy altogether, and the capability approach to justice in particular.  
In Section 1, I explain and motivate comprehensive anti-perfectionism and the value 
of individual autonomy that underlies it. In Section 2, I argue that a comprehensive 
conception of autonomy provides the capabilitarian with a compelling justification for the 
very concept of capability, alongside a number of essential theoretical tools for identifying 
and responding to the kinds of injustices we considered at the end of the last chapter. In 
Section 3, I argue that the anti-perfectionism of my view can offer a compelling defence for 
capability theorists to resist charges of paternalism that we saw levelled at the capability 
approach in previous chapters. 
 
1. Comprehensive Anti-Perfectionism 
As we have seen so far, liberal philosophers are split across a neutralist-perfectionist 
continuum. On one side, political liberals like Rawls and Nussbaum advocate for an 
approach that expresses liberalism through a series of claims about political morality, which 
they take to be acceptable to a wide coalition of otherwise dissenting individuals. On the 
other hand, perfectionists like Raz and Hurka advocate for an approach that identifies 
objective moral values as normatively foundational for liberalism, and they argue that it is 
the proper goal of liberal political authorities to promote such values.  
It is time now to somewhat complicate this simple picture by introducing an additional 
continuum that intersects the one we are already familiar with. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
Quong (2010) has recently argued there are two independent levels at which value 




1. Must liberal political philosophy be based in some particular ideal of what 
constitutes a valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs? 
2. Is it permissible for a liberal state to promote or discourage some activities, 
ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or intrinsic value, or 
on the basis of other metaphysical claims? (italics mine) (Quong, 2010: 12) 
 
There are four possible combinations of answers to this set of questions, which 
correspond to four positions on liberal theory. The political liberalism endorsed by Rawls 
and Nussbaum answers in the negative to both questions, thereby applying the principle of 
neutrality to both the justification of liberal philosophy and the content of the laws a liberal 
state may pass. Rawls (1993) argues that such an arrangement is necessary to ensure the 
stability of a political community characterised by pluralism, as well as the legitimacy of the 
laws its citizens are subject to. For Nussbaum, as we saw in Chapter 1, political liberalism 
allows the capabilities to be defended as “specifically political goals (…) free of any specific 
metaphysical grounding” (Nussbaum, 2000: 5), rather than free-standing claims about the 
intrinsic value of some ways of living. 
When philosophers speak of ‘comprehensive liberalism’, they are for the most part 
referring to liberal perfectionism, a position which answers in the positive to both questions. 
Liberal perfectionists thereby take liberalism to be based on a particular ideal of a worthwhile 
human life and they hold that the state can (and should) actively promote valuable ends 
through policy (e.g., Hurka, 1993; Raz, 1986; Wall, 1998).  
However, thanks to Quong’s distinction, we can see there is a second sense in which 
liberalism can be comprehensive – as a result of answering ‘yes’ to the first question and ‘no’ 
to the second. This position is called comprehensive anti-perfectionism and it differs from 
traditional comprehensive liberalism in an exciting way. While comprehensive anti-
perfectionists share the view that liberalism is best understood as being based in a particular 
ideal of a valuable life, they argue that the nature of this ideal is such that it is inconsistent 
with promoting valuable choices in people’s lives. Comprehensive anti-perfectionists 
typically assume this ideal to be individual autonomy—the capacity for self-government—
which they argue can only be upheld by a principle of anti-perfectionism. 
This is a lesser-known interpretation of liberal theory, but it has found support in the 
work of several philosophers from the last decades. For example, Ronald Dworkin (2002) 
has argued that while liberalism has to be neutral at the concrete level (i.e., anti-perfectionist), 
it cannot and should not remain neutral “about the character, force, and standing of the very 
question of how to live” (Dworkin, 2002: 239), otherwise it would risk being vacuous and 
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confirm the worry of critics that liberal justice lacks ethical authority and that it “leaches the 
poetry out of life” (ibid, 238). Dworkin endorses ‘the challenge model’ of ethics, according 
to which an individual’s life is successful insofar as it is an appropriate response to the 
particular challenges the individual finds herself facing. Dworkin defines this model in direct 
opposition to an ‘impact’ model, according to which a life’s success would be assessed based 
on its achievements and the impact on those achievements. What matters for Dworkin is that 
a life is lived according to choices that one makes freely and that one approves of one’s 
choices. For this reason, Dworkin holds that perfectionism may only make someone’s life 
better if we accept an impact model. If, instead, what matters morally is the way in which 
individual rise to particular circumstances, perfectionism must be rejected for it cannot help 
us overcome challenges. Perfectionism is, therefore, inconsistent with our best understanding 
of what makes life valuable. 
Similarly, Kymlicka (2001) argues that a good life is one that an individual “leads from 
the inside, according to [one’s] beliefs about value” (Kymlicka, 2001: 203). This creates an 
endorsement constraint – for an activity to be valuable, it must be endorsed by the individual 
pursuing it. Perfectionistic intervention from the state will invariably violate this constraint, 
and the activity in question will, according to Kymlicka, “cease to have value for the 
individuals involved” (ibid.). 
One of the most recent advocates of comprehensive anti-perfectionism, Ben Colburn 
(2010) argues that liberalism ought to be understood as a political philosophy aimed at 
promoting individual autonomy – the ideal of “people deciding for themselves what is 
valuable and living their lives in accordance with that decision” (Colburn, 2010: 43-4). This 
conception of liberalism, similarly to Dworkin’s and Kymlicka’s, precludes perfectionism 
since the good life requires something which, as Colburn argues, perfectionism threatens.  
 Before we can assess Colburn’s claim that autonomy is inconsistent with 
perfectionism, we must examine the concept of autonomy more closely than we have done 
so far. Gerald Dworkin (1988) has pointed out that autonomy refers to a ”tangled net of 
intuitions, conceptual and empirical issues, and normative claims” (Dworkin, 1988: 7), so 
we would do well to try to pick this tangle apart. 
Conceptually, autonomy can be understood as a capacity – an ability to give oneself 
rules and to act in accordance with them. Normatively, autonomy can be understood as a 
character ideal – an ideal of an individual living under the rules of her own making, rather 
than those imposed on her by others. It is an ideal characterised self-directedness and self-
government, and it describes individuals “controlling to some degree, their own destiny, 
fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their lives” (Raz, 1986: 369). An 
autonomous person is a “self-conscious chooser” (Wall, 1998: 138), she wields “de facto 
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power and authority over choices and actions significant to the direction of [her life]” 
(Oshana 2006: 2).  
Autonomy does not simply consist of negative freedom, or the freedom from coercion 
or external interference (Berlin, 1969). In fact, negative freedom is neither necessary, nor 
sufficient for autonomy. It is not necessary because individuals may autonomously place 
themselves in situations where their negative freedom is constrained. Imagine someone 
joining a Catholic Convent and abiding by its strict monastic rules. We would not necessarily 
think of such a person as lacking in autonomy, even though they suddenly find themselves 
in a situation where their choice set is severely constrained. Moreover, negative freedom is 
not sufficient for autonomy either. Imagine someone developing an addiction to painkillers 
after undergoing knee surgery. Now imagine that they begin neglecting their commitments 
and dedicating more time and energy to sourcing additional doses of the drug. We would not 
think of such a person as acting autonomously, despite their actions being uncoerced.  
The necessary and sufficient conditions of autonomy are a matter of philosophical 
dispute. Some accounts require higher-order reflective reasoning (e.g., Dworkin, 1988: 20), 
while others emphasise a robust range of options for individuals to choose their ends from 
(e.g., Raz, 1986: 374). In the next section, I outline and motivate a socially relational 
conception of autonomy, which I will make use for the rest of this thesis. However, for now, 
I must explain autonomy insofar as it will allow us to critically assess the comprehensive 
anti-perfectionist’s position. 
Colburn argues that autonomy requires individuals to reflectively endorse the values 
they hold, and that they must do so under conditions of independence (Colburn, 2010: 25). 
Moreover, for Colburn, autonomy is a second-order value, an upshot of which is that it 
happens to be content-neutral. A value is second-order if it includes a second-order variable, 
namely a variable that tracks de dicto specifications of value, rather than specifications that 
are de re. A value is first-order if it includes a first-order variable only, expressed de re. 
Accordingly, second-order variables need some kind of further specification by way of 
another variable:  
In the specification of some values, there are second-order variables which 
range over (or track) other specifications of value. Let us call ‘second-order’ 
any value which can include a second-order variable. Other values cannot 
contain such a variable: either they specify particular states of affairs, or they 
contain first-order variables, which range only over states of affairs. Let us 
call values of this sort, both of the content-specific and content-neutral kind, 
‘first-order’ (Colburn, 2010: 56-7). 
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According to this distinction, autonomy turns out to be a second-order value since 
following the directive “live autonomously” requires further specification by way of other 
variables, in a way that the directive “live your life according to the teachings of Swedish 
Lutheranism” does not. The latter directive contains a first-order value, while the former 
contains a second-order value. If judgements of the second-order were translated into first-
order judgements, they would then refer to content-specific judgements and we would, in 
effect, be mischaracterising the source of their value. For example, if I decide that the correct 
life for me is a life of religious devotion, and the religion I happen to follow is Swedish 
Lutheranism, then, naturally, the implication of my claim is that I ought to live a life of 
devotion to Swedish Lutheran practices. But it would be a different claim altogether to argue 
that the best life is a life devoted to Swedish Lutheranism, full stop. According to this 
distinction. autonomy turns out not to be a singular, content-specific valuable way of life, but 
rather a way of reflectively and freely endorsing and pursuing first-order values – whatever 
they may be. 
Colburn argues that there are two reasons why a commitment to autonomy is 
inconsistent with perfectionism. First, promoting first-order values would involve 
misidentifying what is valuable. Swedish Lutheran practices in the above example are only 
valuable because they slot into a second-order claim about the value of religious practices. 
To claim the first half of that sentence without the second would be an illegitimate shift of 
meaning, according to Colburn; “at best we turn an unrestricted generalization into a value 
claim that is indexed to a particular individual at a particular time, and at worst we will 
translate a true sentence into one that is false” (ibid, 60). And second, promoting first-order 
values that are not endorsed by all citizens would compel some people to accept claims they 
may not have any reasons to accept, which would, as a matter of practical implication, violate 
their autonomy by making individuals less responsible for the choices that they make as a 
result of this interference (ibid, 27). According to Colburn, accepting the value of autonomy 
is equivalent to accepting the truth of anti-perfectionism – one claim supports the other and 
vice versa. 
Bringing comprehensive anti-perfectionism back to the realm of the capability 
approach, we may offer an equivalent analysis in terms of capabilities. According to this 
analysis, promoting the capability of, say, artistic expression involves promoting a first-order 
value. This is because the value of creative expression underlying the capability picks out a 
content-specific functioning (if indeterminate). On the other hand, promoting the capability 
of autonomy means promoting a second-order value. I will call a second-order capability of 
this kind a meta-capability. I give a more careful definition of this in the next chapter, but for 
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the time being I define it as the capability to exercise capabilities according to one’s 
conception of the good. 
The central idea of the capability approach is that the free exercise of certain 
capabilities is fundamentally valuable irrespective of the choices one makes, and that justice 
requires endowing individuals with the opportunities for exercising capabilities. On this view, 
people are not passive recipients of goods who then convert those into value or utility, but 
rather active and self-conscious shapers of their own lives, for whom the exercise of their 
capacities, such as choice, reflection, or creative pursuits, is of central importance for their 
lives going well. For this reason, I take it that phrasing the claims of justice in terms of 
capabilities already presupposes a nascent commitment to the value of autonomy, even if no 
explicit pronouncements are made in the writings of capability theorists. 
Moreover, Nussbaum aspires for her capability approach to rectify failures of 
individual autonomy which she sees as pernicious threats to justice, even if she does not 
phrase these in the language of autonomy. For example, she worries about adaptive 
preferences and internalisation of oppressive norms (Nussbaum, 2000: 149), both of which 
diminish an individual’s capabilities by dint of damaging her autonomy and alienating her 
practical reason from her own values and reasoning. 
Nussbaum’s conception of capabilities in particular can be shown to have affinity with 
a family of views which analyse autonomy in terms of the social relations that individuals 
stand in. Relational theories of autonomy share a common assumption that “persons are 
socially embedded, and that agents’ identities are formed within the context of social 
relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social determinants, such as race, class, 
gender and ethnicity” (Mackenzie and Stoljar, 2000: 4). This means that an individual’s 
exercise of autonomy is (at least partly) determined by external social forces, such as the 
types of relations she stands in with other individuals. Some relations, such as relations of 
care and reciprocal support, may enhance an individual’s capacity for autonomy by fostering 
confidence or self-reflection, or by placing her in a network where valuable choices are 
available. Other relations diminish an individual’s capacity for autonomy – such as relations 
of subservience, or relations characterised by violence or manipulation. Such relations may 
sap an individual’s beliefs in her own capacities, or they may coercively limit the choices 
available to her (ibid, 22). A central concern of relational theorists of autonomy is “attending 
to and analysing oppressive social contexts and their effects on agents” (ibid, 12). 
For example, Nussbaum has summarised the core idea behind her capability approach 
in the following way: 
63 
 
The core idea is that of the human being as a dignified free being who shapes 
his or her own life in cooperation and reciprocity with others, rather than 
being passively shaped or pushed around by the world in the manner of a 
“flock” or “herd” animal. A life that is really human is one that is shaped 
throughout by these human powers of practical reason and sociability (italics 
mine) (Nussbaum, 2000: 72). 
Not only does Nussbaum recognise reciprocal care in her approach to political morality, 
but she also gives equal emphasis to practical reason and sociability as cornerstones of the 
human condition. Moreover, Nussbaum is motivated for her account of justice to attend to 
disadvantaged and marginalised people. Her discussion of adaptive preferences and harmful 
socialisation would be especially productive when read against the backdrop of relational 
autonomy – a higher-order analysis of what goes wrong with individual practical reason in 
these kinds of cases. But frustratingly, the capability approach remains formally agnostic 
about autonomy and its connection to social relations.   
In short, the capability approach holds that freedom to achieve well-being is of primary 
moral importance. But I will argue that without a robust concept of autonomy, this freedom 
remains underspecified and fails to supply us with the tools needed to identify instances of 
capability failure that come about due to failures of autonomy. The capability approach, 
therefore, has a compelling reason to align itself with an autonomy-minded understanding 
of liberalism, and a socially relational conception of autonomy in particular. Relational 
conceptions of autonomy have a distinctly emancipatory edge, which I believe is perfectly 
suited for the capability approach.  
This particular choice of dialectic also means that it is not necessary for me to provide 
an independent argument for the value of autonomy, as would be the case perhaps if I were 
attempting to defend a comprehensively anti-perfectionist position from a general point of 
view, absent its relation to the capability approach to justice. Instead, I am arguing for a 
particular interpretive move in the context of the capability approach, and the theoretical and 
practical benefits that committing to the value of individual autonomy entail are sufficient 
by their own merit for making this interpretive move.  
2. The Relational Autonomy Toolkit 
In this section, I formalise my argument for aligning the capability approach with a specific 
conception of autonomy: a socially relational conception inspired by the works of Diana 
Meyers (1987, 2014) in particular. I argue that analysing autonomy as causally dependent on 
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a number of social variables can help the capability approach make sense of a number of 
capability failures, as well as to fend off Chamber’s objection from social constructionism, 
according to which liberal approaches to justice are unfit as they fail to recognise the effects 
of social norms on individual choices. 
As we saw in the previous section, conceiving of autonomy as relational means 
recognising that an individual’s capacity for self-government is inextricable from the 
particular social relations she stands in, and the causal effects that these relations have had 
on her, for example, on how she was socialised and what kind of beliefs and attitudes she has 
come to internalise, and so on. For example, a person who has been brought up to believe in 
herself and respect herself will be more capable of governing herself than a person who has 
been routinely scolded for using her own judgement. A person who enjoys loving 
relationships will find that when she sets her mind toward a goal, she will be supported and 
have a network of friends and family whom she can rely on in times of difficulty. On the 
other hand, someone who is isolated, or whose goals are actively undermined by those who 
hold power over her, will find acting on self-directed choices substantially harder. 
Proponents of non-relational conceptions of autonomy insist that their view can 
account for the role of social relations in shaping autonomy without having to claim that 
autonomy is in some important sense relational itself. For example, Gerald Dworkin 
identified autonomy as the “second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their 
first-order preferences” (Dworkin, 1988: 20), which requires “procedural independence”, 
namely freedom from those ways of influencing people which “subvert their reflective and 
critical faculties” (ibid, 18). Colburn’s responsibility and independence constraints, which 
we discussed in the previous section, also protect the individual against external threats to 
autonomy which may be due to social forces (Colburn, 2010: 25). According to these 
examples, autonomy can be affected by external social forces, but it is nonetheless a capacity 
that is internal to the agent. Whether or not someone is autonomous then is ultimately due to 
a set of internal conditions obtaining. 
Relational accounts of autonomy, however, place the focus primarily on the 
individual’s social relations and on the ways in which these relations constitute, or cause the 
development and exercise of autonomy. Social facts are, therefore, not secondary to an 
analysis of autonomy: they are irreducibly central to the possibility of a person being self-
governing. Being autonomous in a relational sense thus means wielding “power and 
authority within central social roles and arrangements” (Oshana, 2005: 183-4) which one 
participates in and is bound by. 
There are numerous ways of refining these claims further. Two distinctions are, 
therefore, in order which will help us make sense of some key differences in relational views 
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on autonomy. First, relational accounts can be either constitutively relational, or causally 
relational. Constitutive accounts hold that personal autonomy is constituted by one’s standing 
in certain kinds of social relations. In other words, it is the social relations themselves that 
are the defining conditions of autonomy (e.g., Christman, 2004: 147). For example, if I enjoy 
relations of respect and mutual recognition, it is by virtue of these relations that I possess the 
capacity for autonomy. On the other hand, if I find myself dominated to a sufficient degree 
by another person, it is necessarily because of this relationship obtaining that I am not 
autonomous, despite other considerations. External conditions which are oppressive take 
away an individual’s de facto power to exercise authority over a person’s actions (Stoljar, 
2018). On the other hand, causal accounts of autonomy hold that social relations have a 
causal influence on the development and exercise of the capacity for autonomy, but that they 
themselves do not constitute autonomy. Causal accounts, therefore, “investigate the effects 
of external ‘relational’ factors on agents’ autonomy” (ibid.), but they do not reduce autonomy 
to relations themselves. 
Second, we can distinguish between procedural and substantive accounts of autonomy. 
Procedural conceptions of autonomy are exclusively concerned with the procedure by which 
individual came to have the desires and preferences they have. For example, Raz holds that 
the autonomous life is “discerned not by what there is in it but by how it came to be” (Raz, 
1986: 371), and so does Colburn, for whom there are no content restrictions of the first-order 
variables that go in specifying the content of autonomous choice.  
On the other hand, substantive accounts of autonomy place a normative constraint on 
the kinds of choices individuals may autonomously hold. For example, Wall (1998) argues 
that autonomy requires the virtue of independent-mindedness for individuals to be able to 
form their own judgements about how to lead their lives (Wall, 1998: 137). Paul Benson 
argues that individuals must have self-respect and responsibility, both of which he 
conceptualises as normative constraints on autonomous choice (Benson, 2000: 80). Natalie 
Stoljar argues that individuals must possess “an ability to criticise courses of action 
competently by relevant normative standards” (Stoljar, 2000:107), which should rule out 
preferences that come about from internalising oppressive norms (ibid.). An upshot of a 
substantive account of autonomy is that certain choices will ipso facto turn out to be 
inconsistent with autonomy. For example, no matter how robust a decision-making procedure 
an individual engages in, if she chooses to, for example, enter into arrangements that are 
hostile to her self-respect or diminish her sense of self, she would have failed to be 
autonomous. Such an account of autonomy rules out the possibility of individuals freely 
entering into voluntary slavery or joining highly restrictive and inegalitarian communities. 
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For example, Oshana (2006) argues that autonomy “is not a matter of being free to act as one 
pleases, but a matter of living in a particular way” (p. 73). 
Meyers develops a procedural, and in her words value-neutral, account of autonomy, 
which incorporates some normative content in the formulation of a list of agentic 
competencies which she argues are constitutive of autonomy:  
Autonomous people exercise a repertoire of skills to engage in self-discovery, 
self-definition and self-direction . . . The authentic self is the evolving 
collocation of attributes that emerges in this ongoing process of reflection, 
deliberation and action. (Meyers 2005, 49) 
Meyers recognises that agentic skills are causally dependent on socialisation and the 
relationships individuals enjoy. The exercise of some skills may be damaged by the kinds 
of oppressive practices we have considered in this thesis so far. Meyers also argues that her 
account requires self-respect which, if damaged by oppression, may mean that the 
individual never learns to be autonomous (Meyers 1989: 208 cited in Stoljar, 2018). 
Understanding the effects that socialisation has on individuals’ choices is essential for 
justice, not least because socialisation can compel oppressed people to endorse their 
oppression. Socialisation also reflects hierarchies of power, which are causal impediments 
to achieving justice. For example, a “differential childhood socialization continues to funnel 
girls into the psychology of dependency and altruistic devotion to others, which is 
traditionally associated with femininity” (Meyers, 1987: 621). This limits women’s choices 
in patriarchal societies in ways that may look perfectly voluntary and innocuous from a 
standpoint that is insensitive to a social analysis of autonomy. Conceptualising autonomy 
as primarily social is essential for making sense of the ways social norms subvert our 
internal capacities, and our capabilities, in turn. 
Meyers distinguishes seven types of agentic skills: 
1. Introspection skills that sensitize individuals to their own feelings and 
desires, that enable them to interpret their subjective experience, and that 
help them judge how accurate their self-understanding is. 
2. Communication skills that enable individuals to get the benefit of others’ 
perceptions, background knowledge, insights, advice, and support. 
3. Memory skills that enable individuals to recall relevant experiences – from 
their own lives and also those that acquaintances have recounted or that they 
have encountered in literature or other art forms. 
67 
 
4. Imagination skills that enable individuals to envisage feasible options – to 
audition a range of self-conceptions they might aspire to and to preview a 
variety of courses of action they might follow. 
5. Analytical skills and reasoning skills that enable individuals to assess the 
relative merits of different conceptions of what they could be like and 
directions they could pursue. 
6. Self-nurturing skills that enable individuals to secure their physical and 
psychological equilibrium despite missteps and setbacks – that enable them 
to appreciate the overall worthiness of their self-understandings and 
pursuits and to assure themselves of their capacity to carry on when they 
find themselves wanting or their life directions misguided. 
7. Volitional skills that enable individuals to resist pressure to capitulate to 
convention and enable them to maintain their commitment to their values 
and goals (Meyers, 2014: 121). 
Meyers holds that this account of autonomy is procedural because what makes a 
desire or preference autonomous, according to this account, is that it is developed through 
the concerted exercise of the above competencies. By contrast, a person would fail to be 
autonomous if she lived a life of uncritical acceptance of social norms and expectations, or 
if her actions were entirely random or unguided by any of the above competencies. However, 
it is plain to see that this particular framework of competencies has non-negligible 
normative content. For that reason, it may be more accurate to refer to it as a weakly 
substantive view of autonomy. According to Benson (2005), weakly substantive views of 
autonomy have normative content, but they do not impose direct constraints on the 
preferences of agents, unlike the strong substantive accounts we considered earlier, for 
whom the exercise of autonomy has fairly specific normative parameters.13 Meyers stresses 
that it is important that “a theory of autonomy should not homogenize agents” (Meyers, 
2000: 480) and should instead be value-neutral and, in turn, accommodating of a range of 
choices individuals may make. She insists that her view, however, is not value-laden, even 
if it may be “value-utilizing” (Meyers, 2014: 121) in the sense of relying on a class of 
normative claims in the formulation of a list of competencies.  
 
13 A comparison with Gerald Dworkin’s (1988) higher-order reflection account may make this distinction 
between procedural and weakly normative views of autonomy clearer. For Dworkin, autonomy consists in 
the “second-order capacity of persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences”. The normative 
content here is minimal. The procedure that Meyers’ account has us follow, on the other hand, is more 




There is ample philosophical debate over the adequacy of procedural or weakly 
substantive views of autonomy. For example, Stoljar argues that such accounts are too weak 
to challenge the internalisation of oppressive norms in practice because some preferences 
may satisfy all the pertinent procedural standards, but still turn out to engender oppressive 
or unjust norms (Stoljar, 2000). Stoljar refers to this as the ‘feminist intuition’, or the 
intuition that despite passing the hurdles of procedural autonomy conditions, it would be 
inadequate to treat all of women’s preferences as necessarily autonomous. To illustrate this 
intuition, Stoljar uses an example by Benson (1991 cited in ibid.) in which a college student 
who excels in her studies and leads an active, challenging, and otherwise autonomous life, 
nonetheless expends a lot of time and money in worrying about her appearance. Benson 
explains that internalizing norms (in this case, norms of femininity) blocks the agent’s 
capacity to resist the development of preferences which result from this norm. The girl in 
the example may pass all of the procedural tests for autonomy, but according to Stoljar, we 
would be right to exercise the feminine intuition and argue that her autonomy is indeed 
hampered by the norms she has internalised. Stoljar argues that we ought to endorse a 
stronger account of autonomy which places direct normative constraints on the content of 
individuals’ preferences (Stoljar, 2000: 108-9). 
While I cannot adjudicate this particular debate here—or any of the other similar 
debates in the relational literature—I take it that there are additional political reasons for 
opting for a view of autonomy which is consistent with a wide range of choices and 
preferences. We saw Meyers argue that a theory of autonomy should not homogenize agents, 
and I take it that this claim is all the more significant in the context of this thesis. Namely, 
I argue that autonomy is the value which animates the capability approach, and for this 
claim to be coherent, we must understand autonomy to be a procedural, content-neutral 
value which is consistent with a wide range of choices and preferences. That is to say, the 
same reasons that hold for opposing perfectionism hold here. We should be careful not to 
sneak in any perfectionist assumptions into our account of autonomy.  
Moreover, I find Meyers’ account of autonomy competencies sufficiently robust to 
effectively rule out the kinds of uncritical endorsements of unjust norms that we have seen 
philosophers like Chambers and Stoljar worry about. I concede that this leaves a conceptual 
possibility of an individual entering into deeply unjust and inegalitarian practices, 
something a substantive account would rule out ipso facto. But this conceptual possibility 
does not worry me since I take it will be extremely unlikely for an individual with genuine 
self-mastery to come to a decision like that autonomously. And since public authorities 
would be obligated to investigate instances of what looks like genuine oppression, the 
conceptual possibility of an autonomously subservient person should not do much to change 
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our practical approach to such problems. 14 There are several conceptual possibilities that 
we may not be entitled to rule out from a philosophical perspective, but these should not 
worry us from a policy perspective, given the evidence for their improbability. It is, after 
all, a conceptual possibility that we are all brains in a vat, or highly complicated simulations, 
yet we would find it odd to allow these possibilities to guide policy. 
At any rate, I argue that a comprehensive capability approach committed to the goal of 
promoting autonomy is better equipped to achieve its purported aim of empowering 
individuals and allowing them to pursue well-being according to their own values. Adopting 
a comprehensive commitment to a relational conception of autonomy can enable this version 
of the capability approach to pertain to a larger set of real-world injustices by identifying 
capability failures which come about as failures of autonomy. In particular, adopting a 
competency-based account of autonomy is fitting since competencies refer to the internal 
requirements of individual capabilities. This way, we can subsume an analysis of autonomy 
into capability terms. In the next section, I will argue that autonomy should be understood as 
a specific kind of capability, and we may use Meyers’ account of autonomy competencies as 
a plausible starting point for thinking about the internal requirements of this capability.  
Without a normative commitment to autonomy, there is a particular flaw in the way 
Nussbaum demarcates problems for global justice. Nussbaum’s ambivalence toward the 
value of autonomy makes unclear the extent to which supposed threats to an individual’s 
capacity for autonomy would be considered problems for a capability view of justice to tackle. 
For example, large swathes of the global population live under the rule of authoritarian 
strongmen and, as a result, have few opportunities to exercise their capacity for autonomy, 
as well as key capabilities. The capability approach intends to guarantee a solution to the 
latter problem, but not necessarily the former. Nussbaum argues that freedom and autonomy 
need not figure in every person’s conception of the good life and that “we should respect 
people who prefer a life within an authoritarian religion (or personal relationship), so long as 
certain basic opportunities and exit options are firmly guaranteed” (Nussbaum, 2005: 60).  
I take this to be a problematic way of reasoning, which reveals a deeper failing of 
Nussbaum’s view. Nussbaum overestimates the extent to which individuals are free in the 
face of an absence of external obstacles. This is a more applied version of the problem I 
 
14 I don’t take this to extend to the most extreme case of supposed voluntary slavery though. I find that to 
simply be a confused use of language. An individual may choose not to exercise her autonomy (either in the 
first-order or second-order sense), but she can never fully relinquish her own moral authority over her 
decisions. Thus the voluntary slave is nothing more than a person with a temporarily self-effacing lack of 
autarchy and autonomy. If she were to change her mind after enslavement, she would, of course, cease to 




addressed in the previous chapter, namely, that Nussbaum’s concept of free agency is not 
responsive to certain kinds of obstacles to autonomy. A discussion of exit options can help 
refine my point and to motivate my claim that a comprehensive approach to justice is 
necessary going forward. 
Exit options are insufficient for guaranteeing freedom of the kind Nussbaum intends 
here. A focus on exit options as a subset of choice available to an individual presupposes a 
naïve view of individual choice and the extent to which individuals can transcend the social 
world. It is a view where the choice of exit from an asymmetrical relationship can arise and 
be acted on by a rational individual. For example, suppose I join a religious commune and 
accept their way of life fully. I have explicitly rescinded my old relationships and values in 
favour of immersing myself in the practices of the commune. Now suppose that after some 
time has passed, I grow bored of this way of life and consider leaving. What would have to 
be the case for me to have a meaningful exit option? Well, for a start, I must have sufficient 
negative freedom to leave the commune, that is to say, there must not be anybody or anything 
physically preventing me from packing my bags and leaving. Suppose that I do have ample 
negative freedom, but the opportunity cost of leaving behind this way of life that I have 
grown accustomed too is just too high. I risk losing the only people in life that care about me, 
and I risk giving up the only structures that give my life a sense of meaning. Do I have a 
meaningful option of exit, given all of this? 
Before we answer that, let us consider a third case, which is a variation on the second. 
Suppose that the leader of the commune has noticed signs of my discontent and in an effort 
to prevent sedition, has been engaging in a process of subtly gaslighting me about the 
prospects of my life if I leave the commune. Suppose he has succeeded, and my self-worth 
becomes tied to my standing in the commune, such that even contemplating leaving it fills 
me with enough fear to deter any thought of leaving. Again, do I have a real exit option here? 
I take it to be clear that neither in the second nor third case do I have a meaningful exit 
option. In the second, the costs are simply too high for me to afford to leave, and in the third, 
I have been manipulated into staying and I hold insufficient power over my will. It is unclear 
how robust Nussbaum’s notion of an exit option is for relationships and ways of life of this 
sort, and whether it would recognise cases like this as the injustices that they are. But I take 
it that even if we had compelling reasons to remedy problems like this (although it is unclear 
whether Nussbaum does, given her claim that not everyone values autonomy), the focus on 
exit options is simply an ill-fitting piece of the argument. The notion of an exit option is 
ambiguous between a range of readings – a purely formal opportunity in the negative liberty 
sense in one end, and an extremely demanding one in the other end which would 
accommodate my examples above. I take it that it for Nussbaum to be able to motivate the 
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more demanding reading of an exit option, she would have to claim that autonomy is, in fact, 
valuable for individuals, or more valuable than she is willing to admit. Without a robust set 
of necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy, we are left with the formal reading, 
which, in practice, is of little practical use as my examples above illustrate.  
This is precisely why I argue that the tools provided by relational autonomy are 
essential for theorising about justice. The claim that exit options are sufficient in autonomy-
threatening situations assumes an implausible conception of the person as a detached chooser 
who can transcend her social situation at will. This is not an accurate picture of a human 
being for similar reasons that we saw Chambers articulate in Chapter 2.  
So, is Nussbaum wrong to claim that autonomy need not feature in every person’s 
conception of the good? In a sense, she is. Recall Colburn’s (2010) distinction between first- 
and second-order values. The autonomy that Colburn argues we ought to promote is a 
second-order value – it consists in second-order judgements about various first-order 
variables that may de dicto form the content of those judgements. However, autonomy can 
also be understood in the first-order sense; Colburn calls this reading ‘autarchy’ (Colburn, 
2010: 54), which can be described as a content-specific kind of autonomy. We can refer to 
this kind of autonomy as a detachedness, independence, or self-sufficiency. An individual 
has autarchy insofar as she is free of external influences and obstacles.  
Now, Nussbaum is entirely correct to claim that autonomy need not figure in every 
person’s conception of the good life, and that the state has no reason to compel people to live 
lives that are characterised by this value, if we understand Nussbaum to mean autarchy here. 
Indeed, there will be plenty of lives that contain very little autarchy – including lives that 
Nussbaum refers to in the quote above, such as lives lived under voluntary religious 
restrictions. But I take it would be a mistake to argue that autonomy in the second-order sense 
is therefore also a contestable value. If indeed it was, then Nussbaum’s own claims about 
needing to institute exit options would never get off the ground for they would simply lack 
any normative force. Even when individuals claim to not value autonomy, say, by voluntarily 
defaulting on a traditional way of life or entering into arrangements that limit their freedom, 
they are nonetheless exercising a kind of capacity: they are choosing not to choose. To 
exercise autonomy in the second-order sense of the word is to assert one’s normative 
authority to make decisions, even if these decisions are sometimes self-effacing. 
Moreover, reading Nussbaum this way has important implications for capabilities. If 
individuals surrender their autarchy, and if they do so autonomously, this need not be a 
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problem for a capability view of justice.15 However, there will be numerous cases in which 
individuals’ exercise of their autonomy has been constrained, either due to socialisation or 
other impediments. In such situations, people will also fail to have adequate capabilities to 
pursue well-being freely and according to their own reasons. And this is precisely why 
autonomy in the second-order sense is indispensable for the capability approach – it enables 
the successful pursuit of capabilities.  
A comprehensive commitment to the value of autonomy is, therefore, necessary for 
championing individual capabilities. An analysis of capabilities must be replete with an 
understanding of what kinds of social relations facilitate or impede a person’s capacity for 
self-government. By contrast, a framework that says very little about the nature of 
autonomous personhood may result in idiosyncratic policy results, where the relevant 
conditions are specified later in the policy process and vary between contexts. This may lead 
to problems: for example, two seemingly like-minded policies may have different results 
owing to differences in interpreting the concept, or a particular policy may have unintended 
consequences for an underprivileged group because its authors operationalised the concept 
in a way that was blind to existing power relations. Under some conceptions of autonomy, I 
could be said to have an exit option in the religious commune example, even if the social 
relations that bind me to it make the costs of leaving unbearably high. I suspect similar 
conflicts will invariably occur when deliberating about the extent to which individuals and 
communities around the world can be said to possess the capabilities that capability justice 
aspires them to have. 
Perhaps a potential problem for this proposed reinterpretation of the approach would 
be the evident disagreement in the literature on the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
autonomy. According to such an objection to my proposal, a capability approach built on a 
supposedly partisan and contested view of autonomy may end up obscuring more than it 
illuminates, and it would be vulnerable to criticism from philosophers who take a different 
view on the conditions of autonomy. The purported advantage that I have been endorsing 
might, therefore, turn out not to be an advantage at all. If so, we might be better off sticking 
to a capability approach which does not take a side on these substantive issues and remains 
agnostic about the requirements of autonomy. 
I address this problem primarily to acknowledge the partisan nature of my approach, 
even if I may not have a deductively sound argument for why it is the correct one, or why all 
others are deficient. What I can do to motivate this conception—above what I have already 
 
15 Although philosophers who endorse a more substantive reading of autonomy (e.g., Oshana, 2006) would 
argue that some such choices would simply be impossible to be done autonomously. According to their views, 
if someone was to enter into arrangements that severely limit their autarchy, this would be cause for concern. 
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argued in this section—is to emphasise the practical ease with which a capabilitarian allied 
with Nussbaum can make this interpretive move. Not only does a relational conception of 
individual autonomy make explicit a number of claims about the impetus of capabilities 
which Nussbaum already implicitly holds, it has a distinctly emancipatory edge, which I 
believe is perfectly suited for the capability approach. Theorists in this literature have been 
keenly aware of how traditional moral and political philosophy has been indifferent, or even 
outright hostile to minorities and disadvantaged peoples. If my claims in this section have 
been successful, an alignment with relational autonomy can offer the capability theorist the 
tools she needs to make this emancipation reality. 
3. The Anti-Perfectionist Toolkit  
We have now seen the benefits of aligning the capability approach with comprehensive 
autonomy. It remains to be seen what role anti-perfectionism ought to play in capability 
justice, aside from the obvious role of being entailed by my claim that autonomy happens to 
be a foundational value for capability justice. In this section, I argue that a principle of anti-
perfectionism is exactly what the capability approach needs in order to distinguish between 
acceptable and unacceptable forms of paternalism. 
If my argument in Chapter 2 was successful, then there is a compelling reason to favour 
a capability approach which can be shown to avoid perfectionism. Conceiving of capabilities 
as content-specific freedoms based on objective judgements about the good implies a kind 
of disrespect toward individuals which is incompatible with treating people as normative 
authors of their lives. Recall that I endorsed Quong’s account for why paternalism is 
presumptively wrong; that is, because it implies a disrespectful judgement about an 
individual’s lack of ability, or her likelihood not to make good or correct decisions. The 
principle of anti-perfectionism I defend in this thesis, therefore, allows room for a particular 
kind of (in my view) justified paternalistic interference, namely, interference under 
conditions where individuals are demonstrably lacking in the meta-capability for autonomy. 
Under such conditions, I take it that it is legitimate for state institutions to take an interest in 
the content of their choices. However, the goal of such a program is not to compel people to 
make better choices, or to prevent them from harming themselves. On my view, the rightful 
end of paternalism would be to remedy autonomy failures and to ensure that individuals are 
extricated from situations or social practices that undermine their autonomy. In practice, this 
may involve compelling people to change their behaviour, but I treat this as a foreseeable 
consequence of some paternalistic interventions, rather than the proper aim of justice. 
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In the next chapter, I propose that the promotion of the meta-capability of autonomy 
ought to have lexical priority over the promotion of capabilities. This move is intended to 
clear the way for a justifiable and legitimate avenue for paternalistic interference in the 
choices of individuals: those cases in which individuals have been shown to lack the meta-
capability of autonomy. This is the only instance in which the content of people’s first-order 
choices may legitimately be interfered with according to my account. This is because if 
individuals can be shown to lack the capacity for autonomy, the legitimacy and authority of 
their subsequent actions can be called into question. If someone identifies with oppressive 
and unjust norms, then we are entitled to question the normative authority over which they 
endorse these norms. In my view, this is a justifiable intervention, and one that is required 
by capability justice in order to remedy possible capability failures. 
I take it that this way of negotiating a principle of paternalism is more attractive and 
straightforward than Nussbaum’s, whose response to accusations that her account is too 
paternalistic takes either of the following two forms. Nussbaum either points to the politically 
liberal credentials of her view to show that capabilities are promoted only in a thin and 
political sense, or she bites the bullet and argues that a measure of paternalism is necessary 
for tackling injustice. Nussbaum employs the former strategy when she looks at the 
possibility of an individual’s desires being corrupted against her own knowledge. She argues 
that overriding individual’s self-reported desires in such a case “does not entail an 
unacceptable type of paternalism, if this recognition is combined with a version of political 
liberalism and a focus on capabilities as political goals” (Nussbaum, 2000: 8). Nussbaum 
uses the latter strategy in the following passage: 
Any bill of rights is paternalistic (…), if paternalism means simply telling 
people that they cannot behave in some way that they have traditionally 
behaved and want to behave. (…) More generally, any system of law is 
paternalistic, keeping some people from doing some things that they want to 
do. It is fully consistent to reject some forms of paternalism while supporting 
[others] (ibid, 53). 
Nussbaum’s stance on paternalism here is rather blunt and underspecified. It is unclear 
what conditions have to obtain for paternalistic interventions to count as legitimate. She takes 
paternalism to be justified when it compels people to stop acting in unjust and oppressive 
ways. Elsewhere, she has argued that some capabilities, like health and bodily integrity, are 
so crucial to individual well-being that “they are legitimate areas of interference with choice 
up to a point” (Nussbaum, 2000: 95).  
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Of course, a capability approach to justice should not be hampered by a blanket ban on 
paternalism. For example, Nussbaum argues compellingly that adaptive preferences and 
desire corruption have a corrosive effect on individual agency (e.g., ibid, 117). According to 
such arguments, to treat every one of an individual’s self-expressed desires, no matter the 
circumstances that led to their development, as necessarily authoritative and stemming from 
their authentic self, would amount to allowing various present injustices to go on 
unchallenged. For example, a person may voluntarily endorse not having freedom over her 
reproductive choices, or she may voluntarily participate in social practices that treat her as 
politically inferior. Policies that seek to address these injustices and dismantle the associated 
social practices will invariably come across as paternalistic since they will involve 
questioning and dismissing individuals’ stated desires. 
The principle for distinguishing between justifiable and unjustifiable forms of 
paternalism defended here is superior to Nussbaum’s principle because it does not consist of 
an ad hoc modification of a foundational principle. Nussbaum claims that individual choices 
ought to be protected except in cases that meet a loosely defined set of conditions. The 
principle I defend holds that the normative authority with which individuals are assumed to 
make decisions can only be questioned when there is reason to think this authority may be 
subverted due to a failure of her agentic competencies. This is, therefore, a procedural 
principle. 
However, is this a plausible principle? After all, relational conceptions of autonomy 
are infamously demanding, and if we assume the necessary conditions of autonomy to be 
demanding in such a way, we might be endorsing a principle that calls for an extraordinary 
degree of paternalism. For example, John Christman points out the difficulty of spelling out 
workable conditions of autonomy for such “finite, socially located, embodied beings” as us 
(Christman, 2015: 147). Christman claims that people’s choices “are limited by [their] 
physicality, the contingencies of birth and countless other unchosen and unchangeable 
aspects of their condition” (ibid.). If we understand people’s capacity for autonomy to be 
conditional on the social relations they stand in, it become extremely difficult to formulate 
practicable conditions for establishing which of an individual’s preferences are due to 
authentic reflection, and which are due to an uncritical acceptance of social norms and 
expectations. 
One response to this objection would be to bite the bullet and argue that the claims of 
relational autonomy are in fact demanding because of how sensitive our capacity for 
autonomy is to external influence. According to this line of thought, public authorities have 
to be involved in the lives of its citizens simply because of how easy it is for autonomy to be 
undermined by other actors. Suffice to say, such a response would not be very convincing. 
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Aside from entailing the politically unpalatable implication that individuals ought to be 
compelled to be free by being forced to repudiate their social commitments, it would also 
suggest an unattractive and misleading picture of autonomy. Being autonomous should not 
be a matter of transcending social influences and living independently of others.  
A better response would be to follow Linda Barclay (2000) who points out that 
“autonomous agency does not imply that one mysteriously escapes altogether from social 
influence but rather that one is able to fashion a certain response to it” (Barclay, 2000: 54). 
On Barclay’s view, autonomy is continually constructed by individuals who have to negotiate 
the effects of socialisation. Accordingly, being autonomous does not mean warding yourself 
off against any social influence, malign or otherwise. Rather, it means being able to respond 
to social influences in an appropriately critical and authentic way. Joel Feinberg (1980) writes: 
Our standards must be high enough to exclude subtle counterfeits of 
authenticity, yet not so high as to render authenticity an empty or unrealizable 
idea . . . We may all be in, some respects, irrevocably the products of our 
culture, but that is no reason why the self that is such a product cannot be 
free to govern the self it is. (Feinberg, 1980: 22) 
If we take this line of thinking, then we need not accept the view that the state is 
committed to micro-managing people’s beliefs and relations in the name of justice. Rather, 
what we need to do is to identify widespread social practices that are empirically shown to 
diminish individual autonomy by damaging people’s exercise of the agentic competencies 
described in Section 1. Dismantling these social practices and supporting the individuals 




This chapter has argued that there are compelling reasons for the capability approach to 
realign itself with comprehensive anti-perfectionism – an interpretation of liberal theory 
based on the foundational claim that individual autonomy is valuable, and that this value 
precludes perfectionism. Aside from being able to resolve the normative inconsistency we 
saw the capability approach face in Chapter 1, I argued that this alignment provides practical 
tools for identifying and responding to capability failures which come about because of the 
internalisation of unjust social norms. I also argued that the particular principle of anti-
perfectionism which I endorse doubles up as a principle for distinguishing between justifiable 
and unjustifiable forms of paternalistic intervention in people’s lives.   
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Chapter 4: A Two-Step Capability Approach to Justice 
In the previous chapter, I argued that there are compelling reasons for the capability theorist 
to embrace autonomy and to disavow perfectionism. It remains to be seen how a capability 
approach to justice can do these things in practice, and how it may evade a series of 
challenges associated with this particular combination of claims. 
In this chapter, I defend a two-step approach which consists of two principles arranged 
in lexical priority. First, governments have a moral obligation to secure individuals with a 
meta-capability of autonomy. That is to say, governments must provide the conditions which 
are conducive to individuals exercising a range of agentic competencies which are 
constitutive of autonomy. Second, governments have a moral obligation to provide 
opportunities for individuals to exercise this meta-capability in six domains of well-being: 
health, politics, knowledge, relationships, self-expression, and work. I argue that exercising 
autonomous choice in the pursuit of welfare is necessary for a good life, regardless of the 
specific choices individuals eventually make, and even if they choose to forgo some 
supposedly valuable choices altogether. 
In Section 1, I define meta-capabilities and capability domains and motivate my 
account of capability justice. In Section 2, I provide an account of how the capability 
approach can respond to unjust social norms and relations in practice by recognising a class 
of relational conversion factors. In Section 3, I address three significant objections to the 
proposal in this chapter: that it involves subordinating some citizens, that it is incoherent, 
and that it is practically unstable. I show that all three fail to offer good reasons to oppose a 
comprehensively anti-perfectionist capability approach to justice. 
 
1. Capabilities Revisited 
The capability approach to justice I develop here consists of two steps. Step one, which takes 
priority, is to guarantee individuals with the meta-capability of autonomy. This step involves 
endowing individuals with the means to govern themselves effectively by promoting a range 
of agentic competencies and challenging social structures and practice which give way to 
relations of subservience, oppression, or disrespect. For this end, I conceive of autonomy as 
a particular kind of capability which is constitutive of the successful exercise of other 
capabilities. 
Step two of this approach then resembles a more traditional capability approach to 
justice. According to this step, governments must guarantee individuals with opportunities 
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to exercise a range of capabilities across several key domains of well-being. I propose that 
we understand well-being as classified into six domains of human activity, with somewhat 
porous boundaries. Moreover, I take this move to be a suggestion and, therefore, not final. I 
take it that there are multiple and overlapping ways of carving up the logical space of well-
being, which may depend on a number of considerations. The defining feature of this 
framework should be the idea that instead of enumerating specific capabilities, we classify 
significant ways of being into domains over which we entrust each individual as the most 
authoritative judge for what is to count as a valuable capability in the first place and which 
capabilities are worth possessing and exercising given their conceptions of the good.  
 
1.1 Autonomy as Meta-Capability 
I define a meta-capability as a second-order capability. To adapt Colburn’s (2010) 
terminology of second-order values, I define a second-order capability as a capability which 
does not refer to sets of (first-order) functionings, but rather ranges over the exercise of other 
capabilities. In short, a meta-capability can be understood as the capability to be capable to 
achieve functionings. This way of phrasing it may sound a little obtuse, but it helps illustrate 
the second-order nature of this kind of capability. 
Aside from trading in second-order values in a way that is analogous to Colburn’s 
analysis, a meta-capability is also a distinct kind of capability whose exercise constitutes the 
appropriate exercise of capabilities simpliciter. In my view, an individual most possess the 
meta-capability of autonomy for her to be able to exercise her human capabilities freely and 
reflectively. As such, this meta-capability plays a similar functional role to Nussbaum’s 
architectonic capabilities of practical reason and affiliation which “organize and suffuse all 
the others” (Nussbaum, 2000: 82). Nussbaum notes that practical reason is necessary for the 
exercise of other capabilities, but conceiving of the capacity for autonomy as a second-order 
capability means recognising that the relation in question is not one of mere necessity. In this 
section, I argue that autonomy is constitutive of an agent’s capacity to exercise her 
capabilities. A similar claim could be made about the architectonic capability of affiliation, 
but in my analysis, this is subsumed under the meta-capability of autonomy, since I take it 
that social relations are indispensable for the possession and exercise of autonomy.  
To conceive of meta-capabilities as deserving lexical priority to capabilities is not to 
conceive of them as ontologically simpler than the capabilities, or as mereological parts. 
Meta-capabilities are just as complex as capabilities: they are made up of internal capacities 
and skills, and their exercise necessitates the presence of certain external facts, like sufficient 
lack of obstacles, availability of options and so on. Unlike capabilities, however, meta-
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capabilities do not refer to concrete dimensions of well-being. Individuals may have an 
independent interest in exercising their judgement to choose, such that a life where judgement 
is not exercised would be one with considerably lower well-being. However, I propose to 
understand this interest in a second-order sense, that is to say, as ranging over dimensions of 
well-being. So, I may have an interest that I am able to exercise my judgement on matters of 
my health, and on the kinds of hobbies I wish to pursue. But perhaps I am content with 
defaulting on my partner’s or family’s judgement when it comes to religious matters. This 
would be consistent under a multi- order analysis of the kind I am proposing, and it illustrates 
the reason why we should understand capabilities and meta-capabilities as independent. My 
claim that I value exercising my judgement in one domain is consistent with the claim that 
this need not hold for other domains.  
According to my view, an individual must possess the meta-capability of autonomy in 
order to pursue well-being according to her conception of the good. On my view, this would 
consist in the choice of what counts as a relevant and valuable capability in the first place, 
and in the acts of availing yourself to particular capabilities and exercising them. This is 
because one must exercise free, reflective, and critical judgement for the exercise of 
capabilities to count as their own. The alternative would be exercising capabilities non-
autonomously, for example, because of a critical acceptance of social norms or expectations, 
or due to manipulation or adapted preferences, or perhaps in a way that is random and free 
of reason altogether.  
I have argued already that autonomy is a meta-capability because of the unique 
function that it plays in guiding our activities and giving their pursuit a distinctly authentic 
identification. I leave open the possibility that we may discern other meta-capabilities. For 
example, Sridhar Venkatapuram (2011), conceives of health as a meta-capability. Recently, 
Claassen (2019) has argued that there ought to be a meta-capability for navigational agency 
(Claassen, 2019: 51). For the time being, I am interested in highlighting and querying the 
role that individual autonomy plays in organising and justifying the capability approach to 
justice. I see no reason why discerning autonomy may not be consistent with identifying 
other capabilities in this second-order sense.  
1.2. Capability Domains 
 
Recall that a capability refers to the freedom to pursue well-being. In Nussbaum’s index of 
central capabilities, each capability refers to the freedom to do valuable things across a range 
of dimensions of well-being, such as health, bodily integrity, and creative expression. I retain 
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the structure of this definition, but I propose refiguring how narrowly we understand 
dimension of well-being and how specific each capability should be, in turn. 
As we saw in Chapter 1, Nussbaum’s list of capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000: 78-80) 
tracks an array of independently valuable functionings, like engaging in valuable 
relationships, expressing oneself creatively, and exercising control over one’s environment. 
By contrast, I propose a list of capabilities which tracks domains of choice without gesturing 
at specific choices individuals may ultimately make and without containing implicit claims 
about the relative value of some choices over others. I take it that this way of formulating 
the capabilities is necessary to implement comprehensive anti-perfectionism. In other words, 
I take it that this move is necessary to show adequate respect for each individual as author 
of their life. Moreover, because capability promotion at this level presupposes that 
individuals possess the meta-capability of autonomy, we need not worry here about having 
to override individuals’ choices to prevent harm to them. These problems exist at a different 
order for they are failures of individual autonomy, and not substantive failures of individuals 
having made the wrong first-order choice. This is why lexical priority between steps one and 
two of my account of justice is critical – it is intended to correct for deficiencies in people’s 
judgement making capacities and to prevent state institutions from micromanaging the 
content of individuals’ choices. Before we distribute the goods and opportunities necessary 
for promoting capabilities, we must be confident that these will be used by individuals who 
are capable of deciding for themselves what capabilities they wish to avail themselves of.  
The main task of this chapter, however, is to establish that that we carve up the logical 
space of well-being into six domains of capability. By domains of capability, I refer to areas 
of a person’s life which (a) track their well-being in some significant sense and which (b) 
contain any number of pertinent capabilities that individuals may deem significant for their 
well-being to select, and to ultimately exercise. Availing yourself to capabilities will then 
involve exercising autonomous judgement.  
Perhaps an immediate drawback of such a capability framework would be that the 
concept of capability becomes less fine-grained than it appears in, say, Nussbaum’s work. 
For example, when Nussbaum speaks of the capability for creative expression, she 
enumerates specific activities and ways of being that constitute it. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
she provides a series of sketches of what a life replete with valuable opportunities would 
look like. Whereas by picking out, say, a domain of self-expression, I am not gesturing at 
how this cluster of capabilities is to be realised in practice. I am merely identifying that self-
expression is a significant constituent of individual welfare, and that individuals must be 
given a variety of opportunities to realise this activity in multiple incommensurable ways. 
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I take this to be a strength of my account, rather than a weakness. Capabilities should 
be multiply realisable and multiply divisible. This account of capability is less fine-grained 
by design in order to accommodate the observation that the exact content of capability will 
change from context to context, and from individual to individual. Consider an analogy with 
language. The precise meaning of what we take the phrase ‘language skills’ to mean will 
differ by context. Language skills refer to a wide array of skills; what we mean exactly will 
flexibly change based on our intended level of precision. When we ask if a toddler has 
language skills, what we have in mind is, for example, if they can pronounce words clearly 
or answer simple questions. When we ask the same question of an adult learning a second 
language, we may want to find out if they understand puns or conversational implicature and 
so on. By analogy, the notion of capability in any of the domains I propose can refer to a 
broad range of multiply divisible functionings with meaning that will ultimately be indexed 
to individuals.  
But if this is how we understand capabilities, does it not make capability promotion 
extremely indeterminate? State institutions are not privy to each individual’s conception of 
the good, and they cannot design distributive policies in such a bespoke way. Of course, that 
is not what I have in mind here. I argue that so long as unjust social practices and power 
structures are removed as per step 1 of my account, and individuals are capable of exercising 
autonomous judgement, then the rest of the work for capability justice is in providing 
individuals with a range of opportunities so that they may exercise their autonomous 
judgement across a range of possible activities. In practice, this will require drawing an 
adequate threshold of opportunities for each capability domain.  
I propose that we understand capabilities as falling into six domains: 
1. Health capabilities, 
2. Political capabilities, 
3. Epistemic capabilities, 
4. Relational capabilities, 
5. Self-expression capabilities, 
6. Work capabilities. 16 
 
16 I remain open to the possibility of defending a framework of different constituents, perhaps, formulating 
them in a broader or narrower sense. The defining feature of this framework should be the idea that instead 
of enumerating specific capabilities (which, in turn, refer to specific functionings), we are enumerating 
domains of well-being in which individuals themselves are the best judges for what counts as a capability in 
the first place, and which capabilities are worth exercising (so long as they possess the necessary meta-
capabilities to appropriately exercise capabilities). 
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First, while health is a fundamentally important dimension of well-being, one that in 
some situations may entirely eclipse all others, I take it that it that health still refers to a 
dimension of well-being, rather than to something that enables or constitutes the pursuit of 
well-being. For example, Venkatapuram (2011) proposes that we think of health as a meta-
capability, while Nussbaum thinks that individual choices in the domain of health can, in 
some situations, be overridden altogether. Health is not a meta-capability under my 
definition of the term for reasons I have already stated, and I am willing to yield to 
Nussbaum’s point that some health decisions may be overridden, but only for the procedural 
reason that we can demonstrate these decisions to come about because of failures of 
autonomy. That is to say, we may override an individual’s decisions about her health only 
under the conditions that those decisions had been made non-autonomously and, therefore, 
lacking in normative authority, for example, under conditions of manipulation, or adapted 
preferences or internalised oppression.  
There will, of course, be no shortage of practical examples that will challenge my claim. 
Suppose I subscribe to a particular religious view that prohibits undergoing blood 
transfusions, and I suffer significant trauma and lose blood. Would medical professionals be 
acting wrongly if they were to proceed with authorising a blood transfusion? Or suppose I 
have a terminal health condition, and instead of slowly wasting away in a hospital or hospice, 
I decide to voluntarily end my life under my own terms. Would my family and doctors be 
acting wrongly if they were to deny this request?  
These are fascinating questions which I cannot answer here, but I take it that a 
satisfying answer will have to depend on more information: most importantly, whether the 
choices under consideration have been made under conditions which were conducive to 
autonomy. For example, if my religious refusal of a blood transfusion had been internalised 
due to manipulation or peer pressure, or if I were to repudiate this belief had I been given 
the opportunity to reflect on it critically, it would not hold the necessary moral authority. 
Adjudicating this question in practice and in real time will, of course, be nearly impossible, 
but I take it that this is theoretically the correct way to proceed here. According to my view, 
paternalistic interventions into people’s health choices that are justified on the benefit for 
the individual should only be permitted in cases where it is either unclear that an individual’s 
decision has been made autonomously, or if there is sufficient evidence to deem it non-
autonomous or due to some sufficiently malign external influence. Further, I take it that just 
because the stakes in these cases are so high, it does not follow that there should be a 
presumption of paternalism in the domain of health. Denying this claim would entail a deeply 
unattractive kind of relationship between individuals and state institutions. 
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Second, the political domain picks out all those ways of being which have a public 
dimension, and which involve individuals coming into relation with public institutions. This 
way of defining the political capability domain may seem too broad, as political capabilities 
defined in this way will invariably spill over into the other domains. For example, an 
individual’s access to health capabilities or her employment prospects may be tied to the 
particular political institutions she is governed by. I take it that this spill-over is consistent 
with the multi-modal and multiply divisible way of carving up capabilities that I have in 
mind here. To clarify what is unique about the political domain is that it picks out all those 
capabilities that are primarily political. For example, campaigning for better reproductive 
health options would be a political functioning as well as a health functioning by extension. 
Similarly, we may speak of voting, running for election, organising protests and assemblies, 
getting involved with civil society organisations and so on as examples. By being obligated 
to provide individuals with capabilities in the political domain, the state is, therefore, 
obligated to allow individuals to exercise autonomy in the political domain – however their 
conception of the good sees fit.17  
The political domain is meant to pick out all those ways of being and doing which 
have a public dimension and which involve coming into relation with public institutions. 
This way of defining the political capability domain may seem too broad, as it will invariably 
spill over into the other domains since, for example, an individual’s access to certain health 
capabilities or her employment prospects may be tied to the particular political institutions 
she is governed by. This spill-over is consistent with the multi-modal and multiply divisible 
way of carving up capabilities that I have in mind here. To clarify what is unique about the 
political domain is that it picks out all those capabilities that are primarily political. For 
example, campaigning for better reproductive health options would be a political functioning 
as well as a health functioning by extension. Similarly, we may speak of voting, running for 
election, organising protests and assemblies, getting involved with civil society 
organisations and so on. By being obligated to provide individuals with capabilities in the 
political domain, the state is, therefore, obligated to allow individuals to exercise autonomy 
in the political domain.  
Third, I argue for the domain of epistemic capabilities. I define these in greater detail 
in Part 3 of this thesis where I apply the capability approach to education, and to civic 
 
17 This seems like an adequate place to emphasise again that the phrase ‘conception of the good’ should 
always be read as if it was prefaced with ‘reasonable’ as is customary in liberal philosophy. This is to rule out 
conceptions of the good that would require, say, giving some individuals disproportionate political power or 
the power to enact violence. I take it that there will be examples of people holding intolerable views of how 
political power ought to be exercised. My account of justice need not humour these people by treating their 
claims as authoritative if they are opposed to liberal values like equality of persons. 
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education in particular. By the epistemic domain, I refer to the baseline of skills and 
knowledge that individuals require to engage in various activities of their choosing. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I attempt to formulate certain baselines that all governments ought to 
secure to prepare for individuals for life in the contemporary world, but I take it that this 
baseline, however we wish to conceive of it, is also context-dependent and will further 
depend on individuals’ conceptions of the good.  
Fourth, the relational domain picks out capabilities to enter into and to sustain 
interpersonal relationships. In Chapter 6, I identify relational capabilities as the capabilities 
necessary to build social capital – a kind of capital which consists of ontological relations 
between individuals on the one hand, and some key normative constraints on those 
relationships that make them valuable, such as trust and reciprocity and non-domination. I 
argue that social capital is necessary for political capability, but the more general description 
of relational capabilities would be that they allow individuals to form bonds with one another 
for various ends.  
Fifth, while some ways of self-expression will spill over into other capability domains, 
there is an important reason for delineating a distinct domain here for all those capabilities 
which range over pursuing one’s values for the end of self-expression. This may refer to, for 
example, creative, professional, or religious endeavours or to the way an individual wishes 
to present herself to others, and what she wishes her life to mean.  
Sixth and finally, the domain of work picks out all those capabilities associated with 
various kinds of work. Work can be done for several reasons, such as self-expression, or it 
can be done purely for the reason of subsistence and supporting a family. Claiming that states 
are obligated to provide adequate capabilities for work for all individuals means that they 
have to provide individuals with opportunities for fulfilling and rewarding work in a way 
that treats them with dignity and respects their values. 
The capability framework presented here is continuous with Nussbaum’s in some ways, 
but sharply divergent from it in other striking ways. This framework is still a sufficientarian 
framework of distributive justice in that it requires public authorities to secure individuals 
with a threshold level of capabilities in each domain. An upshot of the more flexible analysis 
of capability I have given here is that the relevant thresholds are more flexible, too. And 
because the selection and pursuit of capabilities causally depends on the possession of the 
meta-capability of autonomy, this creates a prior requirement on governments to secure 
individuals with the right environment for making decisions autonomously. This gives us an 
attractive account of what the goals of distributive justice ought to be: first, dismantling 
social structures and practices that are hostile to individual autonomy, and equipping 
individuals with the skills necessary for exercising reflective, introspective judgement freely, 
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and second, guaranteeing a range of opportunities for individuals to exercise autonomous 
choice across a range of domains of well-being. 
An outstanding task, however, is to draw adequate thresholds for each capability 
domain. The baseline we draw here has to primarily be policy-guiding, so it cannot be 
sensitive to interpersonal differences to such a fine-grained degree that the above analysis 
would allow in theory. In Part 3 of this thesis, I take up this task for the domains of epistemic, 
political, and relational capabilities.  
 
2. Relational Conversion Factors 
In the previous chapter, I argued that a capability approach to justice can benefit from 
incorporating a relational analysis of autonomy, which can reveal the complex and 
interesting ways in which social practices influence people’s effective freedom. It is now 
time to demonstrate how a capability account of justice can successfully do this in practice 
– by identifying social relations as a salient class of conversion factors.  
Conversion factors refer to real-world variables which determine the degree to which 
an individual is able to convert a given resource into a functioning. Sen (1992) argued that 
conversion factors fill a conceptual gap between the opportunities to achieve certain ends 
and the fact of achieving those ends, and they also give an account for why some individuals 
may be unable to exercise capabilities despite having formal access to the appropriate 
resources and opportunities. Conversion factors can be internal to the individual, such as 
one’s intelligence, skill set or physical conditions, as well as external, such as societal or 
environmental conditions and institutions and public policies. Recall from the Introduction 
that capabilities require a combination of internal capacities and external resources. For 
example, owning a bicycle does not necessarily grant its owner the capability of cycling for 
she must also possess the skill of cycling and live in a place of the world where cycling is 
not outlawed and so on.  
For Sen, conversion factors are not just necessary for providing a conclusive causal 
account of the development and possible failure of capabilities. They also help to formalise 
the significant role that the social world plays in shaping people’s capabilities. Sen stresses 
that “being free to live the way one would may be enormously helped by the choices of 
others, and it would be a mistake to think of achievements only in terms of active choice by 
oneself (Sen, 1993: 44). The social world, with its norms, practices and relations introduces 
a complex web of intersecting factors which ground individual capabilities. 
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We can now build on this observation and introduce conversion factors which enable 
or impede an individual’s capability. For example, a Victorian woman may possess both a 
bicycle and the necessary skills to ride one effectively, but dominant social mores at the time 
dictated that riding bicycles was unfeminine and could cause severe health problems for 
women. By contrast, a contemporary Dutch woman would find riding a bike an empowering 
and socially and environmentally conscious choice, for which she may be praised by her 
friends and family. The difference in the pertinent social factors—both cultural and 
material—significantly changes the opportunities available to both women, and the value 
they may choose to place on their opportunities. Social conversion factors can, therefore, 
explain why relative advantages and disadvantages occur, even when all resources are 
distributed seemingly equally. I argue that a relational analysis of autonomy can suggest a 
series of relevant relational conversion factors.  
Social conversion factors of this kind may be difficult to accurately measure. I take it 
that for large scale policy purposes, the level of analysis does not have to be so fine-grained 
to catch all the various relations that each individual stands in. Rather, what we should be 
concerned with here is recognising those widespread social practices which impede 
autonomy, and those which facilitate it. 
As a starting point for formalising a workable list of relevant conversion factors, I 
propose the following list of relational features. For an individual to be capable of exercising 
the normative competencies associated with autonomy, she must stand in relations 
characterised by (1) normative recognition respect and (2) equality. Impediments to these 
two conditions can effectively function as impediments to capabilities by restricting the 
extent to which individuals have effective freedom to do particular things or to live in 
particular ways.  
The first relational feature requires individuals to respect each other’s normative 
authority. This feature may be lacking in certain types of relationships and social practices, 
which can damage an individual’s self-respect or her capacity to exercise normative 
competencies, like volitional skills and self-nurturing skills (Meyers, 2005: 121). This, in 
turn, would diminish an individual’s autonomous judgement and her capabilities. There will 
be relevant exceptions where the lack of normative recognition is not a problem for justice, 
such as in the relationship between a parent and a child, or in instances where individuals 
have certain mental or physical impairments which ought to limit the extent to which certain 
options should be available to them. In these cases, I take it that individuals will have 
guardians who are responsible for exercising judgement on their behalf to ensure their well-
being is met to an appropriate standard.   
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Such exceptions notwithstanding, however, social relations that are characterised by a 
lack of normative recognition of individuals ought to be a prima facie problem for justice. 
For example, social practices which subordinate some people or groups as inferior or 
incapable must be treated as significant sites of injustice.  
Second, individuals must stand in relation characterised by equality. The lack of this 
feature signals either the presence of selective laws or selective enforcement of laws, both 
of which can effectively relegate some individuals to second-class citizenship and rob them 
of access to capabilities either directly by making them formally unable to access certain 
freedoms, or indirectly by making them internalise beliefs which make people see 
themselves as unable to exercise capabilities that may be accessible to them. Social practices 
that go against the equality of people should then be treated as unjust.  
These two features should provide philosophers and policymakers with a starting point 
for identifying and addressing social factors which act as causal impediments to people’s 
capabilities. Social practices of this sort, of course, cannot be tackled merely by rewriting 
laws. For example, outlawing discrimination with the passing of laws that uphold equality 
is not likely in itself to end social practices that involve various kinds of discrimination. For 
one thing, there will be instances of discrimination that state institutions are not aware of, 
such as in families or religious organisations. Much more has to be done over and above the 
legal avenue to weed out unjust practices. This makes it all the more important for states and 
public institutions to be carefully attentive to dominant social practices in their communities, 
and how these practices may diminish people’s capabilities.  
It is worth pointing out the similarities that this account of justice shares with proposals 
made by relational egalitarians. Philosophers working in this field argue that the primary 
goal of justice ought to be ‘democratic equality’ (Anderson, 1999) or ‘equality of status’ 
(Miller, 1997 cited in Voigt, 2020) between individuals. Relational equality is defined in 
opposition to distributive accounts of equality, which hold that justice requires the equal 
distribution of some metric of welfare. For relational egalitarians, on the other hand, equality 
of relations is the primary goal. They argue that such a goal will help dismantle the unjust 
structures which hold some people in relations of domination and subservience. 
The account of justice defended in this thesis—by virtue of adopting a concern for 
social relations as conversion factors for capability justice—ends up committed to some of 
the same claims which are made by relational egalitarians, albeit in a roundabout way. A key 
commonality to point out is that, like relational views of equality, I endorse the view that in 
order to achieve justice, we must go beyond thinking about the role of institutions; we should 
also be committed to change in social norms and practices (Voigt, 2020). Throughout this 
thesis, we have seen examples of how social practices can act as key conversion factors for 
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individual autonomy, and their capabilities in turn. It would, therefore, follow that the scope 
of justice ought to include widespread social critique and a break from a Rawlsian focus on 
the ‘basic structure’ of society in an institutional sense.  
However, I take it that it is also worth emphasising how my proposal differs from 
relational equality. On my view, social relations play a significant role in the development 
and exercise of individual autonomy and, in turn, individual capabilities. But this role is (a) 
causal, and (b) it is one of many causal variables and, as such, relations are not the primary 
goal of justice. I take it that capabilities also require large-scale material distribution. It is 
not sufficient to dismantle oppressive social practices and hierarchies of power, individuals 
must also be given palpable opportunities to exercise their autonomy through their 
capabilities. People must be educated, and they must have social provisions in place which 
treat them with sufficient dignity. They must have child-care and access to self-expression 
and hobbies. All of these things have an unmistakeably material dimension. That is to say, 
they have a resource cost, which is why my proposal is nevertheless an exercise in 
distributive justice. For these reasons, perhaps the account of justice defended in this thesis 
could be best described as a hybrid account of justice which has both a relational and a 
distributive dimension (e.g., see Moles and Parr, 2019 for a discussion on hybrid accounts 
of justice).  
 
3. Objections 
In Chapter 1, I argued that Nussbaum’s interpretation of the capability approach is internally 
inconsistent – contested value judgements appear to play an idiosyncratic role in its 
justification and its content in a way that is inconsistent with Nussbaum’s commitment to 
political neutrality. Realigning the capability approach with comprehensive anti-
perfectionism involves giving up neutrality at the level of the foundation of liberal 
philosophy, but retaining it at the level of policy content, thereby solving the supposed 
inconsistency by restricting what neutrality ought to range over when we theorise about 
justice.  
However, the upshot of this move may be that we are merely replacing one 
inconsistency with another, or perhaps with several more inconsistencies. For this 
realignment to be plausible and coherent, we must now establish it as a consistent and stable 




3.1. The Subordination Objection 
It may be argued that an approach to justice allied with a particular view about what is 
valuable is unattractive since it excludes those people who do not endorse this value. 
Nussbaum (2011a) makes such an argument: she claims that autonomy need not feature in 
every person’s conception of the good, and that autonomy-minded liberalism, therefore, 
involves subordinating the dissenting individuals. 
In formulating her version of the capability approach, Nussbaum took herself to be 
“[moving] beyond the merely comparative use of capabilities to the construction of a 
normative political proposal that is a partial theory of justice” (Nussbaum, 2000: 12). It is 
worth disambiguating two ways in which Nussbaum uses the qualifier ‘partial’: to refer to a 
minimum threshold of justice, and to refer to a political (i.e., not comprehensive) account of 
justice. She employs the first meaning when discussing the threshold level for all capabilities 
that, she argues, ought to be provided to all people by their governments. In this sense, her 
theory is partial in that it “simply leaves unaddressed the question of what social justice 
requires once those thresholds are met” (Robeyns, 2016). She makes a similar claim when 
discussing the content of her list of capabilities, which, she argues, is “facilitative rather than 
tyrannical” (Nussbaum, 2000: 96) and subject to “continued reflection . . . [a] proposal put 
forward in a Socratic fashion” (ibid, 77). However, there is a second sense in which 
Nussbaum describes her approach as ‘partial’ and that is in the sense of her list of capabilities 
constituting “emphatically a partial and not a comprehensive conception of the good” (ibid, 
96).  
If Nussbaum’s contribution was to move the capability approach from an open-ended 
tool of interpersonal comparison of well-being to a partial theory of justice, then my proposed 
modification would be a move much further — to a complete theory of justice. However, it 
would be a move only in the second sense, that is, a move toward comprehensiveness, rather 
than toward complete specificity. The capability approach may still remain partial in the first 
sense, for it need not commit to an exhaustive set of parameters for justice. As I argued in 
the previous chapter, autonomy is a procedural and content-neutral value. Aligning an 
account of justice with this claim need not commit us to a fully specific set of ethical 
prescriptions. The resulting list of capabilities can remain open-ended, subject to change 
upon application in different contexts, and sufficiently Socratic for it not to significantly 
differ from Nussbaum’s in that regard. I take it that it is this first sense of ‘partial’ that is 
more important to Nussbaum’s overall project, for she recognises that inter-cultural 
differences, and variation in a host of external factors across the world would make 
committing to a maximally specific list of policy goals an impossible feat. For this reason, a 
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fluid, yet sufficiently robust, framework fares better than a grandiose and specific conception 
of the good. 
However, Nussbaum does give reasons against comprehensive interpretations of 
liberalism, which suggests that the second sense of ‘partial’ I distinguished earlier may be 
more crucial to her argument than it first appears.  
Nussbaum’s argument here is directed toward Raz. Raz’s conception of liberalism not 
only has a comprehensive foundation, but it is also perfectionist. Namely, Raz argues that 
liberalism is committed to the view that autonomy is valuable, which creates a duty on the 
state to provide citizens with a wide range of valuable options which Raz argues are 
necessary for achieving autonomy. Nussbaum does not make this distinction between these 
two features of Raz’s theory, so when she refers to his view as ‘comprehensive’, a more 
precise way of reading that would be ‘comprehensive-perfectionist’. Nussbaum argues that 
in practice, a comprehensive-perfectionist doctrine like Raz’s would amount to “expressive 
subordination” (Nussbaum, 2011b: 35) if one happens to dissent from the conception of the 
good endorsed by the state. Since this looks antithetical to liberalism, her argument goes, we 
would do well to opt for a conception of liberalism which is political rather than 
comprehensive.  
There are two ways to resist Nussbaum’s conclusion here. First, we may clarify the 
distinction between comprehensiveness and perfectionism and show that Nussbaum’s 
problem with Razian liberalism is due exclusively to the perfectionism of his view, rather 
than to the comprehensiveness. Raz’s account of liberalism involves the active promotion of 
autonomy-conducive states of affairs (Raz, 1986). Autonomy for Raz refers to an individual’s 
capacity to author her life with the presence of a range of valuable opportunities (ibid, 371). 
Nussbaum contrasts Raz’s conception of autonomy with what Rawls calls “political 
autonomy” (Rawls, 1993: xliv-xlv cited in Nussbaum, 2011). She describes the latter as 
requiring “protection of the spaces in which people may leave one view and opt for another” 
(ibid, 36). Nussbaum states that this is not the same as Raz’s autonomy “because no 
announcement is made by the state that lives live under one’s own direction are better than 
lives lived in submission to some form of religious or cultural or military authority” (ibid.). 
The implication here is that Rawlsian autonomy is acceptable from a wide array of ethical 
views, whereas Raz’s conception commits us to the unpalatable and unjustified conclusion 
that some lives have less value than others if they spurn autonomy. But this should only be 
cause for concern if we accept that autonomy is best promoted by perfectionist means. I 
defend the opposite view. Perfectionism is inconsistent with valuing autonomy in a second-
order sense for reasons that I discussed in Chapter 3.  
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The second way to resist Nussbaum’s conclusion is to point out that her aversion to 
comprehensive liberalism need not be due to the value of autonomy in general, but rather due 
to the particular content-specific conception of autonomy that Raz defends. Raz argued that 
autonomy is valuable only if it is practiced for the pursuit of independently valuable ends 
(e.g., Raz, 1986: 378). The conception of autonomy I defend here does not place limits on 
the content of individual’s choices. I argue that autonomy consists of the exercise of a range 
of competencies, which, in turn, require individuals to stand in particular kinds of social 
relations. This conception of autonomy is procedural in that autonomy is a matter of 
satisfying a particular procedure of decision-making, rather than a matter of making 
particular choices. As such, this conception of autonomy is content-independent insofar as it 
focuses on the genesis, rather than the content, of individual preferences. Such a conception 
need not lead autonomy-minded liberals to the implication that some lives are less valuable 
by dint of the content of people’s choices. It also does not suggest that the content of people’s 
choices is a legitimate domain of contestation. Justice requires that people possess the meta-
capability of autonomy, it does not require that people be compelled to make specific choices 
or discouraged from others. 
But why think that autonomy is necessary? Elsewhere, Nussbaum has argued that 
autonomy need not figure in every person’s conception of the good life and that “we should 
respect people who prefer a life within an authoritarian religion (or personal relationship), so 
long as certain basic opportunities and exit options are firmly guaranteed” (Nussbaum, 2005: 
60). 
I argued in the previous chapter that we are entitled to interpret Nussbaum as saying 
that autarchy need not be valuable since the choice of giving up autarchy can nonetheless be 
made autonomously. We can, therefore, read Nussbaum’s argument against comprehensive 
liberalism as an argument against perfectionism and a content-specific conception of 
autonomy. Nussbaum’s claim against comprehensiveness is that it supposedly leads to the 
subordination of those with dissenting views. But I have shown that there is nothing intrinsic 
to a comprehensive view of liberalism that would lead to such an unpalatable result. 
Nussbaum’s argument, therefore, only applies to the two features of Raz’s account that are 
extrinsic to comprehensive liberalism. Comprehensive liberalism need not be committed to 
subordinating individuals if (a) it is based on a conception of autonomy which takes no 
interest in the specific content of individuals’ choices and (b) if it is coupled with a principle 
of anti-perfectionism. The comprehensive view I defend satisfies both conditions and, as 




3.2. The Incoherence Objection 
The liberal position of comprehensive anti-perfectionism has been dismissed by some critics 
as incoherent for attempting to accommodate two mutually exclusive commitments: to 
promote autonomy while simultaneously refraining to promote valuable ways of life (e.g., 
Nye, 2012; Porter, 2011; Rudisill, 2012). Critics argue that this is an incoherent combination 
of commitments, and one must be surrendered for the other one to be taken seriously. 
To put this objection to rest, I must reiterate my claim that I take autonomy to consist 
of a second-order capability – a meta-capability which ranges over the exercise of capabilities, 
rather than specific first-order value claims. The upshot of understanding autonomy this way 
is that the promotion of autonomy us unlike the promotion of values simpliciter. This will 
allow me to argue that there is nothing inconsistent about promoting autonomy as a meta-
capability, while remaining anti-perfectionist about values that make up individual 
conceptions of the good. On my view, the successful exercise of the meta-capability of 
autonomy is what enables individuals to pursue their chosen capabilities in a way that reflects 
their authentic desires and values, but autonomy itself has no bearing on the content of those 
desires and values. 
This way of defusing the objection is similar to Colburn’s strategy, which hinges on 
establishing autonomy as a second-order value while arguing that anti-perfectionism ought 
to only range over first-order specifications of value (Colburn, 2010: 57-60). I am 
sympathetic to this reasoning, but I argue here that phrasing autonomy as a second-order 
capability provides for a more convincing way of dispelling the present objection.  
Recall that according to Colburn, we can distinguish between (at least) two orders of 
value, and corresponding levels of perfectionism. Second-order values contain variables (i.e., 
specifications of value) which can themselves contain nested variables, whereas first-order 
values cannot contain nested variables; “either [because] they are content-specific, in which 
case they contain no variables at all; or they are content-neutral but contain only variables 
incapable of having nested variables” (ibid, 64). In other words, first-order values are the sort 
of values that we may refer to in everyday speech with the referent ‘value’, while second-
order values need additional reference for their meaning to be determinate. 
Autonomy, Colburn argues, is a second-order value since it makes a de dicto reference 
to other judgements about what individuals may hold as valuable, rather than a de re 
reference to particular specifications of value. This is because Colburn conceives of 
autonomy as an agent’s capacity to “decide for themselves what is valuable and being able 
to live their life in accordance with that decision” (ibid, 67). Autonomy is thus not a singular, 
content-specific valuable way of life, but rather one’s capacity to negotiate with first-order 
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value claims in a meaningful way. Colburn goes on to point out that perfectionism is 
understood to range over claims in the first order. Therefore, the argument concludes, 
comprehensive anti-perfectionism is not incoherent.  
Sebastian Nye (2012) has argued that Colburn’s strategy turns on a merely structural 
difference between two levels of value, and any attempt to single out autonomy as a value 
that is unlike other values looks like an ad hoc exception.  
I argue that phrasing an equivalent distinction in capability terms, rather than in terms 
of value, can help strengthen Colburn’s general strategy if we take the merely structural 
distinction to be too weak. Conceiving of an individual’s capacity for autonomy as a second-
order capability offers a more robust justification for treating autonomy as analytically 
distinct from capabilities or specific functionings. The distinction here is not merely 
structural, it is ontological. When an individual exercises her autonomous judgement, she is 
asserting her authority as a free and rational agent. She is exercising a capability of hers, but 
the consequence of this exercise is indeterminate, since exercising autonomous judgement 
does not itself consist in a specific activity. If a state were to actively promote the exercise 
of creative endeavours or religious devotion for their intrinsic worth, the state would be 
endorsing a set of claims about the objective moral value of those ways of life. By contrast, 
if a state promotes the exercise of autonomy, it is not doing anything of the sort.  
Suppose you ask me what my friend Joel has been up to since graduating university. I 
tell you that Joel has been exercising autonomous judgement, or that he has been living 
autonomously. Presumably, you stare at me wondering why I have stopped speaking mid-
sentence. “But what is he doing though?” you may then ask. Suppose instead I answer in the 
following way: Joel has been pursuing a career in public relations and raising a family, while 
volunteering for his local chapter of the Green Party. The latter response has determinate 
first-order content and picks out a range of activities that let you infer Joel’s conception of 
the good life. The former does no such thing. The former tells you about the way in which 
Joel has been conducting himself.  
Autonomy refers to the capacity to make self-originating and authoritative judgements 
about how to live your life. As such, promoting this capacity is perfectly consistent with the 
principled reluctance of meddling in the content of people’s decisions. Comprehensive anti-
perfectionism is, therefore, a coherent set of claims to hold. 
I imagine that this argument may not be immediately persuasive. The claim that 
autonomy—no matter how we elect to understand it—is a value in the first place is a 
normative claim, which could be disputed. As a result of this realisation, my reasoning here 
may strike the reader as a kind of transcendental trick: a way of rebranding an objectionably 
partisan value claim as an objective truth. Here is the bluntest way to phrase this worry: what 
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differences does it make if autonomy is a capability or a meta-capability, a first-order value, 
or a second-order value? What differences does it make if it is a normative and causal 
constituent of other values when autonomy is itself a value? Moreover, it is a contested value, 
one which need not be endorsed by everyone. Suppose I have no interest in living 
autonomously, and my autonomy never features in any of my thoughts about what the good 
life is. Suppose I wholeheartedly identify with social conventions that limit my choices and 
steer me toward a life path that has been tried and tested by my family before me. In such a 
case, I may not have any reason to think of autonomy as a special kind of value.  
And indeed, there is no reason why such a life would be intrinsically bad or worthless 
necessarily. But such a life would also not necessarily be devoid of autonomy. It may be 
devoid of autarchy, or independence or detachedness from others. Autonomy is what enables 
the particular choices that I make. A person who identifies with the interlocutor’s beliefs in 
the above case would thus not be holding a view that is inconsistent with mine. They would 
simply be making a category mistake in equivocating between autonomy and autarchy, which 
I have shown refer to two distinct concepts.  
But even if the objector recognises their mistake and corrects it, they may nonetheless 
be puzzled why autonomy is objectively valuable in the second-order sense? This is, of 
course, a fascinating question, which I will not be able to answer here. Recall that the dialectic 
of this thesis does not require me to answer this question. I am arguing that insofar as we 
have reasons to think that the claims of justice ought to be phrased in capabilities, we should 
understand this claim to presuppose that autonomy is valuable. The distinct role of autonomy, 
therefore, is due to the way it enables the pursuit of other values. A practical upshot of this 
claim is that if an individual chooses not to exercise her autonomy, then that itself is an 
exercise of autonomy (so long as the choice was procedurally rigorous, of course). I take it 
that this practical upshot is sufficient to dispel the worry that promoting autonomy is 
inconsistent with refusing to promote valuable states of affairs. 
3.3. The Collapse Objection 
Even if my argument for the theoretical coherence of comprehensive anti-perfectionism is 
successful, it may still be argued that the view is unstable as a matter of practical consequence. 
Namely, there is a risk that comprehensive anti-perfectionisms may collapse into 
perfectionism. Quong argues for this risk, writing that “once liberalism is tied to some 
specific views about the good life, the liberal state will unavoidably be acting for perfectionist 
reasons” (Quong, 2011: 25). Quong does not take himself to be providing a conclusive 
argument against all versions of comprehensive anti-perfectionism, rather he is defending 
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the more limited claim that a comprehensive appeal to individual autonomy does not rule out 
perfectionism, making this particular form of anti-perfectionism an “unviable position” (ibid, 
26).  
Quong’s conclusion, I believe, rests on the supposed truth of two claims. First, he 
interprets the comprehensive antiperfectionist to be making a sort of ad hoc modification to 
the liberal principle of neutrality, namely that the liberal state ought not to act for perfectionist 
reasons “except considerations to do with the value of autonomy” (ibid, 24). And second, 
Quong takes comprehensive anti-perfectionism to only preclude some perfectionist action. 
Policies which “encourage citizens to lead more valuable lives without foreclosing any 
particular options” (ibid, 25) would supposedly be permitted, Quong believes, for such 
policies would not infringe on individuals’ autonomy, but they would nonetheless be 
perfectionist, and thus entail an unacceptable kind of paternalism (ibid, 100-3). 
Quong is right to point out that the first claim amounts to a form of perfectionism, one 
that looks rather arbitrary. However, comprehensive anti-perfectionists need not accept such 
a claim. What distinguishes autonomy from other supposedly perfectionist, values is not an 
arbitrary normative judgement about its relative worth, but rather its second-order and, in, 
turn content-neutral nature for reasons that we have already seen.  
In practice, autonomy can be promoted as a meta-capability through a range of policy 
options that are demonstrably not perfectionist. For example, redistributive policies aimed at 
curbing material inequalities will allow disadvantaged individuals to take opportunities that 
may have once been unavailable to them. Challenging and dismantling social practices that 
keep some people subservient to others will allow those individuals to make their own 
choices about their plans of life. Teaching students critical and imagination skills will give 
them the disposition to reflect on which of their beliefs are contingent on socialisation, and 
which ones they would rather rethink. And so on. Policies that take this form would not be 
perfectionist in that they would not be guided by the intention of promoting valuable 
achievements or encouraging people to make choices that are good for them.  
Quong’s second claim poses more of a problem to my view, but this too can be resisted. 
Quong suggests that there is no principled constraint keeping comprehensive anti-
perfectionism from effectively collapsing into perfectionism. That is to say, even if particular 
policies can be demonstrated not to be ad hoc exceptions to an anti-perfectionist principle, 
some of them may become practically unrecognisable from perfectionism by virtue of their 
consequences.  
One way to reply to this claim would be to establish a principle that can reliably rule 
out perfectionism in practice. So, if we could identify a feature of autonomy promotion that 
would be practically inconsistent with perfectionism, then we could use this feature to 
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formulate a principle that would prevent the supposed collapse from happening. Colburn 
(2012) takes such an approach and argues that autonomy requires that individuals be 
responsible for their actions, and that perfectionist interventions in individuals’ choices 
invariably diminish the extent to which people are responsible for the outcomes of their 
choices. For an individual to be autonomous under Colburn’s view, she has to be responsible 
for achieving the ends she has given herself, that is to say, she must, as a matter of 
consequence, be successful in living the life that she has chosen for herself (Colburn, 2012: 
22-26). According to Colburn, this necessary condition is undermined by attempts to 
encourage individuals to make good choices because such attempts either “reduce the 
relevance of our individual agency to both the explanation and the normative consequences 
of our actions” (ibid, 27) or coercion may change the nature of options available “to make 
all but one unacceptable to the chooser” (ibid.).  
 Responsibility thus provides Colburn with a principle that keeps anti-perfectionism in 
check, thereby denying Quong his conclusion. A perfectionist promotion of autonomy, 
according to Colburn, would diminish the extent to which an individual is responsible for 
how her life goes, which means her autonomy would be diminished in turn. And because 
comprehensive anti-perfectionism is concerned with promoting autonomy, the liberal state 
cannot be perfectionist. This puts firm parameters around the kinds of things the state can 
legitimately do. 
The success of this retort will depend on whether the reader shares Colburn’s view that 
responsibility of this kind is a necessary feature of autonomy. I do not take a stand on this 
issue here. However, I believe there is another pertinent feature of autonomy which we have 
already considered in this thesis: a relational feature of normative recognition. I do not intend 
to show that normative recognition is any less controversial a feature of autonomy than 
responsibility. Even if both analyses turn on accepting some controversial claim, the 
combined analysis, I take it, will have some disjunctive appeal in that the conclusion of my 
argument can be shown to be acceptable from at least two standpoints. 
I argue that understanding autonomy as socially relational suggests a compelling pro 
tanto reason for why perfectionism is incompatible with valuing autonomy – perfectionism 
signals a lack of recognition respect toward an individual over her choices insofar as it 
consists of a negative judgement about the person’s ability or likelihood not to make the 
correct decision. This is the reason we endorsed a presumption against paternalism in Part 1 
of the thesis. In other words, perfectionism leads to the wrong sort of relationship obtaining 
between the individual and the state. I take it that this reason holds only in a pro tanto sense 
as it may be overridden by other considerations.  
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In this thesis, I defend the claim that individuals must stand in relations characterised 
by normative recognition and equality. The former requires ‘recognition respect’, or the kind 
of respect which entitles people “to have other persons take [them] seriously and weigh 
appropriately the fact that they are persons in deliberating about what to do” (Darwall, 1977: 
38). Roughly, A and B relate to each other with mutual recognition if and only if A recognises 
B as having final normative authority over B’s self-regarding decision-making and vice versa. 
This does not mean that neither person can influence the other’s decisions in any way, but 
rather that both recognise that the final authority resides with the person whose life the 
decision refers to. For example, I may try to convince my reluctant friend to convert to 
Theravada Buddhism by appealing to her sensibilities and beliefs. But it would obviously be 
unacceptable for me to refuse to accept her unwillingness as authoritative and to trick her 
into attending a meditation retreat or to nudge her until she is too exhausted to continue 
resisting my influence. Doing so would damage her exercise of her autonomy competencies.  
I argue that normative recognition provides the comprehensive anti-perfectionist with 
a compelling pro tanto principle which prevents autonomy promotion from collapsing into 
perfectionism. When the state promotes autonomy, it recognises the individual as having 
normative authority over her life, regardless of the particular choices she may ultimately 
make. By contrast, when the state promotes first-order valuable ways of life through 
perfectionist means, the state fails to recognise this authority; in some cases, it may actively 
undermine it. The practical implication of this kind of relation is that it puts individuals in a 
vulnerable position. The modern state wields enormous influence over its subjects, and if its 
policies fail to pay adequate recognition respect to citizens as normative authors over their 
own lives, then the state risks misusing that power by dominating them. Since, under my 
view, standing in a relation of normative recognition is necessary for the exercise of 
autonomy, political actions which fail to treat people as normative authorities over their 
conceptions of the good are inconsistent with autonomy.  
However, does perfectionism always consist in a failure of recognising the normative 
authority of the individual? In the case of coercion, this seems plainly true. But liberal 
perfectionists are not interested in defending coercion, they hold that perfectionism can be 
promoted by non-coercive means, such as nudges, subsidies and discouraging certain options. 
I take it these are problematic too insofar as they work by circumventing the individual’s 
conscious decision-making. I argue for the claim that all perfectionist policies are 
problematic in the end of Chapter 2. If my claim there is true, then there is no reason to think 
that non-coercive perfectionist policies of the sort defended by Raz and Wall could 
nonetheless uphold the kind of relation of normative recognition I defend here. 
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I have been emphasising that normative recognition only provides us with a pro tanto 
constraint on perfectionism. I take it that this constraint has considerable weight for the 
reasons I discussed above, but it could nonetheless be overridden by some other, more 
pressing consideration. For example, Mackenzie (2008) argues that a measure of 
perfectionism is needed to ensure individuals are given the relevant normative competencies 
to be capable of autonomy. I argued in the previous chapter that the competencies associated 
with autonomy can be defended as normatively thin, but even if we accept that a measure of 
perfectionism was necessary for the promotion of autonomy, this would be consistent with 
the pro tanto constraint on perfectionism I establish here. Mackenzie’s claim that a measure 
of perfectionism is sometimes needed to equip individuals with robust enough opportunities 
is an overriding consideration to my claim, the strength of which will depend on the merits 
of the argument it is established with. Absent an argument, I hope it can be seen why I take 
perfectionist policies to run the risk of undermining individuals’ normative authority over 




This chapter has seen me propose and motivate my two-step capability approach to justice. 
This account consists of two normative principles: states must do what they can to ensure 
individuals are capable of autonomous judgement, and they must provide them with ample 
opportunities for this judgement to be exercised across a range of capability domains. My 
account of justice also significantly expands the range of conversion factors which should 
feature in our analysis of justice. Finally, I addressed three objections to my view. I argued 
that all three can be resisted by clarifying the concept of autonomy and recognising the 


















Chapter 5: Capability and Education 
Education is a significant area of focus for social justice. If we take education to be fulfilling 
a purely instrumental role in preparing an economic workforce for the prosperity of society, 
then inequalities in education pose a problem insofar as they may lead to wider 
socioeconomic inequalities. If we take education to be intrinsically valuable, then 
inequalities in education are simply unjust as they entail that those members of society who 
receive a smaller share are deprived of a valuable good. Advocates of the capability approach 
argue that education also plays a unique causal role in the development of human capabilities. 
In this chapter, I argue that the account of capability justice defended in this thesis 
offers novel tools for formulating an ambitious and transformative approach to education 
policy. Before I do that, I offer some reasons why the capability approach is a promising 
framework for thinking about education from the point of view of justice in the first place. I 
do this with a brief literature review of the intersection between the capability approach and 
education.  
In Section 1, I provide a summary of the role of education in Sen and Nussbaum’s 
work as well as in more recent literature—from both analytic philosophers and education 
scholars—which attempts to clarify the role education plays in capability approaches to 
justice. In Section 2, I distinguish three specific ways in which the capability approach can 
be brought to bear on education: putting epistemic capabilities into practice, promoting 
agentic competencies, and recognising relational impediments to education, respectively. 
Finally, in Section 3, I consider the role that anti-perfectionism ought to play in education. I 
look at some recent arguments in favour of perfectionist education and critically assess their 
merits from a capability justice standpoint. 
 
1. Education in the Capability Literature 
As an object of distributive justice, education has been a focus of the capability approach 
since its inception, and this is reflected in the writings of both Sen and Nussbaum. Despite 
this supposed focus, however, philosophers and education experts have since critiqued both 
Sen and Nussbaum for leaving education “largely undertheorised” in their work (Unterhalter, 
2003: 10). Further work on clarifying this relationship has generated a dynamic literature on 
capabilities and education and their interplay in various theoretical and applied contexts. 
For Sen, education plays a significant role in the capability approach. Sen (1992) picks 
out education as one of “a relatively small number of centrally important beings and doings 
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that are crucial to well-being” (p. 44). Sen takes education to be fulfilling three discrete roles 
in society. First, education plays an instrumental social role in that it promotes critical 
literacy which can foster public debate and dialogue about social and political arrangements. 
Second, it plays an instrumental process role by expanding the set of people individuals can 
come into contact with, thereby broadening their social relations and opportunities these may 
offer. Finally, education plays a dual empowering and distributive role in facilitating the 
ability of those who are disadvantaged, marginalised, or excluded to control their political 
environment by giving them the skills and social capital to organise politically. Parallel to 
these, education also has a redistributive effect between social groups, households, or even 
within families. This is because education can alter an individual’s capability set to change 
her social powers and opportunities, as well as her standing in the social structure (Sen, 
1999b). For example, children of immigrant families tend to be better educated and are, 
therefore, more able to navigate their new social environment and take advantage of 
opportunities that their parents would not have had access to. Through these effects, 
education directly enhances people’s capabilities – it gives them the opportunities to do 
things they value that they might not have otherwise had. This is why Sen (2007) has 
discussed the need for investing in children to facilitate social and economic development 
and the protection of children’s rights. 
Madoka Saito (2003) has elaborated on Sen’s claims by focusing not only on the direct 
enhancement of capabilities that education offers, but also distinguishing a further indirect 
effect: “the development of judgement in relation to the appropriate exercise of capacities” 
(italics mine) (Saito, 2003: 17). Education can thus not only equip us with opportunities 
directly, but it can also hone our judgment to make better use of the opportunities at our 
disposal. Education can thus be seen as a key causal variable in the expansion of individuals’ 
capabilities. 
However, Elaine Unterhalter (2008) has argued that Sen’s treatment of education is 
somewhat vague and incomplete in comparison to his extensive analyses of policies meant 
for mitigating poverty and famine. This is further problematized by his principled reluctance 
to commit to an index of discrete capabilities and a view of how they may be secured in the 
form of fundamental social provisions. Given the purported importance that Sen attributes 
to this policy area, one may expect greater clarity here. 
Unterhalter goes on to say that there is “remarkable homogeneity in the way Sen 
discusses education” (p. 490), insofar as he makes no mention of differences in form or 
outcome of education, nor of “different modalities of education – processes of learning, 
teaching, assessment and management – and their differing and sometimes contradictory 
consequences for different groups” (ibid.). For example, she criticises Sen for failing to 
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distinguish between education and schooling, a distinction which she argues is essential for 
getting a clearer understanding of the relationship between education and justice. Education 
refers to the successful process of acquiring knowledge and skills (be it through instruction 
or experience), whereas schooling refers to the formal instruction carried out in educational 
institutions or, in some cases, at home.18 The latter should, if done successfully, constitute 
the former, however, education need not consist only in schooling, and, crucially, not all 
schooling will result to an expansion of individual’s capabilities for three reasons.  
First, schooling may simply be unsuccessful in achieving the constitutive aim of 
education by failing to facilitate learning. For example, if schooling is delivered in a 
language a student is not proficient in or by an instructor who has limited knowledge or skill 
then it is unlikely for the student to master the subject successfully. Second, schooling may 
fail to expand capabilities if it consists in inculcating students into a particular 
comprehensive way of life or even brainwashing them to accept certain beliefs without 
giving good reason or allowing space for critical dialogue. Such schooling would arguably 
not facilitate one’s intellectual capacities, but rather force one to accept views one may not 
have good reasons to accept, possibly harming one’s capability set instead of expanding it 
(ibid, 2003). Third, if students from disadvantaged ethnic or socioeconomic backgrounds 
may be routinely subject to verbal or physical violence by their peers. Or if the way they are 
represented in school curricula is demeaning due to prejudicial attitudes, students may suffer 
a net loss of capabilities by attending school. Failing to make a distinction between education 
and schooling simpliciter can, therefore, result in empirical findings and policy that is 
altogether blind to this impediment to people’s capabilities.  
Here is an example that can illustrate this point. Universal school enrolment rates may 
sound like an achievement for justice, but it need not necessarily lead to equal access to 
capabilities. Not only are enrolment rates a poor measure of the overall quality of education,19 
they may also obscure certain negative effects to individuals and communities. Unterhalter 
(2003) illustrates this with an example from South Africa where an increase in enrolment 
rates among black girls has been linked to an increase in rates of sexual assault and HIV 
transmission. Unterhalter also mentions rural village schools in certain states of India where 
girls are socialised into subordinate roles by, for example, being forced to sit at the back of 
the classroom in the dark and having fewer extracurricular activities available to them. A 
blinkered focus on schooling opportunities can, therefore, tell us an incomplete and 
 
18 Since the introduction of compulsory school attendance laws, home schooling is an exception to the 
dominant paradigm of schooling taking place in educational institutions. 
19 E.g., Nussbaum (2002) writes that years of schooling are generally thought to be an imperfect proxy for 
education (p. 73), arguing that the quality, rather than quantity, ought to be the appropriate benchmark. 
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misleading story about individual capabilities since formal opportunities do not always 
translate into educational opportunities. Recently published work on the capability approach 
attempts to rectify this problem by conceiving of education as a set of discrete, 
heterogeneous capabilities which need to be jointly secured by educational institutions.20  
Nussbaum has written relatively more on education than Sen, but not always from the 
same theoretical standpoint – she has broached the subject as a capability theorist as well as 
a classicist and an advocate of liberal arts education. The fundamental assumption 
underlying her work is that education is unmistakably essential for the good life, that “human 
beings are creatures such that, provided with the right educational and material support, they 
can become fully capable of the human functions” (Nussbaum, 2002: 62).  
Nussbaum (1997) has also argued for the merits of a specifically liberal education 
whose goal she attributes to Seneca as the “cultivation of humanity” (p. 8). Nussbaum 
distinguishes three capacities, which she argues are necessary for this end: critical 
examination of oneself and one’s traditions, ability to transcend one’s identity and see 
oneself as a human being tied to all other human beings and, finally, a narrative imagination, 
or the ability to place oneself in another’s situation (ibid.). According to Nussbaum, these 
capacities are essential for the cultivation of intelligent citizens who are capable of 
participating in democracy and questioning the traditional mores of society. This sort of 
education is intended to hone people’s innate capacity for questioning and reasoning and to 
allow them to transcend the contingencies of their identity and instead be guided by objective 
reason. 
Nussbaum echoes the stoic thought that the primary aim of education is to “confront 
the passivity of the student, challenging the mind to take charge of its own thought” (ibid, 
28). A passive individual is one who speaks and acts out of deference to tradition or at the 
whim of her parents or contemporaries. She is not governed by practical reason, but rather 
an “instrument on which fashion and habit play their tunes” (ibid, 29). According to the 
stoics, the solution to this docility is education – the cultivation of capacities which, in 
contemporary parlance, could be argued to constitute autonomy.21 Nussbaum’s work on 
liberal education is an attempt to provide a model for education that accomplishes this goal. 
Nussbaum (2000) has also highlighted education in her index of ten central human 
capabilities, albeit indirectly. Education itself does not feature as a discrete capability in 
 
20 In a way that is not dissimilar to how Nussbaum conceives of her list of 10 central human capabilities, i.e., 
the capabilities are independent of one another and deficiencies in one capability cannot be made up for by 
excess in another. 
21  This reasoning is not dissimilar to how contemporary education scholars conceive of education, e.g., 
Edwards, Ranson and Strain (2002) who argue that learning is “the transformation of understanding, identity, 
and agency … the capacity to develop and sustain reflexivity” (p. 533 cited in Walker, 2007).  
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Nussbaum’s list, however, it pertains most directly to the capability of ‘Senses, Imagination, 
and Thought’ since this includes the ability to think and to reason. She has also argued that 
literacy expands human capabilities and that historically, this has been denied to individuals 
from disadvantaged groups. Moreover, as we saw from Nussbaum’s remarks on liberal 
education, it can also be seen to be highly relevant for the capability of practical reason. 
Nussbaum (2003) has also defended the value of education in the promotion of women’s 
freedom across the world and, more recently, Nussbaum (2010) has argued for the 
importance of teaching humanities and liberal arts to cultivate democratic and civic virtues 
and to minimise the reductive perception of education as merely an economic tool for the 
improvement of a country’s gross domestic product.  
Despite affording more attention than Sen to the role that education plays in the pursuit 
of justice via capabilities, Nussbaum’s remarks on education are somewhat lacking too. 
Nussbaum’s capability framework includes the assumption that education enables 
individuals to think, imagine, and to exercise practical reason, but the account of how this 
comes about is not elaborated on. Another open question is why capability of education itself 
is not featured as a discrete entry in Nussbaum’s index of central capabilities? Can we infer 
from this that the value of education is merely instrumental insofar as it causally contributes 
to the successful possession of other capabilities? In which case, is the contribution merely 
causal, or do some valuable ways of life constitutively depend on active lifelong learning? 
Nussbaum seems to imply that educative goods are teleologically valuable and that a life 
without education would lack humanity. The capability approach stands to benefit from a 
more thoroughgoing analysis of the role education plays in capability justice, perhaps in the 
form of discerning education-specific capabilities or clarifying the causal role played by 
educational factors on individuals’ capabilities. 
Because of the explanatory gaps in Sen and Nussbaum, there is an abundance of more 
recent literature on the interplay between capabilities and education, from analytic 
philosophers and educational theorists alike. This literature attempts to clarify the relation 
between capabilities and education and to offer ways of operationalising the capability 
approach in order to assess and inform education policy. 
A particular point of focus in this literature is the causal pathway of capability 
acquisition. Formative experiences in early life are argued to be vital in determining the 
capability set with which an adult ends up since “adult skills and talents depend critically on 
childhood learning and experience” (Basu, 2011: xi). Conversely, this also means that 
capability failures that occur in childhood may be irreversible in later life and result in the 
stunting of certain capabilities. Expressing education in capability vocabulary can allow 
educators, researchers, and policymakers to identify key decision points in these causal 
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pathways in order to inform interventions aimed at improving children’s access to 
capabilities and preventing capability losses. For example, a popular study by Hart and 
Risley (2003) found that the extent of children’s vocabulary at a young age is a reliable 
predictor of the development of various cognitive and literacy skills and educational 
achievement. The study also found that there is a statistically significant gap between the 
number of words children get exposed to based on their socioeconomic status. Pre-schoolers 
from a working-class background had been exposed to thirty million fewer words (tokens, 
not types) than those from higher income ones, thereby giving them a positional 
disadvantage in their cognitive development. This happens for a number of related reasons: 
wealthier parents are more likely to have free time to spend with their children, engaging 
them in conversation, they are more likely to own books and read to their children, and so 
on. This creates positional inequalities in children’s skills and self-esteem, which is 
problematic for their long-term education. Interpreting this set of causal relationships 
through a capability lens can allow us to identify the material and social conditions for the 
acquisition of capabilities, and to express relevant policy interventions aimed at redressing 
these inequalities as a matter of justice. 
Moreover, because the effects of education are so pervasive not just for individuals, 
but also for the functioning of societies and institutions, this causal narrative of capability 
acquisition has far-ranging implications for justice (e.g., Terzi, 2007). The capabilities of 
everyone in society depend on the sort of education they are capable of receiving and making 
use of. Walker and Unterhalter (2007b) point out that using the capability framework in 
education can aid us in thinking about a number of different general questions, such as: 
“justice and the distribution of schooling, gender equality, redressing poverty, politics, the 
link between school and the labour market, policymaking, education measurement, 
institution building, management and pedagogies” (p. 239).  
Another strength of the capability approach is its focus on the opportunity to achieve 
ends, rather than on the ends themselves. According to the approach, individual well-being 
is a matter of having valuable opportunities available rather than a matter of having realised 
a sufficient number of them. People can always choose (not) to make use of some 
opportunities, and this choice ought to be upheld as a matter of justice, so long as the choice 
was made autonomously, that is. Education equips individuals with the skills needed to make 
meaningful, deliberate choices, thereby enabling them to make use of opportunities to live 
their lives in ways which they may not have realised were possible. 
Comim et al. (2011) make a similar claim when they argue that the goal of bringing 
capabilities to bear on children’s issues means treating children as “capable agents and to 
promote the active participation of children in society” (p. 9). According to Ballet et al. 
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(2011), children are seen as social actors in their own right, as active participants in their 
families and communities, rather than as passive objects of paternalistic management. It is a 
pertinent strength of the capability approach that it recognises the value of individual agency. 
Indeed, Walker (2007) points out that a focus on capabilities “directs our attention to any 
sources of unfreedom that might constrain genuine choices” (p. 192). The goal of education 
is, therefore to “increase students’ freedom in the directions they reflectively value for their 
well-being and agency (Walker and Unterhalter, 2007a: 133). Finally, this emphasis on 
capabilities as freedoms also allows us to recognise that not everyone will choose to benefit 
from educational opportunities in the same way. Some individuals may not put their 
education to much use, or they may even repudiate it.  
 
2. Bringing Capabilities to Bear on Education 
This chapter so far has looked at how the capability approach can be used to frame education 
as a provision of justice. I now turn to the central task of this chapter: to argue that the 
particular account of capability justice defended in this thesis has exciting implications on 
education policy. 
I will apply my claims from Part 2 of this thesis to the domain of education in order to 
defend three claims. First, we can formulate a threshold of epistemic capabilities as basic 
provisions of justice. Second, the discussion of agentic competencies necessary for 
autonomy discussed in Chapter 3 suggests a strategy for promoting individual autonomy 
through educational means. And third, the discussion of relational conversion factors can 
help us identify salient impediments to the development of children’s capabilities. 
 
2.1 Epistemic Capabilities 
 
A promising strategy for formalising education as an object of capability justice would be to 
express education into a discrete capability, or a set of capabilities and include that as a 
provision of justice. This would be a way of refining the claims we saw capability theorists 
make in the previous section, as well making them more practicable. This way of expressing 
educational entitlements may also avoid the problems that a justice-based focus on 
enrolment rates or years of schooling was argued to entail.  
Lorella Terzi (2007) argues that we ought to formulate a capability to be educated as 
a basic capability. Terzi makes use of Sen’s notion of a ‘basic capability’, or one of a subset 
of capabilities that are “a relatively small number of centrally important beings and doings 
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that are crucial to well-being” (Sen, 1992: 44), such as the capability to be well-nourished 
and well-sheltered. This qualifier assumes that there are some capabilities that are “so basic 
to human welfare that they can be identified without any prior knowledge of the particular 
commitments that are held and expressed by an individual or group” (Alkire 2002: 154 cited 
in Terzi, 2007). According to Terzi, the capability to be educated is such a basic and 
fundamental entitlement. This category of capabilities differs from my coinage of meta-
capabilities, since meta-capabilities constitute the exercise of capabilities, whereas a basic 
capability, as Terzi uses it, is one that is a small group of capabilities which are central to 
human welfare.  
Terzi takes this to be a basic capability for two reasons. First, a lack of education 
constitutes an absolute harm to an individual as it denies her access to a range of 
opportunities. An educated individual is more likely to have more opportunities in, for 
example, the labour market or her personal relationships, or in the extent to which she can 
be involved in public life. At the very extreme end of this harm, lack of any form of education 
can result in neglected children who are unable to acquire cognitive and social skills later in 
life. 
Second, Terzi takes the capability to be educated to play a causal role in the realization 
of several other capabilities. Therefore, this capability can be considered foundational for 
the entire framework, “and hence inherent to the very possibility of leading a good life” (ibid, 
30). For example, a degree of education may be necessary for creative endeavours or for 
understanding how to control one’s environment, and generally, how to achieve various ends 
that an individual has chosen. Terzi holds that the capability to be educated contributes to 
the expansion of human capabilities. Therefore, Terzi argues that the capability to be 
educated constitutes a “fundamental entitlement, and its provision becomes a matter of 
justice” (ibid, 25). 
Drawing on Charles Bailey’s (1984, cited in Terzi 2007) relative list of educational 
‘serving competencies’ needed to achieve educational aims, Terzi goes on to formulate a 
preliminary list of seven educational functionings that she takes to be constitutive of the 
basic capability to be educated: 
1. Literacy: being able to read and to write, to use language, and discursive 
reasoning functionings. 
2. Numeracy: being able to count, to measure, to solve mathematical 
questions, and to use logical reasoning functionings. 
3. Sociality and participation: being able to establish positive relationships 
with others and to participate in social activities without shame. 
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4. Learning dispositions: being able to concentrate, to pursue interests, to 
accomplish tasks, to enquire. 
5. Physical activities: being able to exercise and being able to engage in 
sports and activities. 
6. Science and technology: being able to understand natural phenomena, 
being knowledgeable on technology, and being able to use technological 
tools. 
7. Practical reason: being able to relate means and ends and being able to 
critically reflect on one’s and others’ actions (Terzi, 2007: 37). 
According to Terzi, what justifies the inclusion of these functionings is that the absence 
of any of them would constitute a disadvantage to the individual. This way of establishing 
the entitlements is similar to Nussbaum who holds that one cannot imagine a life that is 
simultaneously dignified and free and lacking in at least one central capability (Nussbaum, 
2000:72-4). Terzi argues that none of the functionings she proposes look like they could be 
reducible to others, which makes her conclude that it appears “fairly exhaustive with respect 
to the foundational elements relevant to education” (Terzi, 2007:37). Terzi then goes on to 
independently substantiate each item on her list. For example, she argues that literacy is 
essential for communication, reasoning and expressing oneself, which are all intrinsically 
valuable, while numeracy enables the sort of logical reasoning needed to make sense of the 
world and one’s place in it. Meanwhile, understanding science and technology can help us 
overcome natural obstacles.  
Terzi points out that the value of these educational functionings can be understood as 
both intrinsic and instrumentally valuable for further goods. Nonetheless, whatever the type 
of value, a deprivation of each functioning would constitute an absolute harm to the 
individual. 
According to Terzi, the main upshot of expressing education in capability language is 
the recognition of the foundational role education plays in the expansion of human 
capabilities “and hence to the contribution it makes to the opportunities people have for 
leading flourishing lives” (ibid, 41).  
There is, however, an ambiguity in how Terzi uses the notion of harm and, on one 
reading, her claims are too strong. Namely, the claim that a deprivation of one of the listed 
functionings constitutes an absolute harm implies an odd conception of education, one that 
may be insensitive to variations across time and social context, which we should 
independently think of as fairly relevant for thinking about justice. In particular, some 
curious implications follow from her use of ‘harm’. If a lack of any one of the educational 
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capabilities constitutes an absolute harm, then this means that, for example, everyone 
educated in the UK prior to the latter half of the 19th century were absolutely harmed by the 
lack of a scientific education since science was only included in the general public school 
curricula around this time. Were pre-1870s school children made worse off by the fact that 
they were not taught physics or natural philosophy; were they made worse off than they 
otherwise would have been?22 It is unclear what could justify a claim this strong. It would be 
more plausible to claim that pre-1870s school children failed to receive the benefit of a more 
sophisticated understanding of the laws of nature, so in this sense they could have been better 
off otherwise. However, this is not the same as claiming that they had been harmed. However, 
rephrasing Terzi’s argument to be about the conferring of benefits may have the 
disadvantage of weakening the justification of her argument since the forgoing of a benefit 
seems less of an urgent worry than the incurring of a harm.  
Perhaps instead Terzi’s claim ought to be qualified here by making it explicit that 
educational deprivations are relative or positional harms. A harm is relative, rather than 
absolute, if it makes one worse off than they were, relative to other people in a relevantly 
similar situation, or relative to some relevant standard. The temporal relativity is plain here, 
since the absence of a scientific education could only harm individuals relative to the 
contemporary benefits that such an education confers, and if there had been no such benefits 
at the time, we would not be able to speak of absolute harms. But more importantly, relativity 
to social variables ought to be made explicit, too. Education is often argued to be a 
specifically distributive concern because of the positional advantage that it confers to some 
individuals. Namely, it is the relative difference in education between individuals, rather 
than the absolute points of education, along which, for example, income disparity or other 
measures may fall in a society.  
For example, if cognitive enhancement technology in the near future allows us to 
implant some manner of cognition booster in our brains, this would confer a massive benefit 
on those who receive them as it could enhance their employability in a range of fields. If, 
however, some members of society were unable to afford enhancements, they could be said 
to be harmed insofar as they were positionally disadvantaged by the sudden distance between 
their cognitive capabilities and those of the very wealthy. However, this would only be a 
harm relative to that distance between those without enhancements and those with. Failing 
 
22 I mention both a temporal notion of harm (i.e., being made worse off than you were before), and a modal 
or counterfactual one (i.e., being made worse off than you otherwise would have been). Lack of a benefit 
seems like it could count as a harm under the counterfactual view only, however, this would require a 
conception of desert or entitlement, which is missing in the present discussion. That is, if I wish to claim that 
you have harmed me by failing to benefit me, I will only have a claim against you if I was in some sense 
entitled to the benefit such that you failing to give it to me was a harm. 
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to qualify this harm in such a way would be coterminous to saying that, say, Marie Curie 
had been harmed by the non-existence of cognitive enhancement technology. This would, of 
course, be an odd and false thing to say. 
Therefore, I take it that the supposed harm of educational capability failure ought to 
be made explicit as a function of social context, for it is in this context in which education 
gains its meaning as a significant object of distributive justice. This can be done by 
disambiguating the notion of harm as a foregone benefit that individuals were entitled to 
insofar as justice consists in clearing a particular threshold level of capability for individuals. 
The relative distance between people’s capabilities, as we have seen, will influence the 
relative position of where this threshold ought to be drawn. 
Nevertheless, Terzi’s argument provides a plausible justification for the inclusion of 
education as a basic distributive good for capability justice, and the proposed components 
of education appear robust and exhaustive enough to translate into a clear baseline for 
sufficient education.  
In Chapter 4, I proposed a capability domain which encompasses what I called 
epistemic capabilities, which I defined as consisting of the requisite skills and knowledge 
which individuals need in order to pursue various ends of their choosing. We have already 
seen one factor which influences where a threshold ought to be drawn: the individual’s 
conception of herself and her life plans. Some pursuits are going to require relatively large 
investments into epistemic capabilities, while others will require very little. The baseline we 
draw here has to primarily be policy-guiding, so it cannot be sensitive to interpersonal 
differences to such a fine-grained degree. Therefore, I argue that the baseline for sufficient 
education ought to be drawn with reference to the social variables above, most significantly, 
the positional distance that tracks educational inequalities in a population. 
Nonetheless, we can take this interpersonal variability as a good reason to support 
individuals in making autonomous decisions about the kinds of epistemic goods they wish 
to pursue above the threshold. On my view, the pursuit of capabilities is enabled by the meta-
capability of autonomy, or the ability to select and pursue relevant capabilities in a way that 
reflects autonomous judgement about one’s conception of the good.  
Therefore, we should endorse a mandatory baseline across a range of epistemic 
capabilities—for example, like Terzi’s list of educational functionings—and support 
individual choice for capabilities above this threshold. In the next chapter, I will formulate 
a specific threshold for a specific kind of education – one that prepares individuals to engage 
in the political domain, but I take Terzi’s list, with the modification I have proposed above, 




2.2. Teaching Autonomy 
 
In Chapter 3, I argued that people’s capacity for autonomy is best understood as consisting 
of the exercise of a set of competencies. Since competencies are learned, I argue here that 
this conception of autonomy can be implanted into an account of educational capabilities, 
granting us a promising strategy for promoting autonomy through education.  
In this thesis I have endorsed Meyers’ (2014) account of autonomy, according to which 
individuals must be endowed with the following normatively thin agentic competencies:  
1. Introspection skills that sensitize individuals to their own feelings and 
desires, that enable them to interpret their subjective experience, and that 
help them judge how accurate their self-understanding is. 
2. Communication skills that enable individuals to get the benefit of others’ 
perceptions, background knowledge, insights, advice, and support. 
3. Memory skills that enable individuals to recall relevant experiences – from 
their own lives and also those that acquaintances have recounted or that they 
have encountered in literature or other art forms. 
4. Imagination skills that enable individuals to envisage feasible options – to 
audition a range of self-conceptions they might aspire to and to preview a 
variety of courses of action they might follow. 
5. Analytical skills and reasoning skills that enable individuals to assess the 
relative merits of different conceptions of what they could be like and 
directions they could pursue. 
6. Self-nurturing skills that enable individuals to secure their physical and 
psychological equilibrium despite missteps and setbacks – that enable them 
to appreciate the overall worthiness of their self-understandings and 
pursuits and to assure themselves of their capacity to carry on when they 
find themselves wanting or their life directions misguided. 
7. Volitional skills that enable individuals to resist pressure to capitulate to 
convention and enable them to maintain their commitment to their values 
and goals (Meyers, 2014: 121). 
I argue that all seven of these can be developed through education. If true, this claim 
has two exciting implications. First, it makes education even more central to theorising 
about justice. This is because my account of justice requires the promotion of autonomy as 
its first step, and education provides the most direct opportunity to carry this principle out. 
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And second, plugging in a competency-based conception of autonomy into the capability 
approach can give philosophers and policymakers a straightforward strategy for promoting 
autonomy through education. 
Meyers points out that there is a need for autonomy-augmenting education in order 
to counteract harmful gendered socialisation which undermines women’s agentic 
competencies. She writes that “successful education programs mobilize women’s 
introspection and imagination skills” (Meyers, 2000: 485). But there are good reasons to 
think that education ought to be a reliable way of developing other skills that constitute 
autonomous personhood, too. 
Skills 2-5 on Meyers’ list look like the most direct targets for education. 
Communication and the skill to understand empathise with others can be developed not 
only directly through the study of literature, history, and culture studies, but also directly 
through interaction with peers. Inviting external speakers representing a variety of identities 
can also be helpful for this end.  
Memory skills are central to education in a very direct sense since these happen to be 
what the majority of standardised assessment invariably test for. But the narrower sense 
that Meyers has in mind picks out the ability to “recall relevant experiences” (ibid, 121) 
from one’s own life and the lives of others—both real and fictional—in order to lay out a 
sufficiently diverse array of life plans to choose from. Similar to communication above, this 
capacity can be honed by studying the lives of others via narratives through history, 
literature, and religious studies and also through art and music.  
Imagination skills and the skill to “audition a range of self-conceptions” (ibid.) 
follows directly from this. This skill requires a sufficiently diverse set of feasible options 
that one could see oneself as choosing, which is something that the educational means above 
could provide in the form of exposing students to a range of identities and world views. But 
additionally, it also requires the virtue of open-mindedness or the ability to transcend one’s 
own identity ascriptions and commitments in order to be able to imagine oneself as different. 
This would involve learning that one’s identity is, to an extent, contingent rather than “an 
immutable attribute” (Sen, 2006: 353). This way, students would learn that differences in 
identity are not obstacles to cooperation, or cause for conflict. Analytical and reasoning 
skills can again be promoted directly through education, such as through philosophy, 
history, and mathematics. These skills allow individuals to critically assess the choices 
available to them and understand the causal means-ends relations of achieving them in 
practice.  
 Introspection appears more indirectly related to formal education, although Meyers 
herself points out that education can successfully promote this skill in her example of 
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gendered socialisation (Meyers, 2000: 485). There will no doubt be great variation in the 
exercise of introspection among educated individuals, and this capacity may be more 
closely related to one’s learned behaviour, their upbringing, or the reigning social mores of 
where they live. However, as with imagination and memory above, understanding the 
viewpoints and motivations of others ought to enable curiosity about oneself and thus 
introspection. The means by which this skill could be promoted through education may be 
similar to Nussbaum’s capacity of narrative imagination. By teaching students about the 
inner workings of the mind and the sometimes-opaque pathways by which we come to make 
decisions, they can be taught the skill of asking themselves for justification for their choices.  
Finally, self-nurturing and volitional skills appear to be picking out two related 
aspects of what is sometimes termed psychological resilience, or the capacity to cope with 
difficulties of various kinds and to ‘bounce back’ without lasting damage. According to 
researcher Ann Masten (2014) who studies resilience in developing children, the most 
consistent factors that contribute to resilience in children are supportive parenting and close 
relationships. However, she also picks out effective schooling as a causal factor, as well as 
intelligence, self-control, and self-confidence – characteristics that are promoted by 
effective schooling and educational achievements. This means that these resilience skills 
could be promoted through environmental design in schools as well as through curricular 
design. For example, lauded as one of the highest-performing countries in education, the 
Finnish school system is explicitly aimed at levelling out social inequalities. This involves 
“free school meals, easy access to health care, psychological counselling, and 
individualised student guidance” (Partanen, 2011). Measures like this can build a robust 
support network that can be most useful for vulnerable students and contribute to their 
psychological resilience while in school. 
If we take individual autonomy to be a matter of exercising certain agentic 
competencies, then it is clear that an important source of contributing factors in the 
promotion of these competencies is education. And the upshot of this claim is that if we 
want to promote individual autonomy through public policy, we must focus on education, 
specifically, the sort of education that enables individuals to critically reflect on their 
socialisation and decide how to respond to it appropriately.  
This kind of educational proposal may, however, be vulnerable to the criticism that it 
may involve inculcating students into a particular way of life, thereby making it 
incompatible with the principle of anti-perfectionism which I defend in this thesis. Harry 
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Brighouse (2002) intimates a similar argument when he distinguishes between autonomy-
facilitating and autonomy-promoting education.23 
Brighouse’s aim is to develop an account of a school choice plan which provides 
students with equal educational opportunities and an autonomous education. Brighouse 
believes that autonomy is instrumentally valuable – “other things being equal, people’s 
lives go better when they deploy the skills associated with autonomy” (Brighouse, 2002: 
80), skills like critical deliberation. Accordingly, these skills ought to be taught in school, 
but only in a way that facilitates their development “and does not yield any obligation to 
persuade them to deploy them” (ibid.). Facilitating autonomy means allowing people to 
reap the benefits associated with autonomy without necessarily holding it as a valuable way 
of life in itself. Promoting autonomy would thus be illegitimate since the truth of the claim 
that autonomy is indeed valuable may be disputed by reasonable individuals. Brighouse 
argues that it is not the proper goal of education to ensure that students employ autonomy 
in their lives “any more than Latin classes are aimed at ensuring that students employ Latin 
in their lives” (ibid.). 
Brighouse argues that autonomy-facilitation differs from autonomy-promotion in 
education along two dimensions. First, it is justified differently: “the argument for 
autonomy-facilitating education does not appeal to the civic responsibilities of future citizens 
or to the intrinsically superior value of autonomous living over non-autonomous living” 
(Brighouse, 2002: 80-1). Second, the content is somewhat different in a way that reflects the 
justificatory difference: “the education is purportedly ‘character-neutral’, in that it seeks to 
provide certain critical skills without aiming to inculcate the inclination to use them” 
(ibid.). 24  Later he says that “a state which actively encourages its citizens to live 
autonomously undermines their ability to give unconditional consent, since it actively 
conditions their preferred way of life” (ibid, 82). 
The problem is that Brighouse’s supposed distinction does not work. Given some 
basic facts about the specific type of skills autonomy comprises, it becomes clear that 
facilitating autonomy in the way Brighouse suggests just is the same as promoting it as a 
value, albeit of a different order. Brighouse anticipates such an objection when he concedes 
 
23 Whether or not Meyers’ account of autonomy would favour promotion over facilitation, in Brighouse’s use 
of the terms, is unclear. Meyers insists that her conception is procedural and sufficiently value-neutral to not 
entail the claim that autonomy is a substantively valuable way of life, however, Benson (2005) has pointed 
out that Meyers’ account relies on a number of normative claims, dubbing it a ‘weakly substantive’ view. I 
wish to bracket this debate since I wouldn’t be able to afford it proper attention, so Instead I will show that 
even if Meyers’ account of autonomy as a set of agentic competencies is found to be sufficiently substantive 
and, in turn, my proposal for plugging it into an educational program is found to constitute autonomy 
promotion in Brighouse’s view, this need not be a problem for liberals. 
24 To borrow terminology from the field of relational autonomy, the concept of autonomy-facilitation is to be 
understood as procedural (rather than substantive). 
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that, despite the theoretical differences, it may become difficult to distinguish between 
autonomy-facilitating and autonomy-promoting education in practice. He offers an analogy 
with sports: “it is hard to teach the skills without also communicating that the sport is worth 
playing” (ibid, 81). However, he argues that while this criticism may make it more difficult 
to win support for autonomy-facilitating education, it does not question the notable 
differences in the justificatory strategies vis-à-vis autonomy-promoting education. 
He anticipates a second objection—which he dismisses—that autonomy-facilitating 
education may be outright incoherent. Accordingly, “it seems wrong to say of anyone that 
they have had real opportunity to become autonomous if, though having learned the critical 
skills associated with autonomy, they have failed to develop the habits of character that go 
along with those skills” (ibid.). According to this objection, the distinction between 
autonomy-facilitation and autonomy-promotion is a distinction without a difference. 
In response to this objection, Brighouse argues that instrumental argument in favour 
of autonomy-facilitation “appeals only to the benefit for the opportunity to live well, and this 
benefit may well be gained by the person with the skills but not the habits [of autonomy], 
for two reasons” (ibid.). His reasons are, first, that recognising that people are differently 
constituted, some may simply be unable to learn the relevant habits or achieve the sort of 
autonomous character that is in question. And second, there may be other, “more affective, 
facets of personality which are relevant to learning how to live well, which may be 
undermined by trying to alter the characters of those whose constitutions are such that they 
cannot become fully, or habitually autonomous” (ibid, 82). Accordingly, the state only ought 
to aim at autonomy-facilitation and not to overstep.  
I argue that Brighouse’s distinction is indeed incoherent. It is impossible to teach 
children the skills necessary for autonomy without, constitutively through doing so, 
“inculcating [into them] the inclination to use them” (ibid, 80). This is because the skills for 
autonomy are not passive, they are not the kinds of skills which one can choose to switch 
off. Much like critical or reasoning skills, of which Brighouse speaks highly, skills 
associated with autonomy, once internalised, cannot be silenced at one’s discretion. If I know 
that an appeal to authority is an informal fallacy, and I encounter an argument that matches 
this description, or I am encouraged to act in a way that is based on such an argument, I 
cannot choose not to notice this and be persuaded. The argument’s fallacious nature is 
immediately apparent to me. 25  Similarly, if I possess the agentic skills necessary for 
 
25 I grant that there may be instances in which I may nonetheless be persuaded by such a fallacy. For example, 
I may be less critical toward arguments that support views which I already endorse. When I pass forward such 
an argument to someone whom I wish to convince, I may not be immediately aware of the fallacious nature 
of this argument. But I take it that the salient factor here is that I am using this capacity selectively. 
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autonomy, I cannot not be inclined to deploy them when reasoning about what decisions to 
make or whether those decisions are the result of authentic preferences. The kind of thing 
we do when we exercise autonomy is simply disanalogous to exercising other skills. When 
we exercise our capacity for autonomy, we are asserting our normative authority to make 
decisions. Imagine someone who possesses the necessary skills for self-authored choice, but 
subsequently tries to decline to exercise them. We would say of such a person that they are 
making a mistake about what they are doing. Namely, they are choosing no to choose. But 
this is itself a kind of choice. The skills and competencies associated with autonomy are 
therefore not analogous to other skills since they are transformative and pervade an 
individual’s agency once acquired. Therefore, Brighouse’s distinction, and his argument in 
turn, crumbles.  
To fortify the argument further and bring it in line with contributions made in this 
thesis, recognising individual autonomy as a meta-capability rather than a content-specific 
value gets us to the same conclusion. This is because the meta-capability of autonomy 
consists in skills that individuals have a reason to value despite the values that they hold or 
life plans that they wish to pursue. Consequently, the state cannot promote autonomy as a 
way of life since it consists in a set of tools needed to realise multiple, divergent, and 
possibly conflicting ways of life, and hence there is no acceptable alternative to which 
autonomy facilitation can be contrasted to. One can only equip individuals with the skills 
that constitute autonomy, thereby allowing them to make choices for themselves. Or one 
can fail to do so. There simply is no difference between autonomy facilitation and 
promotion in the way Brighouse suggests because a life of making choices freely is not a 
way of life in the same way that a life of religious obedience or unrestrained hedonism is a 
way of life.  
In closing, it is commonplace in liberal philosophy to hold that children have “a right 
to an open future” (Feinberg, 1980 cited in Fowler, 2011: 88). Incorporating the promotion 
of autonomy in childhood education should then be a direct and attractive way of ensuring 
this goal in practice.  
 
2.3 Relational Conversion Factors II 
 
As we have seen, the capability approach recognises that individual capabilities are mediated 
by various kinds of conversion factors, which determine the extent to which people are 
capable of making use of opportunities available to them. To apply my argument from 
Chapter 4 to the domain of education, I argue that a capability approach allied with a socially 
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relational conception of autonomy can help attend to various practices that hamper 
individuals’ educational attainments.  
When students enter educational institutions, they are not escaping the social world. 
They are entering a space that is continuous with it. That means that whatever social power 
imbalances or corrosive relations exist outside the institutions will invariably permeate their 
experience of education, too. Walker and Unterhalter (2007a) point out that recognising 
conversion factors is advantageous in thinking about justice since “personal and relational 
differences set conditions for capabilities” (p. 9).  
I cannot attempt to make an exhaustive catalogue of relevant conversion factor that are 
at play in education, not least because this would consist in extensive empirical work that I 
would be ill-equipped to undertake. However, in this section, I can sketch some preliminary 
principles that result from analysing examples of cases where relational factors are at work 
in education. 
Particular conversion factors that are specific to education may include teachers and 
relationships with peers, as well as social and cultural attitudes (ibid.). For example, some 
parents may perceive education as irrelevant and pull their children out of schooling in 
favour of work or domestic responsibilities, thereby leading to a diminishing of the child’s 
capabilities (Ballet et al. 2011). Attitudes about race, ethnicity, or gender can play a role too, 
such as in the form of discrimination. Such practices may actively exclude members of some 
ethnic groups from education, such as Roma children in South-Eastern Europe who may be 
screened out by discriminatory school entry tests and relegated to second-rate schools which 
they tend not to finish since their parents are aware of the low quality of education provided 
and opt out before they graduate (ibid.). Or in multilingual societies, the choice of language 
for instruction can entail barriers to accessing education (Unterhalter, 2008). 
Another key example is gendered socialisation, which can reinforce existing 
inequalities and prejudices, and hinder the development of women’s capacities. For example, 
in patriarchal societies, girls may be socialised to be reserved, obedient and to take up 
domestic duties and duties of care, whereas boys may be more likely to socialised to be 
independent, confident, and assertive and to take up careers outside of the home. The 
internalisation and replication of these beliefs through education can be expressed as a 
negative conversion factor insofar as it will result in adapting the preferences of both boys 
and girls. A girl in a patriarchal society may be taught to internalise the belief that she is not 
capable of independent thought or a say in how her political environment is controlled. And 
a boy in the same society may internalise beliefs about the inferiority or subservience of girls. 
This sort of socialisation harms everyone.  
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Recall that one of the components of the capacity for autonomy which I endorsed is 
the ability to imagine oneself as being someone else. Mackenzie (2000) argues that 
oppressive socialisation may impede autonomy by “restricting agents’ imaginative 
repertoires” (p.124), and it is plain to see how this may come about in cases of socialisation. 
If young children are taught that their capacities and options in life are determined by 
qualities supposedly essential to them, like gender or class, they may be incapable of 
imagining themselves without such qualities. If they lack role models with whom they can 
identify, they may never imagine what opportunities they may have under different 
circumstances. Moreover, individuals may be incapable of relating to others with recognition 
respect if the essential qualities are correlated with subordinating relationships. 
The move of expressing social and cultural attitudes—about race, ethnicity, gender, 
disability, or sexual orientation—as latent conversion factors which may impede an 
individual’s development of capabilities, all other things being equal, is a useful one for an 
account of justice. Namely, it will illuminate obstacles to justice in a way that other accounts 
of justice may be less sensitive to. This also gives us a compelling narrative for why 
conversion factors of this kind are a target for intervention: if justice requires securing 
individuals with capabilities, then anything that can be shown to be a causal obstacle to full 
capability ought to be, in one way or another, challenged. And education looks like a domain 
where such factors hold the potential of having far-ranging ramifications. 
Of course, challenging these conversion factors in practice is another task altogether, 
and it will be a formidable one. It will most likely not be possible by making direct changes 
in education law. Of course, changes in curricular and institutional design can be used to 
eradicate negative attitudes and to promote equality of opportunity for all students despite 
their differences. But, as I pointed out above, the classroom is continuous with the wider 
social world in an important sense, which means interventions aimed at challenging negative 
conversion factors in education will have to consist in other interventions too. The task of 
challenging conversion factors of this kind may require a pluralistic and diffuse approach 
that does not restrict its focus to education policy exclusively. We must be committed to 
removing unjust social practices and norms and unequal power hierarchies in practice.  
A similar claim is made by Comim (2011) who argues that the task of promoting 
children’s capabilities ought not to be limited to government policies; parental and school 
practices are an essential point of focus too, and so is allowing children various opportunities 
for self-improvement. Raynor’s (2007) study on educational capabilities in Bangladesh can 
help motivate this point. She presents evidence of student’s capabilities being promoted 
more reliably through non-formal education than from schooling. She studied adolescent 
non-formal education centres in Bangladesh which encourage reading, discussion, music, 
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and dance outside of school. These centres allowed girls to socialise openly about issues 
concerning their lives, allowing them to express themselves more freely than they would 
have been able to at school or at home.  
We could, therefore, demand that governments invest in and support informal and non-
formal education centres26 or that they launch public education campaigns that challenge 
negative social attitudes and stereotypes. We could demand mandatory equality training for 
educators and public sector workers so they may be better equipped to identify and respond 
to biases—implicit and explicit—in their work. These are cursory suggestions, but I hope 
they illustrate the variety of options available to states for challenging negative conversion 
factors to the development of people’s capabilities.  
This proposal for containing social factors on a large scale may invite a somewhat 
familiar objection. Namely, working to challenge widespread socialisation may turn out to 
be overly demanding, or perhaps impossible in practice, if the targeted beliefs have been 
thoroughly internalised by individuals. Suppose an individual has come to endorse attitudes 
that effectively limit her autonomy, and her capabilities. According to an objection of this 
sort, efforts to remove harmful socialisation would entail transcending social influence in 
such a way which may not be possible for such “finite, socially located, embodied beings” 
as us (Christman, 2015: 147).  
One way of phrasing this objection would be to say it may be too difficult to adequately 
separate beliefs and desires that are autonomous and ones that are due to socialisation of an 
autonomy-damaging kind. Plenty of beliefs and desires that come about from socialisation 
are consistent with autonomy. And even if we were to successfully identify some paradigm 
‘bad’ cases that ought to be challenged, we would be committing ourselves to removing the 
influence of the social world while being situated in the social world. This would involve a 
kind of Munchausenian feat of pulling ourselves out of a swamp by our own hair. 
There are two ways to resist this objection. One way would be to point out that, of 
course, not all socialisation is harmful and necessarily inconsistent with autonomy. Suppose 
I love playing the flute and have decided to pursue a career in an orchestra. Suppose that this 
choice had, in fact, been determined in large part by socialisation and implicit expectations 
from my family, all of whom play a musical instrument and think of a musical career as the 
highest form of professional achievement. Was my choice of career necessarily not 
autonomous? Of course not. So long as I possessed the necessary competences to endorse or 
repudiate this decision and so long as I was free of coercion or manipulation, there is no 
 
26 Whereas non-formal education refers to structured learning which lacks either a curriculum or a certificate 
upon completion (e.g., continuing professional development, sports programs, programs developed by 
scouts or guides), informal education consists in self-directed learning or learning from experience. 
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reason to think of this choice as inauthentic or not autonomous. If the bar for autonomy was 
drawn this high, it would render autonomy a vacuous concept altogether for no actual person 
could ever clear it.27  
Instead, it is important that we distinguish between benign or harmless socialisation, 
and harmful or oppressive socialisation. The former either imparts us with the skills needed 
for self-government, or has no causal impact on it, while the latter limits our capacity for 
autonomy by, for example, alienating our acts or motivations from our reasoning (Taylor, 
2013). And, as I have argued, this distinction can be made in practice if one has a clear 
conception of what each kind of socialisation consists in. I have endorsed such a conception 
of autonomy in this thesis. Therefore, if we can identify instances where the internalisation 
of certain derogatory attitudes is correlated with a lack of appropriate agentic competencies, 
we may be justified in treating the beliefs in question as lacking in normative authority and, 
therefore, targets of an intervention of some kind. 
The second way to resist this objection would be to point out that a successful response 
to harmful socialisation need not consist in a wholesale transcendence of socialisation. I 
agree that this would indeed be an impossible task. I take it that responding to harmful 
socialisation ought to consist in a kind of education that reinforces the agentic competencies 
whose lack may have given way to internalising damaging beliefs, while encouraging 
adopting a critical kind of attitude toward the beliefs in question. It would be acceptable, 
therefore, if someone were to ultimately endorse the beliefs and attitudes which she was 
socialised into—so long as she has been given the requisite tools to do so critically and freely. 
One way of establishing why this kind of socialisation is problematic is because it consists 
of a covert influence which is necessarily hidden for the individual (Colburn, 2011:67-9). If 
the influence is revealed to her and she nonetheless chooses to endorse the belief in question, 
then socialisation of this kind could be argued to be consistent with autonomy. Moreover, 
according to my view, certain agentic competencies are necessary for individuals to be 
capable of identifying commitments and desires they would rather repudiate. Therefore, 
there is no reason to think that autonomy requires us to engage in a kind of Cartesian task of 
reflecting on, and ultimately relinquishing, all beliefs we have acquired through socialisation. 
Responding to harmful socialisation, therefore, ought to be a matter of fashioning an 
appropriately critical response to it – whatever the content of that response may be. And so, 
I take it, there is nothing impossible about that (or Cartesian for that matter). 
 
 




3. Perfectionism in Education 
As we have seen throughout this thesis, philosophers are divided on whether they believe 
state institutions ought to promote valuable ways of life. This division is especially striking 
in education where decisions about value can have significant implications for the beliefs 
and values of future people. The capability approach I defend in this thesis is committed to 
anti-perfectionism, or the view that the state must not promote valuable ways of life, and so 
I take it that this principle extends to educational provisions, too. That is to say, we should 
favour education that is anti-perfectionist. However, there have been compelling arguments 
published recently which defend a specific kind of perfectionism that is localised only to 
education. That is to say, this kind of perfectionism is consistent with anti-perfectionism in 
other domains. In this section, I will critically examine two arguments of this kind—by 
Timothy Fowler (2020) and Luara Ferracioli and Rosa Terlazzo (2014), respectively—and 
I will demonstrate why these arguments fail to be persuasive.  
Before I do that, I will make a brief point on the use of key terms in this section. Some 
authors in the field of liberal education do not make an explicit distinction between 
comprehensiveness in the normative justification of the liberal state and perfectionism in the 
implementation of state policy. That is to say, they do not distinguish between two levels at 
which contentious value judgements could play a role: the level of justification, and the level 
of policy output. For example, Brighouse and Swift (2003) argue that education can never 
be a truly neutral activity since it must rely on at least some substantive views about what is 
good in human life and without such views, it “might seem vapid, even pointless” (Brighouse 
and Swift, 2003: 367). 
This sounds like a reasonable claim to make. However, it is ambiguous between the 
following two readings: (1) education can never be neutral for it must satisfy some value, 
and (2) education can never be neutral for it must, in practice, promote some value. These 
claims are not coextensive. One may accept (1) and reject (2). I hesitate to comment on 
whether one may reject (1) and accept (2), however. At any rate, in this section, we will be 
concerned with the truth of the second reading of that claim. That is to say, must education 
promote some valuable ways of life?  
 
3.1. Perfectionism for Children 
 
Throughout this chapter, I have declined to offer an ontological distinction between adults 
and children. I have indicated some ways in which they differ, but, for the most part, I have 
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implicitly assumed children to be small-scale adults. However, perhaps not making this 
distinction does a disservice to the discussion. Fowler (2020) has recently argued that anti-
perfectionism—even if it turns out to be appropriate for adults—is misguided and 
counterproductive for children. Ultimately, he also finds that anti-perfectionism is not 
appropriate for adults either. According to Fowler, justice requires a robust conception of 
children’s well-being—one that goes above the liberal fixation on autonomy—and that 
without such a conception, we would, in fact, be failing to protect children’s interests.  
It shows a child no disrespect to design their upbringing in order to guide 
them towards good ways of living, and in fact we show them disrespect by 
thinking of them as already beholden to the choices of their parents or the 
community into which they are born (Fowler, 2020: 61). 
In other words, to assume that justice for children requires that their autonomy be 
promoted is to make a kind of mistake: a mistake of valorising independence and 
overvaluing the extent to which autonomy features as a normative desideratum in children’s 
welfare. Children require a positive environment with a set of heterogenous goods that will 
lead them to internalise a “positive and plausible conception of the good” (ibid, xii). Anti-
perfectionism, therefore, is a mistaken goal for education insofar as it consists in opposing 
the distribution of such robust goods. 
Fowler argues for this goal in two steps. The first step is to resist anti-perfectionist 
thinking in general, and the second is to resist it in the particular context of children.  
On the first step, Fowler endorses Raz and Wall’s claims that perfectionist taxation 
policies do not constitute coercion, and so there is nothing about perfectionism in itself that 
is inconsistent with regarding individual autonomy as valuable. He writes, “a person’s 
interest in agency is met so long as they have access to good options and no outside actor is 
trying to predetermine how they will live their lives” (ibid, 75).  
On the face of it, this is puzzling because in Raz and Wall’s vision of liberal 
perfectionism, there is indeed an outside actor—the state—and while it may not pre-
determine individuals’ choices in a causally robust de re way, it will invariably be exercising 
a degree of control over individuals’ lives. For example, if the state makes it harder to pursue 
some ostensibly worthless options through selective taxation or actively encouraging its 
opposite, it will make pursuing that option harder. This is what this sort of policy intends to 
do. Let us assume that for any pursuit there is a baseline probability of failure. Say, if I take 
up parkour as a hobby, there is a non-zero chance I will give up eventually, perhaps I will 
injure myself, or other more exciting hobbies will come up, or I will just get bored of it. Now, 
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suppose my local council is responding to widespread reports of antisocial and dangerous 
behaviour, and in an effort to quell this, issues a fine for anyone caught doing parkour on 
public property. Invariably, this will increase the likelihood I will abandon this hobby. 
Suppose I find a gym that offers indoor parkour classes that entail zero risk with the 
authorities, but because of recent cuts to recreational budgets in my area, the nearest facility 
for this is an hour commute. With each incremental step in this narrative, the chance of me 
failing in my aspirations compounds, and while through sheer grit and perseverance I may 
still be able to see this hobby to the bitter end, this becomes more and more unlikely. Say, 
90% less likely. That means for every ten people, nine of them will effectively had had the 
local council pre-determine their choices in a de dicto way. So, perfectionism is not off the 
hook yet. 
Step two for Fowler is to claim that even if perfectionism were bad for adults, it is not 
so for children because of their unique nature as children. Children are vulnerable and 
malleable, and their future welfare is determined by the choices made by those responsible 
for them and the wider social context they are brought up in. This means that direct 
interventions in their lives are not impermissible as in the case for adults, and so “the scope 
to promote goods other than autonomy is significantly increased” (ibid, 76). In other words, 
the reasons that held in the thinking in the previous paragraph—that the state has no business 
determining individual choices for them—simply do not hold for children. Childhood is the 
one area where paternalism is, in fact, necessary to ensure children’s welfare. After all, the 
relationship between parent and child is where we get the very word ‘paternalism’ from. 
The kind of perfectionism that Fowler thinks is necessary has to go above merely 
promoting autonomy for the reasons discussed earlier since autonomy is not the be-all and 
end-all value for children:  
Perfectionism for children is not chiefly about changing the incentives of 
those with reasonably stable sets of goals and plans; rather, it is about shifting 
the environment in which they form those goals. The hope is that exposing 
children to valuable activities, and giving them the skills and time to 
participate in these projects, will cause them to develop an appreciation for 
the value in question. If successful, this would include meaning that the child 
endorses this way of living (ibid, 76). 
Here, I am largely in agreement with Fowler that the environment that children grow 
up in must be conducive to their future welfare, and that the state cannot be fully neutral 
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with regard to all possible environments. This will invariably have implications on education 
policy, family law and so on.  
However, these implications need not be perfectionist if we conceive of them as 
requisites needed for laying the foundations for autonomy in adulthood. This is consistent 
with claiming that autonomy is the foundational value for political institutions, and in 
practice, it can be realised with a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for autonomy 
which I have provided in the form of a list of normative competencies earlier in this chapter. 
Perhaps the list of competencies I endorse could play the role of a criterion that Fowler 
alludes to for distinguishing between environments for children that are conducive to future 
welfare and environments that are not. In this way, the supposedly perfectionist goods which 
Fowler endorses as necessary for children’s development would turn out to be coextensive 
with the second-order goods that my account of justice provides in the form of a meta-
capability of autonomy. 
According to my view, justice requires providing individuals with the capabilities 
necessary for them to live dignified and autonomous lives. If the state oversteps this 
boundary and provides goods that consist in encouraging specific functionings, it is no 
longer preparing autonomous adults, but rather inculcating individuals into particular ways 
of life – which, I argue, is an unjustifiable kind of thing to do. So, according to my view, the 
perfectionism for children that Fowler defends is only defensible if the values it is intended 
to promote can in fact be shown to be coextensive with the necessary requisites for equipping 
individuals with the meta-capability of autonomy. And since I take the necessary requisites 
to consist in normative competencies, whereas Fowler endorses a more comprehensive array 
of valuable activities, I take it that our agreement has ample shared ground. Anything over 
and above this shared ground, however, will be, I take it, inconsistent with respecting the 
normative authority of individuals, and thus ought to be rejected.  
If adult autonomy is valuable, then, for the reasons that Fowler mentions, such as 
children being malleable and their early education determining their normative commitments 
in later life, perfectionism which does anything to determine future choices non-
autonomously is impermissible. I showed how perfectionism can determine a choice in such 
a way, and I take this kind of effect to be unavoidable if we endorse perfectionism. 
Perfectionism for children —the way that I understand it—is, therefore, inconsistent with 
respecting autonomy for adults. But providing the necessary goods for children to grapple 
with learning the agentic skills necessary for autonomy is acceptable.  
An interlocutor may point out that by arguing this way, I have effectively voided my 
claim above, in which I expressed agreement to Fowler’s argument that considerations of 
children’s welfare mean that we ought not to be neutral with regard to all possible 
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environments for children. I believe that the normative competencies for autonomy that I 
endorse are sufficiently robust to provide an autonomy-based principle for distinguishing 
between good environments and bad environments in a way that can still count as anti-
perfectionist in my view. This is because anti-perfectionism refers to first-order values, and 
autonomy is a second-order capability. So, I believe my account of justice can accommodate 
the requirements for protecting children’s welfare on the basis of autonomy and, therefore, 
without referring to specific goods in the form of valuable functionings.  
This way of arguing preserves much of the impetus of Fowler’s argument in favour of 
perfectionism for children. If we follow my account, we are not refusing to take a stand on 
what makes children’s lives go better and what prepares them to have full capabilities in the 
future. Moreover, we are not slavishly upholding the value of autonomy like the liberals 
before us, without a thought of how our philosophy directly implicates children. On top of 
that, I believe that my claim that we should understand autonomy as socially relational can 
be used to soften the blow against Fowler’s argument. Fowler takes the valorisation of 
autonomy and independence to be ill-fitting for thinking about what justice owes to children 
because children are not the “idealized autonomous subjects” (ibid, vii) which traditional 
liberal philosophy is concerned with. Children are vulnerable, interdependent, and social. If 
we adopt a relational analysis of autonomy, so are adults. Recognising this fact may be a 
further reason to see that anti-perfectionism of the kind I defend need not be hostile to 
children’s interests in practice. 
 
3.2 Political Perfectionism 
 
Ferracioli and Terlazzo (2014) develop a similar argument for perfectionism in education, 
but theirs is made using a capability framework. They argue that a politically liberal, and 
therefore neutral and anti-perfectionist capability approach is not well-equipped to respond 
to oppression. They identify two ways in which a politically liberal conception of justice 
may end up tolerating oppression of its citizens: first, by failing to provide effective 
opportunities for marginalised groups to overcome structural prejudices and barriers. They 
mention women, persons of colour and those with disabilities as examples. The formal rights 
afforded by political liberalism are arguably insufficient to translate into meaningful 
opportunities in the face of structural power imbalances. Second, adaptive preferences may 
alter a person’s belief in her own entitlement to exercise her capabilities, thereby making her 
less capable. The authors argue that the choices made in relation to valuable functionings 
ought to be “free of coercive pressure and preference deformed by either our surroundings 
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or our past” (Ferracioli and Terlazzo, 2014: 452), but this simply cannot be achieved by an 
account of liberalism which remains agnostic about the value of autonomy.  
For this reason, Ferracioli and Terlazzo argue that the capability approach ought to be 
based on a hybrid account of liberalism which accommodates comprehensive autonomy. 
They formulate their proposal in the following way: 
In order to show respect for adults, its justification must be political; in order 
to show respect for children, however, its implementation must include a 
commitment to comprehensive autonomy (ibid., 443).  
This proposal is, therefore, neutral in its justification, but perfectionist in its intended 
policy goals. They argue that we ought to ensure that children develop the skills they need 
to make meaningful, deliberate choices about how to exercise their capabilities. The 
resulting account of liberalism is one that is justified on sufficiently neutral grounds to be 
accessible to all reasonable individuals under conditions of pluralism, but its successful 
implementation requires “an educational emphasis on the development of a kind of 
autonomy that is normally associated with perfectionist liberalism” (ibid.,444). Ferracioli 
and Terlazzo refer to this account as “comprehensive, yet non-perfectionist” (ibid.) – a 
phrase that is used differently to how we have used it in this thesis, for reasons that will 
become clear in a moment.  
Ferracioli and Terlazzo agree with Nussbaum’s opposition to a Razian conception of 
autonomy for the reason that Raz’s conception privileges some citizens’ conception of the 
good, while disrespecting others. However, by distinguishing between Raz’s 
comprehensiveness and perfectionism, the authors argue that it is only the perfectionism of 
Raz’s account of autonomy that is problematic. I argued for a similar claim in Chapter 3, 
however, my argument relied on the practical difference between recognising that a moral 
principle ought to extend to the political sphere on the one hand, and taking that to mean that 
the state is in the business of campaigning for this moral principle on the other. Ferracioli 
and Terlazzo’s reasoning for this claim rests, somewhat curiously, on an interpretation of 
Nussbaum’s citation of Larmore. The authors state that Nussbaum omits a key phrase when 
she quotes Larmore’s characterisation of comprehensive liberalism. 
According to Larmore (1996), perfectionist liberalism is based on “ideals claiming to 
shape our overall conception of the good life, and not just on our role as citizens” (p.122), 
and in so doing, it makes contestable claims about “the ultimate nature of the human good 
(ibid.). However, when restating this definition subsequently in her own words, Nussbaum 
reportedly skips the reference to claims about the ultimate nature of human good, which 
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Ferracioli and Terlazzo take to be a way of softening the implications of extending a 
comprehensive principle into the political realm. They use this historiographical observation 
to arrive at the following definitions: 
Comprehensiveness and perfectionism: a political principle is 
comprehensive if it extends beyond the realm of the political. But it is only 
perfectionist if, in addition, it makes claims about the ultimate nature of 
human good (Ferracioli and Terlazzo, 2014: 446). 
These definitions are a little different to how philosophers typically define both terms. 
According to these definitions, comprehensiveness is assumed to be a necessary condition 
of perfectionism. According to Quong’s definition, which I have made heavy use of in this 
thesis, comprehensiveness and perfectionism are orthogonal (Quong, 2011: 12-16). The 
present distinction, therefore, effaces the possibility of a political perfectionism. This is 
curious, considering that is exactly the kind of liberalism that the authors are ultimately 
defending—in Quong’s terms—that is, a liberalism with a political justification but one 
which endeavours to promote value in practice. 
Ferracioli and Terlazzo, therefore, can be seen to defend a ‘comprehensive yet non-
perfectionist’ account of autonomy – one where the state endorses autonomy as a general 
good in the lives of individuals qua persons rather than only qua citizens, “but it need neither 
be the case that the value of autonomy will be treated by the state as a matter of moral truth, 
nor that it will be taken to be a good despite the consequences that it brings” (Ferracioli and 
Terlazzo, 2014: 446). This is justified with a Rawlsian defence; given that the world is 
complicated and questions of about the good are plagued by disagreement between 
reasonable persons (or ‘burdens of judgement’ in Rawls’ terminology), a comprehensive 
view of autonomy helps the state secure individuals’ interest to find one’s value in life freely. 
And Ferracioli and Terlazzo believe this is possible and non-contradictory so long as the 
state takes the comprehensive value of autonomy to be instrumental. In this case the state is 
not making any kind of controversial claim about the ultimate value of autonomy. Rather it 
is acting on the claim that all people have an interest in being able to find meaning in their 
lives – which is both consistent with political liberalism and something which both authors 
take to be a solidly uncontroversial claim. 
Having shown that comprehensive autonomy is not necessarily inconsistent with 
political liberalism, their next task is to show why it is justified and ought to be subsumed 
into a hybrid account. They do this with an argument about education. Ferracioli and 
Terlazzo argue that individuals’ mental capacity for autonomy (something not recognised 
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by the purely political accounts of autonomy endorsed by Nussbaum) are a vitally necessary 
component of autonomy when considering the phenomenon of adaptive preferences as well 
as the role education plays in the development of the capabilities.  
Without educating children to be autonomous, the thin “political” conception 
of autonomy may succeed in providing some set of opportunities to children 
raised in a liberal society, but it will not succeed in empowering these 
children to actually take advantage of those options ( . . . ) instead, we claim 
that the education of children must emphasize the development of a mental 
capacity for autonomy that includes the critical and emotional capacity to see 
oneself as entitled to make certain choices in life, even when those choices 
grate against the social, cultural, and religious norms that those children may 
have been brought to obey (ibid, 448).  
The authors try to avoid the claim that is unpalatable to many political liberals—that 
autonomy makes lives go better in general—and they opt for a self-reportedly less 
controversial claim that the skills associated with autonomy “make one’s life less likely to 
go badly in general” (ibid.). 28 However, they recognise that the sort of education they have 
in mind may go against some people’s comprehensive doctrines and their ideas on how best 
to educate their children. They argue that this is precisely the role played by state-sponsored 
formal education:  
if we cannot require parents to treat as morally acceptable those life options 
that conflict with their own conceptions of the good, then we must shift the 
burden onto the state and require, through its public school system, to 
develop programs in which children are taught to see themselves as 
genuinely entitled to choose different paths in the future (ibid, 450).  
So, they conclude, the capability approach ought to promote comprehensive autonomy 
through education in order to meet its purported goals of securing individuals with 
capabilities. 
For all its idiosyncrasies, I am largely sympathetic to Ferracioli and Terlazzo’s 
argument that public institutions have an obligation to educate children for autonomy as a 
 
28 It is unclear whether this actually marks a substantial departure from the claim that political liberals would 
rather avoid, but since I take the claim to be true on either formulation (and since I am not interested in 
appeasing political liberals), I will let this slide without critical comment. 
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means of securing capabilities. I have argued for this claim earlier in this chapter. However, 
like I pointed out in the discussion of Fowler’s argument, I believe this education can be 
pitched as anti-perfectionist, so long as what we are intending to accomplish in practice is 
the promotion of the meta-capability of autonomy via a set of agentic competencies, as 
opposed to particular content-specific and value-laden capabilities.  
However, the way Ferracioli and Terlazzo go about arguing for this claim ultimately 
fails to be persuasive insofar as their proposal fails to carve out a stable middle ground in 
liberal theory. The normative heavy lifting of their proposal is supposedly done not at the 
level of justification of the liberal state, but at the level of decision-making, which makes a 
political agreement on their normative argument unlikely. Even if their reading of Rawls is 
plausible and the constitutive aims of political liberalism are, as it happens, best met by 
appealing to the instrumental value of autonomy, the conditions of autonomy must be agreed 
upon at the level of justification, rather than at the level of implementation for them to be 
legitimately and appropriately grounded. You cannot ask for signatures on a blank petition, 
the details of which have not yet been written, and go on to fill out its blanks with the 
confidence that all signatories will accept whatever gets written. Doing so would make a 
mockery of the trust the signatories have in the author of the petition. And that is what 
Ferracioli and Terlazzo’s proposal amounts to – they wish to garner political support for 
autonomy in light of its instrumental value in minimising the risk that people’s lives will go 
badly, but the controversial conditions of what autonomy requires are agreed upon by appeal 
to independent ethical argument after the fact of agreement. For this hybrid position to work 
as a liberal enterprise, the argumentative burden of their proposal must be shifted to the 
foundation of the liberal state, and this is where the authors must bite the bullet and accept 
that the liberal state is best understood as a collective endeavour aimed at securing 
comprehensive autonomy, rather than instrumental autonomy, alongside the controversial 
implications that this justification entails. Otherwise, the comprehensive content of the 
conception of autonomy that the authors are defending cannot be justified to citizens in a 
procedurally legitimate way.  
Now, the authors could rephrase the requirements of political justification here, with a 
view of lowering the bar for assent, perhaps to correspond to what Quong calls the “internal 
conception of legitimacy” (Quong, 2010: 139). Accordingly, for there to be legitimate 
agreement on the fair procedures of justice needed for a politically neutral justification of 
the state, this justification does not need to be acceptable to the holders of all possible beliefs 
(including racist and illiberal beliefs). Rather, the justification needs to apply only to a 
constituency of people who already accept some minimalistic liberal platitudes about the 
freedom and equality of individuals and the assumption of the state as an enterprise for 
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mutual co-operation and so on. And since Ferracioli and Terlazzo already established that 
autonomy is instrumentally valuable for the end-goals of liberalism, perhaps this could be 
added to the list of minimal beliefs we assume our idealised constituency to have, thereby 
sneaking in their conception of autonomy to be rubber-stamped by this political agreement. 
However, the conception of autonomy that Ferracioli and Terlazzo need in order to 
fashion an adequate response to the internal constraints of individual autonomy is, arguably, 
not that platitudinous. The conception they have in mind cannot plausibly be defended as a 
minimalist component of liberal commitments, like equality or the rule of law. And even if 
it were possible to pitch autonomy this way, that would effectively remove the problem 
Ferracioli and Terlazzo were responding to in the first place, making their argument 
unnecessary. Because if autonomy were such a minimalist value, political liberals would 
already have all the tools they need to identify and respond to injustices that come about as 
a result of autonomy failures.  
So, for Ferracioli and Terlazzo to accommodate both of their purported 
commitments—to meaningfully secure capabilities and to avoid outright perfectionism—
the hybrid position must be made hybrid in the opposite direction. As I have argued in this 
thesis, it must be comprehensively anti-perfectionist (in Quong’s sense of the phrase, this 
time). I have argued that the promotion of autonomy need not consist in perfectionism since 
I take autonomy to refer to a meta-capability, rather than a particular way of living.  
But it may be worth repeating why anti-perfectionism is a desideratum for liberal 
education. Anti-perfectionism affords sufficient respect for individuals to exercise normative 
authority over decisions in their lives. If autonomy is indeed valuable, then anti-
perfectionism has to be true, and we ought to educate our children in a way that promotes 




This chapter has critically examined education as a domain of application for the capability 
approach to justice. I started by providing a brief literature review of the ways in which 
capabilitarians conceive of education as a provision of justice. I then argued for three specific 
ways we could bring the capability approach to bear on distributing education as a provision 
of justice. First, I argued that we can express a baseline set of epistemic capabilities, or 
capabilities to be educated in Terzi’s terms. Second, I argued that we can express a set of 
normative competencies that are necessary for the meta-capability of autonomy as 
educational goals in their own right. And third, I argued that we can formulate a list of 
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pernicious conversion factors which impede the attainment and development of people’s 
capabilities. I gave some examples of how these can then be addressed in practice by both 
direct and indirect government policy. Finally, I critically examined two arguments for why 
there ought to be a measure of perfectionism in education. I demonstrated both arguments to 
be ultimately unpersuasive, although I argued that some of their more compelling claims can 
be assimilated into a comprehensive anti-perfectionist account of political morality.  
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Chapter 6: Political Capability and Civic Education 
In the previous chapter, we saw how the capability approach can be used to formulate robust 
standards of justice for education which aims to overcome various kinds of injustices. In this 
chapter, I apply my claims to a particular capability domain—political capability—and I 
propose asset of practical policy guidelines for a civic education intended to equip 
individuals with the necessary capabilities for political participation in the contemporary 
world.  
We rightfully take someone to be wronged when they are denied the right to vote, or 
if they are in some other way excluded from a decision-making process in which they have 
a stake. Such exclusion can either happen by design, as in instances of oppression or 
disenfranchisement, or due to other factors that need not be (but can nonetheless be) 
intentional. I will refer to the former as disenfranchisement, and to the latter as alienation, 
although both terms stand in need of disambiguation and refinement before I can put them 
to use. I will argue that the wrongs of disenfranchisement and alienation are both injustices 
insofar as they consist of political capability failures. In this chapter, I argue that a capability-
based civic education is a promising means with which to respond to political capability 
failures.  
In Section 1, I define civic education. In Section 2, I provide an explicit justification 
for the importance of civic education for social justice. In particular, I argue that a successful 
program of civic education must minimise and prevent disenfranchisement and alienation. 
In Sections 3 and 4, I propose two arguments for a capability-based civic education: an 
epistemic argument and a social relations argument. These arguments, as I will show, 
highlight two necessary features of political capability: knowledge and a set of skills on the 
one hand, and social capital on the other. In Section 5, I propose and defend a set of practical 
guidelines for the development of an autonomy-minded capability-based civic education. In 
Section 6, I revisit a familiar objection that the discussion in this chapter will inevitably 
invite: that such a proposal cannot be defended as anti-perfectionist. Putting this worry to 
rest will also allow me to make the more ambitious claim that my view provides a more 
attractive account of civic education than alternative virtue-based views of political 





1. What Kind of Civic Education? 
Civic education is typically understood as education intended to prepare individuals for 
discharging the responsibilities associated with being citizens. Democratic citizenship is 
typically understood to be a kind of privilege: it guarantees a range of privilege-rights, such 
as rights to hold property, stand for elections, and so on. However, these rights are also 
typically associated with a range of responsibilities, some of which are enshrined in law. 
These may include the duty to vote in national elections (such as in Australia or Venezuela), 
the duty to acquire education (such as in China or Dominican Republic) or the duty to 
perform military service (such as in Sweden or South Korea) and a range of others (Hodgson, 
2003). Even in the absence of legally enforceable duties, it is generally understood that a 
democratic citizen will be expected to discharge some moral duties qua citizens. For example, 
the United States Government lists “supporting and defending the constitution, staying 
informed on issues affecting your community and participating in your local community” as 
responsibilities of any American citizen (Important Information for New Citizens, 2019), 
even though these responsibilities cannot be legally enforced without significant and 
possibly prohibitive costs, for example, to individual privacy. 
One of the tasks of the public education system is to prepare citizens for the successful 
discharge of these duties – whatever they may be in any given jurisdiction. Indeed, this may 
have been one of the main driving forces behind mandatory public schooling in the first 
place (Kymlicka, 2001: 293). As democratic institutions have become increasingly 
technocratic, the nature of these duties has also become more demanding. Citizens of modern 
democracies are expected to make use of a bewildering repertoire of behaviours in the 
political domain. For example, we must navigate a dense and ideologically polarised mass 
media landscape to stay informed about political events and actors. We live in an 
increasingly interconnected world, so we must concern ourselves not just with our immediate 
communities, but also with how the consequences of our local actions will be felt globally. 
Come election time, we have to make electoral decisions. We must hold officials to account 
and ensure that they serve the public appropriately, and so on.  
This list of political actions, however, would only satisfy a fairly minimal conception 
of public engagement – one that sees citizens primarily as electors in a representative 
democracy. On a more demanding, deliberative conception of democracy, citizens could be 
tasked with much more. For example, we would be responsible not just for electing 
representatives, but also for maintaining an active culture of discussion, deliberation, and 
day-to-day campaigning. This may involve, for example, attending public forums, 
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volunteering for non-profit organisations and civic associations and so on (e.g., Cohen, 2002, 
Guttman and Thompson, 1996). 
Even in the minimal end of this continuum though, the responsibilities that citizens are 
expected to uphold require a significant level of competence. For example, understanding 
policy differences on technically complex issues, like global trade or climate change 
mitigation, will require at least some relevant knowledge for voters to influence election 
results in these areas. This is why civic education is crucial – it exists to endow individuals 
with the skills, knowledge base and dispositions that are necessary for successfully fulfilling 
civic duties and, in turn, allowing democratic institutions to function smoothly. Amy 
Gutmann (1987) argues that democratic societies hold a collective stake in the education of 
children since they will assume the demanding responsibilities of democratic citizens. As 
such, we “must educate all educable children to be capable of participating in collectively 
shaping their society” (ibid, 14). 
Civic education is usually used either in a broad sense, or a narrow one. Broadly, civic 
education can be used to refer to all processes (intentional and otherwise) that contribute to 
people’s ability to function as part of a community. For example, public forums and churches 
can serve this function as they provide an environment for communal engagement (making 
it civic) and they will inevitably transmit some values and norms to those involved (thus 
making it education). Under the narrow definition, civic education is used to refer to 
deliberate programs of instruction, usually within schools or other educational institutions. 
In addition to providing the necessary knowledge base for democratic participation, civic 
education can also be aimed at developing certain normative dispositions. These may include 
“allegiance, commitment, cohesion, and a sense of community” (Strandbrink, 20017: vi), 
“support for core democratic principles [such as] tolerance” (Hodgson, 2003: 638) or it 
should prepare [individuals] to be fully co-operating members of society and enable them to 
be self-supporting” (Rawls, 1993: 1999). 
The specific content of the knowledge and dispositions that civic education ought to 
aim for is a controversial question in political philosophy. For a start, we need a common 
conception of what a good citizen is; we need to know what her virtues and dispositions are. 
After that, we need to agree on the kinds of methods that ought to be used to educate citizens 
in a way to replicate these qualities. Liberal philosophy, as we have seen throughout this 
thesis, is typically opposed to the micromanagement of people’s lives, so political liberals 
may be especially reluctant to endorse civic education programs that, in their view, constitute 
an undue intervention in individuals’ normative lives. For example, some individuals will 
endorse an account of the good which stipulates that political engagement is a necessary 
feature of a flourishing life, but it would be false to assume this account of the good will be 
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held by all reasonable people. Legislating a civic education program which attempts to 
inculcate a disposition for vigorous political activity may, therefore, be incompatible with 
the state’s commitment to liberal neutrality. 
On the other hand, philosophers who oppose this view (either from a comprehensive 
liberal perspective, or a civic republican perspective) argue that active participation in 
communities ought to be thought of as an intrinsically valuable feature of a good life. Under 
this view, individuals have duties to ensure the successful functioning of communities and 
communal institutions, and these duties are associated with a class of participatory virtues. 
This, in turn, creates an obligation on the state to educate for citizenship. For example, 
Gutmann (1999 cited in Crittenden and Levine, 2018) argues for such a view, while claiming 
that liberal philosophy is an inadequate source of civic commitment and civic education. 
This is because the principle of neutrality limits the state’s capabilities of influencing 
individuals’ normative beliefs. Critics of the liberal position argue that liberalism “cannot 
adopt a serious commitment to civic values that supersede individual interests” (Bull, 2008: 
450).  
There are writers aligned with the liberal tradition who have rejected this criticism, 
however. For example, Stephen Macedo (1995, 2000) has defended Rawls’ political 
liberalism and argued that politically liberal societies can nonetheless identify and promote 
certain liberal virtues which are universally believed to be valuable. Accordingly, these 
would be conceptualised as ‘civic’ (rather than comprehensive) values insofar as they would 
be the result of a political agreement between reasonable parties that may hold incompatible 
comprehensive views. Recognising this class of values would, according to Macedo, 
constitute “liberalism with a spine” (1995). The extent of this agreement, however, and the 
extent of the civic education one could derive from it is a matter of debate (e.g., see Davis 
and Neufeld, 2007). On the other hand, some liberal philosophers have argued that the 
upholding of justice and the smooth functioning of democratic institutions is primarily the 
task of the state, which can be carried out by, for example, a robust system of checks and 
balances. According to this view, labour is divided in a democracy in such a way that the 
smooth functioning of institutions does not fall into the responsibility of the citizen. This 
would, in turn, obviate the need for a highly virtuous citizenry in the first place (e.g., Rawls, 
1993). 
The position of the capability approach to justice29 in this debate would be that whether 
or not there are justice-based reasons for educating for citizenship will depend on whether 
 
29 It may be worth reiterating here that the capability approach is not, strictly speaking, a fully fleshed out 
philosophical position, but rather a framework with varying degrees of normative content depending on the 
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the capabilities enabled by such an education are sufficiently important for a dignified human 
life, regardless of the public good that this education may serve in the upholding of justice.  
This is because a capability framework phrases demands of justice as expressions of what 
opportunities people would need to live a life of value. 
In Section 2, I will argue that there are significant justice-based reasons to educate 
individuals to be politically capable. A familiar caveat bears repeating here; capabilities are 
freedoms, meaning that a capability account of civic education need not concede much to 
the civic republicans in the above debate if it were to defend the value of political 
participation. This is because individuals need not choose to exercise their political 
capability; justice only requires that they possess this capability (albeit that they possess it 
in a robust sense, for it is not sufficient to have merely formal access to political 
functionings). If an appropriately autonomous and capable individual then goes on to deem 
political participation to be loathsome, or boring, or a waste of her talents, then it would not 
follow that her life will go worse or be less valuable than if she were to embrace political 
participation. Of course, her life may go worse as a matter of direct consequence of spurning 
politics for reasons I explore in the next section, but so long as the capabilities are met and 
this choice is made autonomously, it is generally understood that it would be the 
responsibility of the individual to weather these consequences. Similar claims can be made 
about any capability. The capability approach tells us that justice only aims at securing the 
opportunity to achieve functionings, not the functioning itself.  
By contrast, the bulk of philosophical discussion of civic education is phrased in the 
language of virtues. It starts with recognising a class of virtues associated with citizenship— 
such as the virtue of public reasonableness (Macedo, 1990) or various virtues associated 
with civic republicanism (Dagger, 2002)—which pick out the exemplary behaviours of good 
citizens. Philosophers then argue for practical means for instilling these virtues in citizens. 
On the face of it, this seems like an attractive approach. After all, citizenship consists in 
exercising a certain repertoire of actions, and virtues represent the excellent exercise of 
actions. Moreover, it is an excellence achieved over lengthy habitual training and practical 
exposure, which makes it more reliable in a practical sense than theoretical directives taught 
from above which may not be appropriately internalised.  
However, the language of virtues is not uncontroversial. Think back to the debate 
between liberal and republican thinkers. If we take the liberal side, inculcating virtues will 
likely turn out to be unjustified because the normative content of virtues will invariably run 
 
philosopher employing it. However, at a minimum, the valuation of individual freedom and well-being imply 
the claims I make here in a way that, I take it, is not controversial. 
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counter to liberal neutrality. However, if civic education is understood in terms of 
capabilities, the promotion of these need not consist in inculcation of this sort. This is for 
two reasons. First, promoting a capability does not commit one to particular claims about 
the relative value of the functionings in question, unlike virtues. Capabilities, in the way that 
I defend them, pick out significant domains of well-being where autonomous choices can be 
made. Recall that I defend capabilities as coarse-grained and not based on the implicit value 
of particular kinds of functionings, or sketches of the good life which make use of these 
functionings. Second, capabilities need not be exercised, for an autonomous choice within a 
domain may consist in forgoing the capability altogether. Therefore, justice only requires 
that individuals be made to be politically capable since this is one of the domains of well-
being on my view. Justice, therefore, does not require that individuals be made to be 
politically virtuous, in a normatively demanding sense.  
The difference here is not merely semantic. Capabilities need not be tied to substantive 
views about the good (unlike virtues), which makes a capability-based civic education 
compatible with a range of views about the good, and as such, it can be made to be subsumed 
under a variety of other educational goals. Moreover, promoting capabilities and promoting 
virtues will have different success conditions. The successful inculcation of virtues will 
mean that people will exemplify the relevant excellences, whereas the same need not be the 
case for capabilities. Of course, aiming at capabilities will make the policymaker’s job 
slightly harder for these success conditions are harder to establish. As we have seen in 
previous chapters, there will be cases where an individual’s lack of a functioning will be a 
direct consequence of barriers to access or even adapted preferences.  
At any rate, the presumption against paternalism will mean that we must give people 
capabilities, not inculcate within them a set of virtues. This is because, as I argued in Chapter 
2, paternalism affords a kind of disrespect to the individual, which is presumptively wrong. 
Therefore, if there are justice-based reasons to educate for citizenship, we ought to teach 
individuals to be politically capable, rather than to be politically virtuous. Let us now 
establish the antecedent of this conditional claim. 
 
2. Civic Education and Justice 
It is uncontroversial to claim that the benefit provided by civic education is a kind of public 
good – all members of a democracy are argued to benefit collectively from effective civic 
education. This is because the proper functioning of democratic institutions, such as 
elections, juries, plebiscites and so on, demand a certain level of competence on its 
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participants, as well as a certain set of values and dispositions, such as the belief that all 
people are equal before the law and so on.  
However, regardless of the chiefly public good that civic education is argued to deliver, 
there is also an important sense in which educating someone as a democratic actor 
contributes to their individual good. That is to say, being politically capable is valuable for 
the individual. The capability approach gives us a compelling reason why – because political 
capability refers to a significant domain of well-being where individuals hold a strong 
interest in exercising their autonomous choice. The state wields colossal power over the daily 
lives of individuals, so it would follow that it is in people’s self-interest to know how to 
influence this power or how to hold it accountable. As the Greek orator Pericles is quoted in 
a comment on Athenian citizens, “We do not say that a man who takes no interest in politics 
is a man who minds his own business; we say that he has no business here at all” (Thucydides, 
c. 490 BCE).30 The opportunities for political participation should, therefore, be thought to 
be valuable – even if instrumentally. 
If we take this line of reasoning, then it is clear that justice requires that everyone have 
appropriate opportunities to participate in public life, even if some individuals will 
eventually forgo these opportunities. The state is, therefore, not only providing a public good 
when educating for citizenship, but it is also upholding its justice-based obligation to provide 
people with the capabilities necessary for a life of well-being. This dual focus on individuals 
and society may create a novel kind of justification for civic education that can help 
illuminate the ways in which individual claims of desert are tied up with successful 
discharging of their duties in the public sphere. As I pointed out in Section 1, the benefits of 
citizenship are typically understood to be conjoined with certain costs, such as the time and 
energy that citizens have to volunteer to the state. If the benefits of citizenship are socialised 
and diffused evenly in a democracy, then it would seem reasonable to suggest that the same 
should be true of the costs. And this goal can be achieved elegantly with a system of public 
civic education that identifies and targets the knowledge base, competencies and agentic 
traits that are necessary for individuals to bear the costs of citizenship. 
However, the reader may need more convincing of the appropriateness of an educative 
intervention for this end. Perhaps we can get the benefits of political participation through 
other means, in which case I need to say more about why I take education to be the focus for 
political capabilities. I argued in the previous chapter that education holds significant 
potential for shaping individual capabilities by strengthening the necessary internal 
 
30 Sometimes apocryphally quoted as “Just because you do not take an interest in politics doesn’t mean 
politics won’t take an interest in you”, however there is no evidence Pericles ever said that directly (but 
it certainly makes for a pithier saying). 
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resources, so I am extending this claim to the domain of political capabilities. Moreover, as 
I will argue in the next section, there is a significant epistemic dimension to political 
capability insofar as having opportunities in public life require a degree of knowledge and 
skills. For these reasons, I take it that civic education is a promising delivery method for 
justice in this regard. 
It is time to now sharpen this claim further and support it with argument. I argue that 
the kind of education that justice requires is one that is able to prevent and contain the 
negative effects of two phenomena that are inimical to the successful possession of political 
capabilities: disenfranchisement and political alienation. 
By disenfranchisement I mean the intentional exclusion of individuals from various 
aspects of public life. For example, this can happen explicitly in apartheid states where 
members of minority ethnic groups are denied voting rights or rights of assembly, or 
minority groups may lack legal protections, either by law or through deliberate lack of 
enforcement on the part of the authorities. But it can also happen in more surreptitious and 
quotidian ways; for example, through voter ID laws in the United States which have been 
extensively shown to constitute selective voter suppression (e.g., Daniels, 2020: 63-65). The 
logic of disenfranchisement need not be phrased in repugnant claims about the inferiority of 
some groups of people which is all too familiar from 20th century history. Most contemporary 
examples of this phenomenon are arguably closer to being instances of realpolitik – namely, 
self-interested ways for elites to consolidate power by strategically dampening the electoral 
power of those they deem to be their biggest threats. For the Republican Party in the US, this 
happens to be ethnic minority communities. The Hispanic community is the fastest growing 
demographic in the US, and also one of the least democratically active, and since their 
politics tend away from the anti-immigration rhetoric of the right, it is in the strategic 
interests of the GOP to ensure that as few Hispanics as possible take part in elections (ibid.). 
Now, the space for civic education to respond to outright top-down oppression may 
seem limited; so much so that perhaps talking about education at all in this context would be 
somewhat misleading as it may falsely suggest that democratic failures of this sort are, in 
fact, failures of education, or failures of the individual, rather than what they really are – 
abuses of power. It is beyond the scope of my project to give a comprehensive account of 
social change; however, I think that it is plausible to claim that power must be demanded 
from the bottom-up, rather than imposed from top-down for it to be a stable gain in the long 
run. I take it that f power is handed over by an enlightened and benevolent ruler, or if it is 
secured by way of third-party advocacy, then this power is precarious; it depends wholly on 
the continued benevolence of the ruler, or the continued benevolence of the third party. The 
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political capabilities of individuals in such a situation are not secured indefinitely and are 
therefore vulnerable to domination.  
There is no shortage of historical examples to support this claim, such as the suffragette 
movement in the first half of the twentieth century and the civil rights movement in the 
second half. As Dr Martin Luther King Jr. wrote, “Freedom is never voluntarily given by the 
oppressor, it must be demanded by the oppressed” (1963). There is much more to be said to 
support this claim as indisputable, of course, but to the extent that the reader agrees with me 
(and Dr King), they have reasons to give education a central place in the fight against 
oppression. This is because education represents an intervention that aims at strengthening 
the internal resources of individuals, thus making them more capable, among other things, 
to demand and exercise political power. In this way, civic education can aid people in the 
process of challenging disenfranchisement and oppression. Moreover, because of the 
importance of directionality of power transfers, I argue that this sort of intervention is one 
that is more likely to result in stable, long-term gains for democracy – as opposed to 
benevolent power transfers, or transfers through third party advocacy. 
I turn now to the second obstacle of political capability – political alienation. 
Alienation refers to “attitudes of estrangement between oneself and some salient social 
object” (Olsen, 1969: 289), so I use political alienation to refer to an attitude of estrangement 
between an individual and a political object, for example, political systems or institutions.  
Alienation finds its biggest roots in the writings of Karl Marx. Marx identifies an 
economic type of estrangement as one of the most significant injustices of capitalist 
economies – an alienation between a worker and their products that results in “a loss of 
reality for the worker” (Marx 1975: 324 cited in Sayers, 2011). Similarly, we can speak of 
political alienation, for example as Reef and Knoke (1999) define it, as “a social condition 
in which citizens have or feel a minimal connection with the exercise of political power” (p. 
118). Alienation can take the form of persistent feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness 
and guidelessness as experienced against some external object (Olsen, 1969). One of the 
most prevalent causes of political alienation is resentment. Katherine J. Cramer (2016) 
interviewed people in rural communities in Wisconsin and found that one of the most 
common grievances among rural communities was the feeling of being overlooked by 
political and business leaders making decisions that affect them. Coupled with economic 
strain, this can lead to a persistent feeling of alienation that fuels conflict. 
When people feel unsure and insecure about the amount of money available 
to go around, the situation is ripe for a politics of resentment. People are 
especially likely to rely on their group identities in situations of uncertainty. 
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When people perceive that they are not getting their fair share and that others 
are but do not deserve to, the emotion of resentment is a likely result. The 
combination of a reliance on social identities and the emotion of resentment 
can create a situation in which people regularly view politics in terms of 
opposition to other social groups (Cramer, 2016: 21). 
Olsen further distinguishes two forms of alienation: incapability on the one hand, and 
discontentment on the other. Incapability is involuntarily imposed on the individual by her 
social environment which prevents her from participating in political life. For example, 
many African Americans believe that the criminal justice system in the United States is 
disproportionately unfair toward them, so they may experience a sense of futility and 
hopelessness when having to come into contact with the law. Discontentment, on the other 
hand, is a voluntarily adopted attitude toward a social or political system, which occurs as a 
response to perceived failings. For example, a study by Miller and Listhaug (1993) finds that 
people on extreme ends of the political spectrum report the highest levels of alienation from 
the political system. This is because they see no value in political participation if it does not 
speak to their particular viewpoints, so they voluntarily spurn it. 
It is the alienation of the former kind that I would like to focus on and argue that it is 
a problem for justice insofar as alienation is the cause of an individual lacking political 
capability. I take voluntary discontentment to be less of a concern for justice, so long as we 
understand voluntariness in a robust sense, that is to say, if an individual can be said to reach 
the threshold of autonomy that I defend in this thesis. For example, suppose I adopt an 
attitude of discontentment toward the democratic system in my country because it fails to 
accommodate the specific political position I hold. Suppose further that I believe the world 
will come to an abrupt violent end in 5 years’ time and, therefore, humanity’s collective goal 
in the remaining time is to live lives of unabashed hedonism and decadence. It would be 
misguided to treat this discontentment as an indication of some kind of political failure, or 
as an injustice. The goal of justice is not to remove all political discontentment, for this 
would be impossible, and, stronger still, scarcely seems like its proper goal. So long as the 
political position I hold is not itself due to a capability failure, such as an instance of 
manipulation or brainwashing, then the mere fact of my discontentment over it being spurned 
is not a cause for intervention. 
Involuntary alienation, on the other hand, usually signifies a political failure of some 
sort. Alienation, insofar as it consists of the absence of an individual’s political capability is 
an injustice. This is because justice requires that individuals be secured with capabilities in 
the form of opportunities over significant domains of choice. And political alienation of the 
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involuntary sort that I am talking about here refers to a kind of capability failure – a lack of 
meaningful opportunity for individuals to exercise the sorts of choices that are owed to them.  
Alienation empirically leads to lower levels of civic engagement (ibid.), and it can create a 
“fertile breeding ground for populists” (Chwalisz, 2015: 13). If individuals feel like their 
political representatives or the wider system they operate in has failed them, they may 
become apathetic or turn to potentially dangerous extremists who promise to break the cycle 
of ‘politics as usual’. 
If disenfranchisement captures the intentional exclusion of individuals from a political 
process, then alienation refers to all those failures that need not be by design. The distinction 
here is not intended to be exclusive. There may well be instances where public authorities 
fail in their duties to remove obstacles to people’s access to political participation 
intentionally, and as a result, individuals suffer alienation. Functionally, this would count as 
an instance of alienation, but if we have inferential reason to treat this as intentional, such a 
case could be double counted as a form of disenfranchisement, too. 
Both disenfranchisement and alienation are hostile to the possession of full political 
capabilities, and since they, for the most part, refer to distinct causal pathways of hostility, 
justice requires that we fashion an effective response to both. I will argue that civic education 
can provide an effective response to both. I do not take this to be the only response, or indeed 
the most effective among all alternatives. To reiterate, I take civic education to represent an 
attractive kind of intervention for the reason that it consists in strengthening individuals’ 
internal resources that are necessary for possessing political capability. Other interventions 
may be attractive for their own independent reasons in a way that is consistent with my 
claims here. I do not, therefore, intend to rank my proposed educative intervention above or 
below any others. I show that it has independent merit.  
I will discern and investigate two necessary constituents of the domain of political 
capability: epistemic capabilities and relational capabilities. I will then argue that these can 
be promoted via civic education.  
 
3. Political Knowledge and Epistemic Capabilities 
The epistemic dimension of political functionings has become a significant area of interest 
for philosophers and non-philosophers in recent years. The state of political discourse of the 
latter half of the last decade has been described by some commentators with labels like post-
truth (e.g., Fuller, 2018, McIntyre, 2018) or truth decay (Kavanagh and Rich, 2018). These 
are intended to describe “circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in 
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shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (OED cited in 
Blackburn, 2018: 5). 
The striking feature of this phenomenon is not that it consists in challenging truth (for 
which there is ample historical precedent), but that “[truth] is being challenged as a 
mechanism for asserting political dominance” (McIntyre, 2018: xiv). In the resulting vacuum, 
truth is argued to be supplanted by “ideological supremacy” (ibid, 13) which compels 
individuals to hold certain beliefs and perform certain actions by appealing to their emotions, 
prejudices, and ideological commitments directly, thereby attempting to circumvent 
epistemic norms like truth, burdens or proof or rational persuasion altogether.  
The extent to which this is a uniquely contemporary phenomenon is disputable, 
although it could be said that the speed and density with which communication happens in 
the contemporary world exacerbates post-truth tendencies and makes them easier to identify 
in a unified kind of way. Before we can consider the supposed epistemic harms of post-truth 
trends, we should be careful to disambiguate the concept and clarify exactly what we mean. 
The phrase ‘post-truth’ itself is used to refer to several distinct practices at once. 
One of the most obvious ways in which norms of truth can be subverted is by public 
actors intentionally making false and misleading claims. Perhaps the most striking 
contemporary example of this is the US President Donald Trump whose surrogates have 
appeared on media outlets presenting “alternative facts” (Swaine, 2017) and who himself 
has been recorded making 18,000 false or misleading claims in his first 1,170 days of office 
(Kessler, Rizzo, and Kelly, 2020). However, as the most obvious way of subverting truth, 
this may also turn out to be the least interesting one. There is no shortage of historical 
examples of authority figures making false utterances. This may simply be an inescapable 
feature of the kinds of political systems that have been prevalent in human history, where 
the power of persuasion is an indispensable tool for governing. 
Rather, the arguably unique feature of contemporary post-truth trends is that there is a 
number of structural drivers which are compounding and exacerbating the effects of 
disinformation in unique ways. I will highlight three structural drivers of disinformation 
which will be relevant going forward: (1) technology, (2) populism, and (3) individuals’ 
cognitive biases. 
First, advances in information technology have made people vulnerable to certain 
kinds of deceit. Fuller (2018) argues that social media facilitates the erosion of truth. For 
example, he points out that people are increasingly consuming news through social media 
like Facebook, whose user design effectively blurs traditional distinctions between various 
types of sources of information. For example, a news story from the newspaper The 
Guardian may appear on a Facebook user’s feed alongside a story from a private blog with 
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a hyper-partisan ideological agenda. It would be easy for a social media user to afford these 
sources with equal credence, despite potentially stark differences in how truthful or 
accountable their authors were. According to Fuller, this way of consuming media has the 
effect that “people are provided with either conflicting news accounts, which they are then 
forced to resolve for themselves, or simply the news account that corresponds to their 
revealed preferences as a social media user. In either case, they are rendered more confident 
to decide matters of truth for themselves” (Fuller, 2018: 3). 
An increasing reliance on social media for disseminating information entails another 
problem. The algorithms that social media companies have in place are tuned to a singular 
end – to compel users to spend as much time on their platform. This means that the 
algorithms will deliberately elevate content that social media architects expect the user to 
have a strong reaction to. This, in turn, means that social media users will consume media 
that has been specifically curated for their specific set of beliefs and prejudices. This may 
solidify some beliefs, even if they have little factual basis, and introduce users to the beliefs 
of fringe groups (O’Neil, 2016: 180-5). Moreover, the resulting polarisation may make 
dialogue between different ideological groups more difficult by making agreement on a set 
of shared facts less likely. For example, if you think your political opponent is involved in a 
child sex trafficking scheme, there is reason to think that you will be interested in seeking a 
consensus or a dialogue with them.  
The second structural driver of disinformation is populism. Populist political 
movements have grown in influence in recent years, and part of their success comes from 
challenging the authority of traditional political actors and institutions. For example, this has 
been evidenced in the deliberate dismissal of traditional epistemic authorities. Tom Nichols 
(2017) has coined the phrase ‘death of expertise’ for this phenomenon: “a rejection of 
science and dispassionate rationality’ (Nichols, 2017). For example, this was a tactic used 
by Secretary of State for Justice Michael Gove when he dismissed expert testimony on a 
televised debate about EU membership, claiming that “the people in this country have had 
enough of experts” (Mance, 2016). Populist pressures are, therefore, challenging traditional 
epistemic authorities as collateral damage in their efforts to amass and consolidate power. 
Finally, the existence and exacerbation of individuals’ own cognitive biases mean that 
people are often not passive victims of disinformation or deception. Rather, the values and 
desires individuals hold may make them more receptive to certain kinds of false beliefs. Yale 
University researcher Dan Kahan (2010) argues that group values have a significant 
influence on individuals’ risk perception and belief formation; he calls this process ‘cultural 
cognition’. Kahan argues that individuals’ need to belong to communities reliably overrides 
facts of science and causes them to deal with new evidence in a selective way. He writes: 
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“People endorse whichever position reinforces their connection to others with whom they 
share important commitments” (Kahan, 2010: 296). For example, individuals who value 
initiative and economic enterprise will be more sceptical toward evidence which supports 
human-made climate change since such evidence would imply the need for restrictions on 
economic activity. Kahan continues: “People find it disconcerting to believe that behavior 
that they find noble is nevertheless detrimental to society, and behavior that they find base 
is beneficial to it. Because accepting such a claim could drive a wedge between them and 
their peers, they have a strong emotional predisposition to reject it” (Kahan, 2010: 296).  
Together, these structural drivers contribute to an increased uptake of conspiracy 
theories and false and misleading news, increased disagreement about matters of fact, a 
blurring of the distinction between opinion and fact, as well as a decline of trust in traditional 
sources of knowledge (Kavanagh and Rich, 2018).  
It would be a truism to argue that some degree of knowledge and skill is necessary for 
taking part in the political process. For example, no one would deny that citizens must 
understand the political process if they are to take part in it. They must have some 
information about policy disagreements between candidates in an election in order to cast an 
informed and autonomous vote. 31  However, as recent developments in political 
communication have made clear, this kind of minimal conception of political knowledge is 
becoming increasingly irrelevant. Minimal knowledge offers no tools for resisting 
manipulation or radicalisation. For example, understanding the explicit policy differences 
between the Purple and Orange party will be of no use if the Orange party strategy involves 
buying targeted advertisements that track your internet search history and moulding its 
content to complement your views and prejudices and convinces you through lies that the 
Purple party is incompatible with your beliefs. 
What should be the relevant standard of knowledge then? What skills and knowledge 
should an epistemic agent possess if we want to be confident that she will be capable of 
identifying and resisting misinformation? I argue that the kind of epistemic training 
necessary for this end is one that (1) descriptively exposes people to the multitude of ways 
their political will may be co-opted, and (2) teaches them to stand in appropriately critical 
relations with new information and epistemic authorities. That is to say, epistemic capability 
in the political world requires a degree of knowledge about the world, as well as a critical 
disposition.  
 
31 The converse of this statement would be either a vote that is uninformed, and thus random, or non-
autonomous, for example, voting for a political party because everyone in your immediate social circle votes 
for that party. 
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Some philosophical work in this area has focused on factive knowledge alone, that is, 
knowledge of facts about the world. For example, Jason Brennan has argued influentially 
that democracies should institute voter qualification exams as a way of delimiting the 
electorate. Individuals with insufficient factive knowledge about history and politics, or 
other relevant topics constitute a liability for democracies, and as such should be barred from 
voting (Brennan, 2009, 2016). This sort of knowledge is no doubt necessary for 
understanding democratic processes and making decisions that accurately reflect the state of 
the world. For example, without prior knowledge of historical and contemporary 
authoritarian practices, a government’s decision to yield more power to the executive branch 
of government may not seem all that alarming, especially if it is pitched to the public as a 
matter of national emergency, as was the case in Hungary during the COVID-19 pandemic 
in early 2020 (Walker and Rankin, 2020). A citizen with the relevant knowledge base would 
be, I take it, far more likely to treat this move with suspicion and alarm, and more likely to 
voice their concern and be ready to mobilise in order to hold the government to account. The 
citizen without this knowledge would be, I take it, more likely to accept the government’s 
justification for the expansion of executive power as necessary for the common good, or 
even inevitable. Crucially, however, the opposite of that may be the case – an observer could 
have abundant historical knowledge of authoritarian leaders consolidating their executive 
power under the guise of emergency, but fail to have a reason to be alarmed by this particular 
instance.  
As Brennan points out, there are other costs to ill-informed voting. For example, 
citizens who vote without sufficient reason may elect political representatives who will enact 
harmful policies, such as “racist and sexist laws, unnecessary wars, lower economic 
opportunities, lower levels of welfare etc. (Brennan, 2009: 541-2). Since I am primarily 
interested in individuals’ capabilities to resist oppression and alienation, I am focusing on a 
particular subset of these costs only – lack of political knowledge which (directly or 
indirectly) endangers an individuals’ political capability set. 
On the other hand, we may phrase epistemic capabilities in terms of a set of critical 
skills. Critical thinking or ‘reflective thinking’ has been lauded as the leading goal 
educational goal since at least John Dewey (1910) but arguably leading back to 
enlightenment thinkers like Rousseau, Bacon and Locke. Dewey argues that the immediate 
acceptance of an explanation one is presented with is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of 
reflection” (Dewey, 1910: 13 cited in Crittenden and Levine, 2018). Applying this to the 
contemporary problem at hand, perhaps the measure of someone’s political knowledge in 
the face of a supposedly post-truth political landscape ought to be critical reasoning skills, 
rather than factive knowledge. Perhaps we can minimise or contain various malign 
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influences on voters if we teach them to be good critical reasoners. That is to say, if people 
were to ferociously question the sources of information, and in turn the motivations of the 
actors behind those sources, and so on, they would be much more likely to spot 
disinformation and manipulation and, therefore, not fall victim to it. 
I argue that the factive and normative component are jointly necessary for political 
capability in the contemporary world. Factive knowledge without critical introspection may 
result in individuals being formally able to recognise malign influences, but unable to discern 
when to be on their guard, thus leading to higher probability of error. More generally, merely 
agreeing with one another on matters of fact may not be sufficient for engaging in political 
debate.  
On the other hand, individuals with an abundance of critical thinking but a lack of 
knowledge may not be better off either. Instilling a dogged vigilance directed at anyone in 
political power may lead individuals to conspiratorial thinking, which in turn can erode 
norms of trust in society (Cassam, 2019). Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) argue that 
conspiracists suffer from a kind of “crippled epistemology” (p. 204). People are seduced by 
conspiracy theories not because they are irrational, but because they have “a sharply limited 
number of (relevant) informational sources” (ibid.). 
Therefore, I argue that a combination of both pertinent political knowledge and a 
critical cognitive skillset is necessary for political capability in the contemporary world. But 
this opens up a host of further questions, such as what sort of knowledge should we 
emphasise and how can it best be taught? How do we impart critical reasoning skills without 
giving way to the erosion of epistemic norms and trust via conspiratorial thinking?  
A helpful caveat to make at this point is that our expectations of the success of any 
kind of educational outcome ought to be managed by recognising the imperfections of 
human cognition. Behavioural psychology tells us that human beings are social animals with 
finite mental bandwidth (e.g., Kahneman, 2011). For example, our basic need to belong to 
communities is reflected in the flexibility of our belief formation, which gives way to errors. 
For example, the famous Asch (1951) conformity experiments found that individual error 
rates in answering simple cognitive and observational questions went up from 1% to as high 
as 36.8% when done next to actors who were instructed to give the wrong answer on purpose. 
In other words, individuals tended to conform to the majority opinion, even when it involved 
making obvious errors (cited in McIntyre 2018). 
These examples help illustrate not only our imperfections, but also the ways in which 
they can be weaponised for political gain. If political actors can capitalise on cultural 
cognition by, for example, sowing fear and distrust among ideologically partisan, or national 
or racial lines, then a political capability set must include, as a minimum, the capability to 
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recognise this kind of influence for what it is – a way of compelling someone to act in 
particular ways for non-epistemic reasons.  
Let me motivate both desiderata—that we need an appropriate knowledge base and a 
normative critical stance—with a case study of a contemporary political phenomenon known 
as firehosing32 and suggest how we may fashion an adequate response to it and bolster 
political knowledge in the classroom. 
Firehosing refers to a novel kind of propaganda that has gained notoriety in recent 
years. It refers to a deliberate and sustained strategy of deception which consists in 
overwhelming audiences with a large volume of lies, as if being sprayed with a firehose. 
Firehosing thrives on familiarity – the more a claim is repeated, the more audiences are 
willing to believe it, even if that claim is a transparent, blatant, or demonstrable lie. 
Frustratingly, common anti-propaganda methods, like debunking and fact-checking, only 
serve the firehoser’s purpose by amplifying the claims further. 
According to researchers at the USA-based RAND Corporation think tank, “repetition 
leads to familiarity, and familiarity leads to acceptance.” (Paul and Matthews, 2016). This is 
explained by what psychologist call the “illusory truth effect”, namely, the phenomenon 
whereby individuals are more likely to believe statements that they encounter multiple times. 
Fazio et al. (2015) write that “repetition makes statements easier to process (…) relative to 
new statements, leading people to the (sometimes) false conclusion that they are more 
truthful” (Fazio et al., 2015: 993). 
Moreover, if stories invoke emotion this further adds to their sway and increases 
people’s response. Firehosing is characterised by “high numbers of channels and messages” 
and “a shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions.” (Paul and 
Matthews, 2016). Firehosing is not intended to persuade, hence why there is no need to 
present the claims as plausible, rather “it’s to rob facts of their power” (Maza, 2018). 
Firehosing thus erodes standards of truth and succeeds when disagreement is reduced down 
to merely positional warfare: I assert X, my opponent asserts Y. That is all there is to it, there 
is no objective arbiter capable of adjudicating this disagreement.  
There is an abundance of recent examples of this technique being used. The RAND 
researchers focus on Russian transgressions, such as their repeated lies that there were no 
Russian soldiers deployed to Crimea during the 2014 Crimean crisis. More recently, in 2016, 
the Vote Leave campaign for the United Kingdom exiting the European Union printed a now 
infamous slogan on one of their campaign busses: “The UK sends the EU £350m a week. 
Let’s spend that on the NHS instead” (Quinn, 2019). This figure was demonstrated to be 
 
32 Short for the phase ‘a firehose of falsehoods’. 
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false, but in spite of how many times it was formally refuted, the messaged had been 
circulated so widely by media outlets themselves and amplified further by irreverent 
campaigners sticking to the message, that it may have played a role in the referendum on EU 
membership. A study found that 42% of the public believed the controversial claim months 
after the referendum (KCL Policy Institute and Ipsos Mori, 2018). 
Firehosing represents a formidable stress test for democracies because without robust 
checks on the freedom of speech, this tactic can go on to deal a tremendous amount of 
damage to our common epistemic environment, and in turn, sow distrust, chaos, and conflict. 
A steady stream of deception can effectively erode individual capabilities too by dulling 
their capacities to distinguish between truth and lie, as well as their capacities to adjudicate 
trustworthiness of epistemic authorities in real time. This, in turn, can alienate individuals 
from the political process, and if weaponised toward particular social groups, it can 
effectively disenfranchise them. This is why I take firehosing to be a pertinent threat to 
capability justice.  
The success of firehosing is not a death knell to our epistemic credentials, however. In 
fact, this sort of manipulation relies on our capacity to distinguish between truth and 
falsehood, but it also relies on the natural limits of this capacity given a large enough volume 
of information. Firehosing works not because we are bad at discerning truth from falsehood, 
but because we are conditioned to thrive in epistemic environments of trust. Human beings 
are not used to environments where familiarity is weaponised against us. This suggests how 
we should respond to this and other similar tactics. We should neither double down on our 
truth discernment capabilities or adopt a stance of hyper-scepticism about new information. 
Our response instead should be a conscious effort to be cognisant of attempts to corrupt our 
epistemic environments and the intentions of the actors behind these attempts. The response 
to the erosion of truth needs to be conscious vigilance of how these norms can be eroded, 
and how they have been eroded in the recent past, not education on the specific claims that 
are being challenged. And I argue that we can do that with a civic education program that is 
honest both about the limits of our rationality, and the lengths that some public actors will 
go to in order to serve their interests.  
The RAND report on firehosing suggests that instead of fact-checking, we ought to 
instead try to bolster the internal resources of those that have been firehosed so they can be 
protected from similar attacks in the future. This is why educational interventions are 
promising – they can equip people with the skills they need to become resilient to lies and 
manipulation. Citizens need a sort of epistemic immune system in order to fight off 
intrusions, and for this immune system to be effective, it needs to be built up and regularly 
tested against novel attacks.  
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Undoubtedly, this carries implications which fall outside of the remit of this project, 
such as regulating social media companies. A Pew Research study found that US adults who 
consume their news from social media are less knowledgeable and less politically engaged, 
as well as more likely to fall into the sway of conspiracies (Mitchell et al, 2020). While 
educational interventions are indeed promising for the reasons I mentioned above, they may 
also have to be coupled with comprehensive regulations on the business practices of internet 
companies, although that is not a claim I’m prepared to say anything more about here.  
To conclude, in order to strengthen our epistemic immune system, we need civic 
education that gives individuals both an appropriate knowledge base and the skills required 
to identify and resist misinformation. In Section 3, I will argue that the first goal can be 
accomplished by history and politics lessons, specifically a history of power relations, while 
the latter can be met by media literacy classes and philosophy and debate. The former will 
give students a playbook of known practices that constitute political power and how it may 
be corrupted, while the latter will refine their capacity to make use of that playbook and to 
identify instances where their political will may be co-opted in real time.  
 
4. Social Capital and Relational Capabilities 
Epistemic capabilities of the kind I outlined above may turn out to be insufficient to combat 
the effects of truth decay, and political incapability in turn. It is possible that individuals may 
possess the appropriate epistemic capabilities, but they may nonetheless fail to have a reason 
to exercise them in the appropriate way due to other overriding reasons. In this section, I will 
argue that there is an additional necessary constituent of the political capability domain—
relational capability—which, as I will show, has interesting implications on the way we 
understand the role of knowledge in politics. I will loosely model my conception of a 
relational capability on the concept of social capital, although I will define social capital in 
a way that departs somewhat from its traditional usage.  
I have argued in this thesis that we should understand individual autonomy as socially 
relational in nature, that is to say, as flourishing under relations characterised by reciprocity, 
mutual respect, and care, and wilting under relations characterised by distrust, subservience, 
and uncritical deference to tradition. There is an additional good that social relations serve, 
specifically in the political context, which is not entirely reducible to the causal effect they 
have on individual autonomy. Namely, social relations afford individuals with social capital. 
Social capital refers to the value of social relationships and networks that individuals operate 
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in. This concept has been popularised by Robert Putnam (2000) who introduces it in the 
following way: 
 Whereas physical capital refers to physical objects and human capital refers 
to the properties of individuals, social capital refers to connections among 
individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them (2000:19). 
Straight away, we can discern two distinct components of Putnam’s definition of social 
capital: an ontological component and a normative component. The ontological part of the 
definition refers to “connections among individuals” (ibid.) simpliciter. An individual 
possesses social capital in the ontological sense insofar as she is a node in a larger network 
of individuals who are acquainted with one another. The more connections an individual has, 
and the more connections those individuals have in turn, the higher her ontological social 
capital.  
The normative component, on the other hand, picks out “the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from [the connections]” (ibid.). These norms are what make social 
relations valuable above the merely ontological acquaintance knowledge that exists between 
people. In practical terms, it is not sufficient to know people, who know people (and so on) 
to make use of the connections that exist between them. Social capital requires “investment 
and use of embedded resources in social relations for expected returns” (Lin, 2000: 786). 
These resources can include, for example, trust, mutual respect, and reciprocity. For example, 
it may not be sufficient for me to simply know another person if I wish her to do something 
for me. There must also exist some kind of a valuable normative relation between us which 
would enable the expectation. 
The ontological component of this definition is straightforward. However, the content 
of the normative relation stands in need of some clarification. Putnam speaks about norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness as the normative relations which account for this being a 
form of capital. However, it is unclear if these are sufficient for valuable social relations. 
Trustworthiness and reciprocity can both be present in relationships characterised by 
asymmetrical power relations, or even domination, in which case we ought to be reluctant 
to call this kind of relationship a form of capital. A may trust B to φ but only insofar as A 
holds power over B which makes not φ-ing prohibitively costly for B. Similarly, A’s φ-ing 
may be reciprocal on B’s φ-ing, but the nature of each party’s obligation may be 
asymmetrical. For example, a kidnapper may trust their victim with metal kitchenware or 
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even reciprocate kind gestures in their own way, but it would be absurd to suggest there 
exists a kind of social capital between both parties. 
To refine the normative requirements of social capital, I will draw on the relations 
discussed in Part 2 of this thesis, which I argued are conducive to individual autonomy, and 
in turn, individual flourishing. I argue that it is relationships that meet these normative 
requirements that are constitutive of social capital. Namely, relations must consist of mutual 
normative recognition and a sense of equality among all people. This is the way in which 
my usage of ‘social capital’ from now on will differ from Putnam’s, or that of other 
philosophers and political scientists. For the sake of theoretical cohesion, we may also treat 
social capital as a special subset of relational conversion factors. In Chapter 4, I argued for 
a significant class of conversion factors which mediate the conversion of resources into 
capabilities. We can think of social capital as referring to the value of all those relational 
conversion factors which have a net positive value on individual capabilities, that is, relations 
characterised by normative recognition and respect and equality. 
We now have a rough working definition of social capital, so the next task is to 
establish why social capital is necessary for political capability and how it can be 
strengthened via civic education. 
Putnam argued that social capital not only enriches the lives of individuals, but also 
enables the functioning of societies. Where social connectedness dwindles, according to 
Putnam, people’s engagement with the democratic system suffers alongside. This has to do 
with a number of functions that social capital plays that we ought to pick apart. I will identify 
three key functions: (1) it contributes to social trust, which is a necessary condition for 
successful co-operation between members in a society, (2) it fosters self-respect for 
individuals, which is a necessary condition for individual autonomy, and (3) it pools together 
individual bargaining power, allowing individuals to access power they would not have been 
privy to had they not been connected. 
Trust is an indispensable necessary feature of human co-operation. Trusting someone 
means having a particular kind of attitude toward them – an attitude which involves 
vulnerability and reliance on the other person to be willing to do something (McLeod, 2020). 
Without mutual trust, we cannot enter into any kinds of agreements or conventions with 
other people, and we would have to relegate ourselves to a Hobbesian state of nature. In 
short, “trustworthiness lubricates social life” (Putnam, 2000:16). Social capital consists of 
relations characterised by trust, and this is essential in the realm of politics insofar as politics 
relies on cooperation between people.  
Second, possession of social capital is good for the individual as it contributes to her 
self-respect. Entering into social bonds over shared identities creates self-respect for 
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individuals. Rawls (1971) argued that self-respect is a primary good, a key distribuendum of 
the basic institutional structure of society. For Rawls, self-respect consists in “a person's 
sense of his own value, his secure conviction that his conception of the good, his plan of life, 
is worth carrying out,” and it implies “a confidence in one's ability, so far as it is within one's 
power, to fulfil one's intentions” (ibid, 440). Self-respect cannot be attained in isolation of 
other individuals, and it is a key feature of the normative conditions of social capital. 
Finally, having social capital amplifies an individual’s political effectiveness. The 
ontological and normative connections between individuals can rally people together under 
a common cause, thereby increasing the political bargaining power that each could have 
enjoyed as an individual acting alone.  
For these three reasons, it is clear that social capital is bound up with political 
capability. To refine and motivate this claim, I argue that a necessary constituent of 
exercising choice in the political capability domain is the possession of relational capability, 
roughly, the capability to enter into social networks that are characterised by trust, 
reciprocity, respect, and non-domination. This capability enables individuals to co-operate 
with one another under terms that treat each node in the network as free and equal and worthy 
of respect.  
Let us apply the claims on social capital and relational capability to a case study of the 
LGBTQIA+33 community (for the sake of brevity, I will henceforth use the word ‘queer’ as 
a stand-in for the acronym) around the world. This is a transnational community that up until 
very recently in human history could not have said to exist as a discrete, coherent community. 
Rather, it endured as isolated pockets of individuals and small groups of individuals shared 
by their divergence from ostensibly traditional norms regulating gender and sexual 
expression. A key corollary of this being a nascent community is that without common 
identity ties in communities, queer people tended to have very little political bargaining 
power. In short, they lacked any kind of social capital. As a result, issues concerning the 
rights and welfare of queer people were not matters that could be introduced to mainstream 
political agendas. For much of history, there could be no systemic change, no educational 
programs, no political protections, or even much of an awareness of the lived experiences of 
queer people outside hurtful stereotypes.  
The American science fiction author Samuel R. Delany has written about his 
experience of coming to age as a black gay man in New York City. “In the fifties,” he writes, 
“homosexuality was a solitary perversion. Before and above all, it isolated you” (1988: 268). 
 
33  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, questioning, intersex, asexual. The ‘plus’ symbol indicates a 
placeholder for further inclusion of identity terms not explicitly included. 
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Queer people were either forced into denouncing their sexualities altogether, assuming 
instead a ‘clean’ asexual persona, or they would risk their safety for fleeting moments of 
intimacy with strangers in public areas chosen for casual sex.  
He recounts a vivid episode that challenged this leading narrative. There was a truck 
stop in the New York harbour that had been popular amongst gay men looking for casual 
sex. One night as Delany was there, a group of police marched across the street, blowing 
their whistles, and attempting to arrest the men in attendance. As Delany fled and turned 
around, he was suddenly able to see the sheer number of men that had been at the dockyard 
truck stop, hidden from sight. Some were arrested, but most, nearly two hundred according 
to his estimate, scattered and got away. At that moment, it struck Delany that the institutions 
that gay men had been sequestered to – gay bars, public toilets, and bath-houses – cut up 
their community and their sexual behaviour into tiny portions. But “no one ever got to see 
its whole” (ibid, 268).  
But what this experience said was that there was a population—not of 
individual homosexuals, some of whom now and then encountered, or that 
those encounters could be human and fulfilling in their way—not of hundreds, 
not of thousands, but rather of millions of gay men, and that history had, 
actively and already, created for us whole galleries of institutions, good and 
bad, to accommodate our sex. (ibid.) 
Delany’s epiphany about the sequestering of queer bodies is an apt illustration of an 
emerging community of individuals who lack social capital and, in turn, lack the tools 
needed to resist or negotiate the coercive power of the state which polices them under the 
guise of public safety.  
Had the men in Delany’s truck stop been unified under a common name, and had 
reciprocal trust to defend each other, and had they seen themselves as victims of arbitrary 
state violence and possessed the necessary self-respect to see this violence as illegitimate, 
they would have been, I take it, more likely to assert their collective will and resist police 
violence collectively. A similar thing did happen at the end of the next decade in the now 
famous Stonewall riots that marked a crucial watershed moment in the queer liberation 
movement in the United States and (Bronski, 2012: 209-10). Global justice for queer people 
is, of course, an ongoing project, but events like Stonewall set against the backdrop of queer 
isolation that Delany writes about illustrate that the fight for justice is sometimes a fight for 
social capital. There are still countless queer people around the world languishing in isolation 
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and unable to contribute to meaningful change because they are isolated, in more ways than 
one. 
According to Putnam, “a society of many virtuous but isolated individuals is not 
necessarily rich in social capital” (2000: 16). Even if a virtuous individual passes the 
threshold for autonomy and can demonstrably enjoy the competencies associated with 
autonomous personhood, her lack of social capital will mean that she will have numerous 
additional hurdles to clear if she were to try to bring about social or political change in her 
community. Political engagement is like bowling in Putnam’s famous example – an activity 
that is best done with others.  
The reason I highlight relational capability alongside epistemic capability in this 
chapter is not just because of the independent features that make relational capability 
necessary for full political capability. It is also an attempt to try to compensate for the 
potential failings of epistemic capabilities to adequately respond to truth erosion on their 
own. 
The common assumption behind the discourse on post-truth seems to be that certain 
bad beliefs can be dangerous insofar as they may lead to bad actions. For example, harmful 
beliefs about ethnic minorities may lead to targeted violence, or false beliefs about the 
intentions of political actors may lead to increased support for extremist political movements. 
This assumes that beliefs influence actions in a causally determinate way. We could, for 
example, express this counterfactually by claiming that had people not been mislead about, 
say, the outcome of the 2020 US presidential election, there would have been no, or a smaller 
degree of, violence at the US Capitol on January 6th. And if we accept this causal reasoning, 
we ought to appeal to individuals’ reason and show the relevant beliefs to be false, or, as I 
have argued, we should equip individuals with the internal tools they need to identify false 
beliefs for themselves.  
However, the persistence and stubbornness with which some individuals cling to 
disputed claims suggests that this causal assumption may not be fully accurate. That is to 
say, beliefs may not be causally fundamental – they may themselves be reflections of 
individuals’ already existing normative commitments and allegiances in the world, rather 
than causes of these commitments. This means appealing to individuals’ epistemic faculties 
may not be sufficient to correct political incapability. There may be further, entirely non-
epistemic reasons why individuals come to hold certain beliefs, and moreover, it may turn 
out to be that successfully correcting individuals’ beliefs would have no causal impact on 
their subsequent political behaviour.  
If we accept this more complicated model of the interplay between political belief and 
political action, then we must admit that epistemic interventions into truth decay must be 
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supplemented with some additional measure. I argue that they ought to be supplemented 
with relational interventions – interventions aimed at securing individuals with the capability 
to enter into the kinds of relationships that are incompatible with holding false and truth-
insensitive beliefs.   
But how do we formulate a relational intervention of this sort? Social capital is not 
something that we can teach. However, I argue, it is something that we can foster through 
educational means by teaching people the skills that are necessary for exercising relational 
capability. That is to say, we can teach people the skills and dispositions needed to forge 
bonds of trust, reciprocity, mutual respect, and non-domination. Nussbaum has argued that 
our education policy could turn to stoicism for help in bringing people together and 
strengthening relations that transcend identity differences: “Stoic writers insist that the vivid 
imagining of the different is an essential task of education; and that requires in turn, of course, 
a mastery of many facts about the different” (Nussbaum, 1994). She also points out that 
“One of the greatest barriers to rational deliberation in politics is the unexamined feeling that 
one’s own current preferences and ways are neutral and natural” (ibid.). This feeling gives 
way to an uncritical stance toward one’s normative allegiances in a way that would make 
them hard to question or repudiate. In turn, if these allegiances depend on holding a set of 
beliefs about the world that are not sensitive to evidence or truth, then we can begin to see 
the need to teach individuals to stand in the appropriate critical relationship with their 
normative commitments.  
In the next section, I will suggest that relational capabilities can be taught in practice 
by teaching history of power and oppression, and through service learning that exposes 
students to the diverse social world outside of the classroom. 
Before moving on, it is worth addressing a problem that my discussion of the good of 
social capital may invite. The above discussion may suggest an overly optimistic or 
moralistic understanding of social capital as an unconditional good, or as something 
unequivocally good for justice. The truth is that social capital, like any capital, can be used 
for a variety of ends, including malicious and violent ones. A world where no individual is 
lacking social capital is not necessarily a good one in and of itself. Social capital is what 
enables cults, terrorist organisations and extremists. Political extremists of the contemporary 
world increasingly recruit online, and they prey on people who are disillusioned and 
alienated, people who lack social capital, and they offer it to them in exchange for 
internalising dangerous ideologies. So, it would be false to suggest that justice is merely a 
matter of connecting individuals in the appropriate ways. However, this is a key component 
of individuals’ political capabilities, which, like any freedom or any tool, can be used for 
malicious ends.  
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How might we combat the potentially pernicious effects of increased social capital 
then? Recall that I supplemented the normative component of the definition of social capital 
with two relational features. I argued that interpersonal relationships should be guided by 
mutual normative recognition and a sense of equality between all people. We can appeal to 
these normative requirements to effectively rule out the kind of social connections between 
people which would frustrate, not advance, the requirements of justice. Under such an 
analysis, even if it may be instrumentally valuable for the political extremist to have access 
to a functional social group which would allow her to become an even more effective 
political extremist, it would be false to say that granting such an access should be a provision 
of justice.  
In closing, full political capability requires individuals to be capable of building social 
capital, understood as the capability to enter into valuable relationships with other people on 
the understanding that each will respect each other’s normative authority and equality.  
 
5. Guidelines for Civic Education 
After identifying the justice-based need for civic education and the capability goals that such 
a program should serve in contemporary democracies, it is time to turn to the practical 
question of how to devise a successful civic education program that can deliver on these 
goals. In this section, I will propose and defend four practical recommendations borne out 
of the discussions in the first two sections of this chapter. These are recommendations 
intended for inclusion in state sponsored primary and secondary education curricula, and 
they will be pitched at a considerable level of generality. This is to allow for successful 
application across diverse contexts where social variables may markedly differ, or to allow 
policymakers to tie these recommendations in with existing curricula and existing 
educational goals.  
The four pillars of contemporary capability-based civic education I will defend are: (1) 
content literacy, (2) philosophy and debate, (3) depoliticised history of power, (4) and 
service learning. I do not intend this list to be exhaustive or authoritative. Rather, I take it as 
a promising starting point for accommodating the lessons gleaned from the discussion in this 
chapter.  
First, the case study of firehosing and the discussion on the ‘crippled epistemology’ of 
conspiratorial thinkers suggests that in order to strengthen citizens’ epistemic capacities, 
they must be taught to stand in an appropriate critical relationship with new information. I 
call this pillar ‘content literacy’ to be inclusive of various kinds of content that we could be 
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literate about, that is to say, appropriately critical toward. However, primary and secondary 
education already promote various kinds of literacy by design. For example, Mathematics 
promote numerical literacy, and English promotes literacy of the written word. The kind of 
literacy that I wish to emphasise here is one that has only recently been advocated – digital 
literacy, or literacy about internet content.  
Much of human communication in the last two decades has moved to online spaces, 
which makes disseminating political messages easier as well as amplifying their reach. As I 
argued in this chapter, justice requires that individuals possess the capabilities to evaluate 
internet content, including political messaging, and make appropriate judgments on their 
veracity. Young people are already spending a considerable amount of time online, including 
on social media networks, so it is essential to equip them with the pertinent skills early on – 
ideally as part of their primary education.  
This and similar proposals have gained popularity in recent years. For example, the 
journalist Matthew D’Ancona writes:  
Information overload means that we must all become editors: sifting, 
checking, assessing what we read. Just as children are taught how to 
understand printed texts their critical faculties should be trained to meet the 
very different challenges of a digital feed (D’Ancona, 2017: 78). 
Digital literacy classes would, first, involve showing students how to critically 
scrutinise the source of internet content, as well the affiliations of its authors and their 
relevant epistemic credentials. In the previous section, I noted that social media algorithm 
design makes it harder to identify differences between various sources of information. This 
problem all but disappears if users are taught to follow the stories to their ultimate source 
and ask a series of critical questions about what they see there. For example, is the author a 
journalist associated with a reputable news organisation? Can this story be corroborated by 
other sources? Have the accompanying images been doctored? And so on. Internalising this 
set of behaviours early can allow students to be on guard with respect to new information in 
online spaces, and to ultimately avoid being duped by misinformation. 
Second, students must also be taught how to critically read coded or ideology-laden 
language. Outright fake news are only one subset of potential disinformation found online. 
Disinformation is a common tactic among various political extremists, whose 
communications often involve language characterised by double meaning, such as dog-
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whistles,34 subtext or even symbolism. So just as we expect children to read between the 
lines of Jane Austen and Charles Dickens, we ought to teach them to do the same for texts 
that suggest, say, that Western values are under threat by increased migration to Europe or 
that left wing activists are funded by George Soros as dog-whistles for Islamophobic and 
antisemitic sentiments, respectively. 
Third, we must also be cognisant that topics that are controversial and politicised are 
handled appropriately, as part of digital literacy teaching and more generally. Earlier in the 
chapter, I mentioned the extent to which cognition can be mediated by cultural ties. Dan 
Kahan (2010) advocates for two methods for minimising this effect and containing the 
polarisation that it causes: to present information in a way that affirms, rather than threatens 
people’s cultural values, and to present information and evidence in a way that it appears as 
though it vouched for by a diverse set of experts. I believe both of these claims have 
implications for content literacy, not least because disinformation tends to concentrate 
around controversial and politicised issues, but also because students will invariably enter 
the classroom with some set of beliefs and prejudices that they have acquired at home or 
elsewhere. For example, cultural cognition may cause conflict when students who were 
taught at home that climate change is a myth are now expected to critically dissect climate 
denial communications. 
Therefore, we need to ensure that that students hear from a variety of voices and be 
exposed to a variety of viewpoints as they grapple with acquiring critical literacy skills in 
controversial subject areas. When new information threatens your deeply held allegiances 
and commitments, it is natural to reject this information and imagine that an adversarial force 
is behind it, and to imagine that authority figures, like teachers, are surrogates of it. But this 
adversarial perception can be challenged by showing that convergence on controversial 
topics can transcend diverse world views. For example, you do not have to be a ‘cultural 
Marxist’ to support queer rights, and you do not have to be sympathetic to the practices of 
the pharmaceutical industry to know that vaccines do not cause autism. Moreover, Miranda 
Fricker (1998) has argued that experts, in addition to their epistemic credentials, must 
possess “indicator properties” (162-3). In other words, experts must successfully come 
across as experts to those they are communicating with. To combat the continued 
politicisation of knowledge, we must design our curricula in such a way to highlight not only 
the relevant indicator properties of cited experts, but also to highlight their diversity of 
 
34 A dog-whistle is a coded statement that is intended to be taken up by the target audience only, the same 
way an actual dog whistle produces a sound at such a frequency that it is only heard by dogs and not humans. 
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identities, and to dismantle existing narratives of conflict between different epistemic 
communities. 
The second pillar of my capability-based civic education is philosophy and debate. I 
argued that epistemic capability requires standing in the appropriate critical relationship with 
new information and with one’s own normative commitments. The critical skills associated 
with philosophy and debate can aid us in both of these goals, and they can be complementary 
to the skills gained from digital literacy above. We must teach students to construct, identify, 
assess, and formally refute arguments. This can be achieved with a multi-pronged approach.  
Philosophy lessons can function as an introduction to critical reasoning, equipping 
students with the basic skills of reading and assessing arguments. These lessons can vary 
considerably in their content. Schools with a strong historical and literary tradition may 
choose to design philosophy classes around historical thinkers like Plato and Aristotle. 
Alternatively, philosophy lessons could be light on historical texts and focus instead on 
deductive logic and argument construction. Perhaps instead of Socratic dialogues, students 
could instead read the speeches of politicians. Whatever the specific content, designing a 
philosophy curriculum around the core of critical reasoning skills would allow students to 
then use these in various applied contexts. 
Moderated discussions and formal debates can then be incorporated into the curricula 
of subjects whose content lends itself to justified disagreement, such as history, politics, 
literature, or psychology. I take disagreement to be justified if it there is some sort of rational 
merit in defending dissenting views. For example, there is rational merit in arguing the 
position that the fall of the Roman empire was due primarily to political corruption, rather 
than military or economic downturns, not least because this was a complex event with 
numerous causes, but because constructing and scrutinising an argument of this sort can be 
a useful exercise in organising a large amount of information. There is no rational merit, on 
the other hand, in arguing the position that the shape of the Earth is a flat disc, or that 
vaccinations cause autism. Taking an alternative side on the latter two questions would 
involve arguing in bad faith. Moderated discussions of the former kind would be a valuable 
exercise in the sorts of critical skills that I have argued are constitutive of epistemic 
capabilities in the political realm. And evidence shows that moderated discussions of current, 
controversial issues increase students’ knowledge of civic processes, their skills at engaging 
with other people, and their interest in politics (e.g., Kawashima-Ginsberg and Levine 2014 
cited in Crittenden and Levine, 2018).  
Third, we must strive to teach students an honest and depoliticised history of power 
relations. By ‘depoliticised history of power relations’, I mean a history of the exercise of 
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political power between state institutions and groups of individuals which is presented with 
as little ideological bias as possible.  
I qualify this third pillar with ‘strive’ because I realise what an arduous task this may 
turn out in practice, not least because of the tendency for polarisation around some political 
questions. For example, an explicit goal of the educational policies of many countries 
(including the UK’s) is to foster in students a sense of national identity. Such a goal will 
invariably come into conflict with my proposal if the latter involves exposing students to the 
ways in which national identities may be tied up with historical wrongdoings and abuses of 
power. For example, in 2019, The New York Times launched the 1619 Project, an 
educational initiative to reframe American history as a history centred around colonialism 
and slavery. This was met with fierce backlash from conservative politicians and 
commentators who saw it as an attack on the values and institutions at the heart of the country 
(Ellison, 2020). 
Conflicts like this are inevitable in the social world, so the educational goal of a 
depoliticised history of power will invariably become a site of extreme contestation. In such 
conflicts, we should, of course, take the side of truth, even if this is awkward or comes with 
a political cost. This may sound naïve to the reader, not least because such a claim relies on 
the assumption that it is possible to accurately separate what is true and what is ideological 
in the first place. For example, Michael Sandel (2020) has recently argued that the act of 
framing political facts itself is a political act. “Political debate,” he writes, “is often about 
how to identify and characterize the facts relevant to the controversy in question. Whoever 
succeeds in framing the facts is already a long way to winning the argument.” (Sandel, 2020: 
110). If we engage in this kind of reasoning, then it may not even be possible to speak of a 
depoliticised history of power, let alone strive to achieve it in practice.  
However, at the risk of starting an argument I may not be prepared to see to its end, I 
take it that Sandel’s argument overstates the phenomenon at hand. The framing of political 
facts is a political act, but that should not necessarily tie any inquiry into political facts to a 
kind of relativism about truth. We should be careful to extricate the truth values of claims 
from their political significance here. Moreover, if the principle we use for framing particular 
facts, say, as part of a supposedly neutral history of power relations, is a principle that is 
uncontroversial, or minimally controversial, then perhaps we can afford to bite the bullet on 
this. So, if we agree on a simple principle that distinguishes between legitimate use of power 
and illegitimate use of power (perhaps we appeal to consent or non-domination to motivate 
such a principle), and if we take this principle to be acceptable to a broad coalition of people, 
then the subsequent framing of facts using this principle need not be controversial. Or rather, 
it need not be so controversial to doom the very possibility of my proposal. I take it that it is 
162 
 
possible to formulate such a minimally controversial principle of legitimacy, although I leave 
open the content of such a principle. 
Whatever the specific criterion for deciding between legitimate and illegitimate use of 
power turns out to be, I believe it will have little practical bearing on the kinds of abuses of 
power we would want our education to speak about. For example, former imperial powers 
like the United Kingdom ought not to not shy away from teaching children about the role 
that enslavement and colonial exploitation has played in its history and in its present material 
wealth. Colonial history is often taught in a sanitised, even euphemistic fashion, which 
downplays the responsibility of colonial powers by framing key events as inevitable, or by 
erasing how these events affected the lived experiences of colonial subjects. We must 
reframe how events like this are rationalised. An honest history of power relations, therefore, 
must involve looking at how political power and authority was wielded over its subjects and 
how it affected their lives. History lessons should not shy away from inconvenient truths, 
and they cannot be made subservient to nationalistic norms. Otherwise, the history we teach 
younger generations absolves us of our wrongdoings, and it does very little to ensure such 
wrong doings are not considered legitimate tools of statecraft in the future. And, more 
relevantly for this chapter, it fails to teach students how they may negotiate political power 
exercised over them. 
I take it that this does not have to be a radical transformation to the way that history is 
already taught. The significant change I am proposing is a change in framing. Historians 
have access to an abundance of different sources for any given event, but which sources are 
selected to tell a particular story, especially in a classroom, involves a number of choices 
made by historians, authors, teachers, as well as those charged with designing the curriculum. 
For example, Soviet history textbooks framed the occupation of the Baltic states in 1941 as 
an act of international benevolence as it liberated them from occupying German forces, even 
though subsequent repressions resulted in the forcible deportation and execution of 
thousands of people (e.g., Pettai and Pettai, 2014:55). This is an extreme example of selective 
framing of facts, but arguably similar tendentious framing happens when colonial powers 
are framed as having agency and transformative aspirations for less developed nations who 
are framed as having little to no agency. I argue that the remedy for this is to frame these 
events in terms of power relations between institutions and people. Whether or not these 
relations were legitimate or justified is another question, arguably a more involved question, 
but the crux of my claim here is that the way we report these events in the first place must 
be free of tendentious framing and must instead be cognisant of how power was wielded and 
how this power was met.  
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Another way to correct ideological tendencies in teaching history would be to elevate 
the voices of marginalised and overlooked communities. For example, in 2018, Scotland 
became the first country to embed queer history in its teaching curriculum (Brooks, 2018), 
paving way for conversations about how power has been wielded over a community of 
people that had been all but invisible for most of history. Similarly elevating the experiences 
of ethnic minorities and women is necessary for understanding past injustices and the 
structures of power, as well as the choices of individuals that enabled them. 
The fourth pillar of my civic education proposal involves introducing an additional 
practical dimension to curricular changes – a service dimension. This would involve giving 
students the opportunity to participate in public life in some capacity outside of the 
classroom. This would not only equip them with the knowledge base of how political 
processes play out in the world, but also highlight the value of social capital in cooperative 
endeavours.  
There is much to be said in favour of this recommendation. The distinction between 
knowledge and skills I made in Section 2.1 suggests that there should be an experiential 
element in addition to traditional pedagogy. While students may learn how democratic 
processes work through civics and history classes and while they may learn the cognitive 
skills necessary for engaging in these processes through philosophy and debate, service 
learning may help them internalise these lessons in a way that will guide their behaviour as 
citizens. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that experiential and practical education is 
effective at inculcating the traits associated with civic learning (e.g., Damon, 2001 cited in 
Crittenden and Levine, 2018).  
This practical dimension can be realised in a number of ways. For example, younger 
students can attend tours of various public institutions or civil organisations to get a sense of 
the work they do, whereas older students could be encouraged to shadow people in various 
positions of civil work. If regular outings outside the classroom are too costly or there are 
other prohibitive reasons against them, such as distance, external speakers could be invited 
into the classroom to represent diverse voices from various parts of public life. This would 
also have the added benefit of exposing students to a diversity of cultural, religious, or 
ideological viewpoints. 
In closing, I take these four recommendations—content literacy, philosophy and 
debate, depoliticised history of power, and service learning—to be a promising starting point 
for thinking about devising a program of civic education that secures the capabilities that I 




6. Indoctrination (or Perfectionism in Education II) 
The educational proposal I have laid out is ambitious in scope. The reader will be forgiven 
for being a little puzzled at this point. I started this chapter with the intention of laying out a 
normatively thin, anti-perfectionist set of educational guidelines that would be consistent 
with the capabilitarian’s (and the anti-perfectionist liberal’s) belief in the primacy of freedom 
over impact. The claims that I have gone on to defend, however, look like they may be a lot 
more perfectionistic than what was originally intended. That is to say, the educational 
guidelines that I have laid out look like they may be picking out an array of objectively 
valuable functionings rather than capabilities, and thus overstepping the line that I have 
drawn for this project. 
The most direct way of articulating this objection would be to say that my proposal 
may amount to indoctrination. According to this objection, the proposal that I am defending 
would consist in compelling students to accept a number of claims that may be controversial 
and that they may have good reasons to reject. If it turned out that the proposal does in fact 
rely on the truth of controversial claims, according to this objection, it would make my 
proposal an illegitimate exercise of power. For example, Brenda Almond (1991) has argued 
that decisions concerning education ought “to the maximum possible extent be in the hands 
of the child’s own family” (Almond, 1991: 202). If my proposal runs counter to the freedom 
of parents to determine the ethical views of their children, then it can be argued to be 
inconsistent with respecting parental freedom, according to this objection. 
The position behind this objection is not uncontroversial. For example, Matthew 
Clayton (2006) argues that parental conduct should be regulated by the same restrictions as 
political conduct. Therefore, the permissibility of enrolling children into comprehensive 
views may have to pass the same threshold in parental conduct as it would have to in political 
conduct (Clayton, 2006: 94). Nonetheless, I respond to the to the stronger claim implicit in 
the objection above which assumes that enrolment can be wrong if it runs counter to the 
views of the parent. I do this in order to show that my proposal does not amount to 
comprehensive enrolment at all, and that parents in such a case would not have a claim 
against me even if we assume Almond’s position to be correct.  
It will be helpful to disambiguate between two ways the word ‘indoctrination’ can be 
used – an ordinary language usage and a more technical usage. According to an ordinary 
language usage, indoctrination is sometimes used as a pejorative term to refer to the act of 
teaching something that one has a strong disagreement with. According to this use of the 
word, a teacher may be accused of indoctrinating a child if she was to, for example, tell the 
child something that a parent disagrees with. For example, a parent may accuse biology 
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textbook authors of indoctrination if they were to acknowledge that gender is a social 
category, instead of a biological one, or if they were to dedicate space to talking about 
transgender identities. 
In autumn of 2020, the UK Government’s women and equalities minister Kemi 
Badenoch told the House of Commons that teaching students that white privilege exists in 
the UK as an uncontested fact would be illegal as it would run counter to neutrality and 
consist in indoctrination. She argued that schools should not openly support “the anti-
capitalist Black Lives Matter group” (Murray, 2020) – a group which she sees as being 
responsible for advocating this idea. She also added that a goal of the country’s education 
system is to give everyone “a sense of belonging within British culture” (ibid.) – a goal 
which, presumably, becomes harder to accomplish if we openly articulate critiques of said 
culture. 
I take both of the above examples of the use of indoctrination to be done in bad faith. 
Neither the parent with essentialist views on gender, nor Kemi Badenoch are primarily 
concerned with demonstrating that the claims in question are empirically false, or that their 
truth of the matter is not yet settled. If they were, both would have a much harder time 
arguing their case. Instead, they are primarily concerned with identifying the claims in 
question with some ideological movement which they have independent reason to be hostile 
to. And because the claims are, in some sense, associated with the ideological movement, 
they feel themselves entitled to dismiss the claims. Some anti-racism activists are also anti-
capitalist, and some biologists are progressive allies of the queer community. But these 
alliances are contingent, and at any rate, entirely irrelevant to the truth of the matter. Most 
biologists today contend that gender, unlike sex, is a socially constructed category (e.g., as 
evidenced by The World Health Organisation’s official communications) and claims of 
white privilege are empirically verifiable in absence of any kind of ideological underpinning. 
For example, a review by the Equality and Human Rights Commission35 in 2010 found that 
black people in the UK were up to six-times more likely to be stopped and searched by police 
than white people (EHRC, 2010). 
For this reason, I will not be concerned with considering whether any part of my 
proposal could be objected to in this kind of way. As we have seen, due to cultural cognition 
and other phenomena, people routinely politicise claims across a number of subject areas, 
and I take it would be sufficient here to simply refer to our best understanding of the facts 
 
35  The EHRC is a public, government-funded body, so it is unlikely to be formally associated with any 
renowned anti-capitalist groups. 
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of the matter to disarm any claims of supposed indoctrination on controversial educational 
proposals. 
However, there is a more interesting and more troubling way we could understand my 
proposal to amount to indoctrination. According to the more technical usage of the term, we 
can understand indoctrination to refer to enrolment into a conception of the good. According 
to this way of articulating the objection—which should be familiar from Chapter 4—my 
proposal either collapses into perfectionism or is virtually indistinguishable from it. The risk 
of collapse would entail the risk of conceding to the state a tremendous degree of power for 
controlling the normative behaviour of its citizens. As such, one may argue (and I do) that 
civic education should avoid promoting controversial value claims.  
This latter reading of indoctrination would consist of compelling students to accept 
controversial normative claims, such as claims relating to one’s conceptions of the good. 
Suppose a religious education teacher was tasked with teaching her class about all of the 
religions of the world, but she designed her lessons in such a way to give an unfair advantage 
to the religion she herself subscribes to, say, Swedish Lutheranism. Suppose she would 
explicitly profess the truth of Swedish Lutheranism and also denigrate all other religions. By 
doing this, she would be compelling her students to accept a comprehensive world view. 
Unlike in the example case above, parents of these students would have a legitimate claim 
to make against her. The truth of religious teachings is not an empirical matter, and parents 
would arguably have the right to make these kinds of enrolment decisions themselves 
(assuming we endorse Almond’s view above). 
Understanding indoctrination in this way, is my educational proposal guilty of it? Does 
it involve compelling students to accept the truth of controversial normative claims such that 
dissenting parents would have a legitimate case against it? In a sense, it appears that it does. 
I am, after all, arguing that students should be taught to stand in specific kinds of relations 
with new information, their normative commitments, as well as with other people.  
In order to finally lay this objection to rest, I will restate a familiar claim and use that 
to formulate a more ambitious one – that my proposal, in fact, provides a more attractive 
account of civic education than popular virtue-based views of political participation which 
rely on claims about the good that are considerably more controversial than the one I defend. 
The conception of individual autonomy that underlies my capability approach, and this 
educational proposal in turn, is normatively thin. In Chapter 3, I argued that autonomy is 
constituted by the possession of a list of agentic competencies, such as self-reflection and 
imagination. These competencies are consistent with a vast array of normative choices. This 
makes the possession of autonomy consistent with a vast array of life choices – including 
ones that, on the face of it, look like they may be inimical to the very idea of autonomy. This 
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means that when we defend practices on the basis that they have the potential of promoting 
individual autonomy, we are not making normatively controversial claims with the intention 
of shoehorning individuals into living lives of, say, detachment or freedom from others or 
creative expression. We are saying instead that these practices equip people with  
competencies that they may use for any purpose they wish – even if that purpose is to 
denounce those very same competencies and choose not to exercise them. 
In other words, the extent to which I have to bite the bullet on the claims in this chapter 
being controversial is already the extent to which I have bitten the bullet in previous chapters 
to argue that autonomy is the justifying principle of liberal institutions and liberal justice. 
All the purportedly controversial claims that render my proposal indoctrination in this 
chapter—critical agentic skills, relations of care and respect and non-domination and so on—
have already been established as constituents of the account of individual autonomy that I 
argued is at the heart of this entire project. Moreover, I have also shown that these claims 
can be defended in a way that is consistent with anti-perfectionism. This is because I do not 
take any of them to compel individuals toward specific kinds of content-specific choices. 
The difficult argumentative concessions made in previous sections have the fortunate 
consequence that there is nothing further needed here: the key claims have already been 
made and justified. 
There is more I can say now, however, to disarm this objection. Recall from the start 
of this chapter that the educative goals I am proposing are phrased as capabilities, that is, as 
opportunities for individuals to do things they value, understood as autonomously exercising 
choice across a range of domains of well-being. Therefore, capabilities with which we have 
been concerned in this chapter—relational and epistemic capabilities—refer to opportunities 
in those domains. If individuals choose not to act on these opportunities, justice does not 
require use to compel them to. For this reason, I take it that the educational proposal I am 
defending is perfectly consistent with the goals of liberalism and do not entail a problematic 
kind of indoctrination.  
However, the same perhaps could not be said about civic education that is phrased in 
the language of virtues, which tends to be the traditional currency in discussions of civic 
education and political participation (e.g., Dagger, 2002). Virtues are perfectionist insofar as 
they refer to the habitual exercise of objectively valuable actions, and they are content-
specific insofar as they pick out specific ways of being and doing. Moreover, virtues are 
stable character traits, the possession of which is argued to be essential for the discharge of 
whatever civic duty that is associated with them. Political capabilities, on the other hand are 
freedoms to participate in the political sphere in whatever capacity the individual chooses to. 
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I take it that this proposal, in fact, provides a more attractive account of civic education than 
civic education proposals which trade in virtue. 
One immediate problem with this kind of qualification is that it may in effect run 
counter to my ambitions. Perhaps it is not merely sufficient to equip individuals with the 
necessary capabilities for resisting deception and alienation. Perhaps we have to encourage 
that these capabilities be routinely exercised to actually prevent and contain the problems 
with which I have been concerned in this chapter. To revisit the metaphor from Section 2.1, 
what good is an epistemic immune system if it is not continuously tested by being put to use 
on real epistemic bugs and viruses? Perhaps we do have to cultivate a normative allegiance 
to the kinds of behaviours I have mentioned in this chapter. This would, in effect, entail 
rejecting the ‘standard move’ from Chapter 1, which is an argumentative move that attempts 
to defend the neutrality of capabilities in absence of their normative content by pitching 
capabilities as freedoms and allowing space for non-participation. I cannot answer this 
question here. However, even if a capability-based intervention in curbing 
disenfranchisement and alienation will indeed turn out too weak in practice, I take it that 
aiming at capabilities may still be all that we can do from the standpoint of justice. Whatever 
benefits we could gain from fostering the kind of normative allegiance I am gesturing at here 
may turn out to pale in comparison to the cost of allowing states to meddle into the normative 
behaviour of their citizens. So, if we take state overreach to be a formidable problem for 
legitimacy, a capability approach might be the better approach we have for tackling 
injustices which alienate and disenfranchise people, even if it is an imperfect approach in 




This chapter has critically examined a way that the capability approach to justice can be 
applied to civic education in order to formulate educative interventions to tackling problems 
associated with the intentional and unintentional exclusion of individuals from various 
political processes. I outlined two capabilities which I argued are particularly significant in 
the political domain—epistemic and relational capabilities—and I argued that they play an 
essential role in resisting disenfranchisement and alienation. I then formulated four practical 
suggestions for primary and secondary education curricula that could help strengthen these 
capabilities in practice. Finally, I looked at an objection to my proposal which states that it 
would involve an unacceptable kind of indoctrination. I argued that this proposal need not 
consist in indoctrination, and the only values it presupposes are already the values that I have 
argued in this thesis should be foundational to our best account of justice.   
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Summary and Concluding Remarks 
In this thesis, I have proposed and motivated a novel kind of capability approach to 
distributive justice. I started the thesis by identifying a troubling kind of tension in 
Nussbaum’s capability approach. While it is committed to an interpretation of liberal theory 
which allows its claims to trade in prescriptions of political morality only, it seems to 
overstep this boundary by advancing prescriptions that cut across several areas of individual 
life. For this reason, I argued that Nussbaum’s capability approach finds itself in an awkward 
position which straddles a divide in liberal theory. I argued that such an inconsistent 
capability approach is impracticable and may lead to inconsistent application of laws. 
I then argued that this tension suggests a kind of dilemma: in order to remove the 
capability approach from the awkward position it finds itself in, it might seem prudent for it 
to either double down on a robust principle of neutrality or to embrace a liberally 
perfectionist conception of political morality. As it happens, neither of these options is 
particularly attractive for an account of justice. The move toward neutrality robs the 
capability approach of its normative strength in delivering justice to the world’s most 
disadvantaged people. Political liberalism overestimates the extent to which uncoerced 
individual actions are free. A principle of autonomy is, therefore, needed to adjudicate 
whether individuals enjoy effective freedom or not. On the other hand, the move toward 
liberal perfectionism fails too as it has the implication of disrespecting individuals. Perhaps 
such a move would also add fuel to those critics of Nussbaum who accuse her of attempting 
to export cultural imperialism to the developing world. But then again, I suppose my 
proposal may be vulnerable to the same kind of critique. I also suppose such critics would 
be wrong for they would be misunderstanding what autonomy means. 
By clarifying the neutralist-perfectionist divide in liberalism and referring to Quong’s 
(2011) taxonomy of liberal theory, I was able to claim that this dilemma is only an apparent 
one. This suggested an alternative move into reconciling the normative tension of the 
capability approach – by realigning the approach with an interpretation of liberalism known 
as comprehensive anti-perfectionism. I argued that we should understand capabilities to be 
normatively justified by the value of individual autonomy – the capacity of individuals to 
lead their own lives by making decisions about value and fashioning appropriate responses 
to the social relations they stand in. The particular nature of this claim, in turn, entails a 
presumption toward anti-perfectionism, which is a principle that I argued Nussbaum and 
other capabilitarians ought to endorse in order to formulate a principle for legitimate 
interventions in people’s decision-making. Namely, the principle of anti-perfectionism 
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means that public authorities cannot act in ways to promote or denigrate some individuals’ 
reasonable conceptions of the good, and that the extent to which they can interfere in 
individuals’ decision-making is outlined by state’s duty to promote and uphold individuals’ 
autonomy – a capacity that I conceptualised as a meta-capability, or a capability to pursue 
and exercise other capabilities.  
This cleared the way for me to develop a two-step capability approach to justice. Its 
first step—which takes lexical priority over the second—requires states to secure individuals 
with the meta-capability of making autonomous judgement about their plans of life. The 
second step of this proposal requires states to provide individuals with a sufficient threshold 
of adequate opportunities across six domains of well-being.  
I also argued that this reimagined capability approach to justice can allow us to make 
sense of social practices as conversion factors and their subsequent effects on individual 
volition and capabilities. I argued that the socially relational conception of autonomy I 
endorse can help us identify social practices which we ought to protect, and social practices 
which we ought to strive to dismantle. I showed that this task will involve substantially more 
than merely passing and upholding laws. It will involve coaxing some individuals out of 
unhealthy relationships, and reforming social practices in a way that enables people to 
challenge unjust norms. I pointed out that this move also bridges the gap between distributive 
and relational approaches to justice. I take it this could be an avenue for exciting future work.  
In the final part of this thesis, I applied the capability approach to education and argued 
that my account of capability justice has practical implications for education policy. In 
particular, I argued that we can promote capabilities, as well as autonomy, through a number 
of educational means. I argued that this can be done while retaining the principle of anti-
perfectionism. I then tested these claims with a case study of civic education which aspires 
to prevent and mitigate the effects of various contemporary phenomena, such as fake news, 
conspiracy theory uptake, and propaganda. I argued that people’s political capabilities can 
be promoted with an educational program that teaches them a set of relevant skills, gives 
them a baseline knowledge base, and teaches them how to enter into healthy and valuable 
social relationships. 
One of the main tasks that this thesis undertook, above the ones I have already 
mentioned here, was defending comprehensive anti-perfectionism as an attractive and 
compelling interpretation of liberal political morality. This task involved defending it from 
various critics who see it as incoherent, unstable, or involving a kind of subordination of 
those who dissent from the comprehensive doctrine endorsed by the state. I argued 
throughout this thesis that the transformative aspirations of the capability approach are best 
delivered with an approach to justice which holds at its core a specific and demanding 
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conception of individual autonomy. Moreover, I argued there need not be anything 
incoherent about a liberal state which promotes autonomy while refraining to promote first-
order claims about moral value. I reiterated this claim specifically in the context of my 
education proposal by arguing that it can be shown not to involve an indoctrination of a 
problematic kind.  
When we think about the demands of justice, we ought to begin by asking – what are 
people capable of doing and being? Are they succeeding in what they have set out to do? As 
we have seen, these questions are not easy ones, and the specific variables that we would 
need to understand in order to answer them are not easy to measure. Every opportunity that 
an individual gives herself or forgoes exists within a complex social web of meanings and 
expectations that may impact the extent to which she was free to choose. The things that 
people are capable of doing and being, therefore, cannot be formulated in a way that is 
ignorant about this social web. This suggests that capabilities have to be understood as 
expressions of people’s autonomous judgement. Governments all around the world must, 
therefore, give themselves the task of promoting autonomy in its various expressions in 
human life. Only by doing so will they be able to secure individuals with the capabilities 
needed to live well.   
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